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The Hilmer report (1993) sought to recommend a consistent national approach to 
encourage greater competition in the Australian economy. One of the ways it sought 
to do this was to remove any competitive advantages government-owned businesses 
might have by way of any tax advantages.1 These competitive advantages needed to 
be removed in order to achieve competitive neutrality - a market whereby all firms 
compete on a level playing field and are subject to the same rules and regulations 
regardless of their ownership. This aim to achieve competitive neutrality between 
public and private businesses paved the way for the formation of the National Tax 
Equivalent Regime (NTER). 
The National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER) is an administrative inter-
governmental arrangement under which, for competitive neutrality purposes, the 
Federal income tax laws are notionally applied to listed governmental business 
entities owned by the State and Territories as if they were subject to those laws. The 
resulting NTER tax is a liability owed and paid by these entities directly to their 
owner State and Territory Governments – it does not form part of the actual Federal 
income tax base as it would for privately owned companies. Apart from some 
specific modifications, NTER entities are treated in the same way as their federal 
counterparts. For example, an NTER entity is required to lodge income tax returns, 
make quarterly or monthly PAYG instalment payments, is subject to audit or other 
compliance assurance activities by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), has the 
ability to seek private rulings, and is subject to interest and penalty charges in the 
same manner applicable to privately owned organisations.2 
The follow up to the Hilmer Report, the Competition Policy Review Final Report 
(“The Harper Review”), was released on 31 March 2015. Competitive neutrality 
formed one of the critical competition topics covered in this report. The NTER was 
mentioned in several of the submissions but none called for a sizeable sweeping 
reform of the system currently in place, nor was it suggested in any of the 
recommendations of the Final Report. It does not appear that the findings or 
recommendations of the Competition Policy Review will have any impact on the 
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structure or administration of the NTER. The recommendations relating to 
competitive neutrality included: 
• Recommendation 15: a review of competitive neutrality policies by the 
proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy; 
• Recommendation 16: greater transparency and effectiveness surrounding the 
competitive neutrality complaints process; and 
• A requirement for annual reports to include a statement on compliance with 
competitive neutrality principles.3 
The objective of this research is to determine whether the National Tax Equivalent 
Regime achieved its goal of encouraging competitive neutrality. 
Key findings 
The key findings of the research were that, while the NTER did contribute to its goal 
of encouraging competitive neutrality, there were a number of areas, both within the 
tax law and within the regime, which resulted in both advantages and disadvantages 
when the private and public sector were compared. The NTER entities had a number 
of advantages and disadvantages over their privately-owned counterparts. 
A comparison of tax paid between NTER entities and their privately-owned 
counterparts found that NTER entities typically paid more tax. In addition, compared 
to their privately-owned counterparts, the NTER entities studied had higher liabilities 
compared to total equity, paid a higher rate of interest (when interest paid was 
compared to total borrowings), paid more dividends, and had a lower ratio of 
expenses to each dollar earned. 
A case study considered the effect of the removal of the NTER, and instead 
increasing the amount of dividend paid to Treasury. It was found that doing so would 
increase the return on assets, net profit margin and earnings per share ratios increased 
on average 32.65% for those companies studied, with the majority increasing in the 
vicinity of 40 - 43%. If compared to a privately-owned entity, this advantage would 
be material. 
                                               
3
 Commonwealth of Australia, Competition Policy Review Final Report, (2015) 50-51. 
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Further, a comparison of the tax allowance provided by the price regulator to the tax 
paid was studied to determine whether the tax allowance would be a suitable and 
more efficient substitute for the NTER. It was found that the tax allowance would not 
be an adequate substitute for a tax equivalent regime.  
The comparison of the tax allowance to the tax paid has been the subject of a review 
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This chapter provides an overview of the thesis, including the central research 
questions and the six objectives addressed in order to answer the research questions. 
The chapter provides a brief background of the area studied and why this research is 
a significant contribution. It goes on further to provide an outline of research method, 
and a summary of the chapters in this thesis.  
1.2 Objectives 
The central objectives of this research are: 
1. To evaluate how effective a tool the National Tax Equivalent Regime 
(NTER) is in achieving competitive neutrality, and 
2. Whether other methods could be more effective. 
In order to address the objectives, the thesis: 
1. Provides an outline and history of the NTER and competitive neutrality; 
2. Defines what is meant by “competitive neutrality” in this context; 
3. Identifies alternative tools to achieve competitive neutrality and examines 
whether they were also subject to variation from State to State due to 
differences arising from the workings of each State’s Treasury; 
4. Examines a different existing regulatory structure and the impact it has on 
competitive neutrality; 
5. Determines why tax was the policy used to achieve competitive neutrality in 
this circumstance; and 
6. Examines whether or not another tool (instead of tax) could have been more 




1.3.1 The National Competition Policy and competitive neutrality 
The economic concept of efficiency is a significant social goal as it aims to ensure 
maximum economic surplus.4 Briefly, efficiency occurs when the allocation of 
resources achieves the maximum output possible. Competition policy plays a 
substantial role in encouraging efficiency.5 However, there is evidence that a 
competitive market will not always encourage efficiency. This will be further 
examined in section 2.11.4. 
The need for a national competition policy arose because government-owned entities 
can have both competitive and economic advantages over their privately-owned 
counterparts. These advantages include, for example: exemption from taxation and 
charges; government guarantee on debts; lower interest rates on loans; and no 
requirement to achieve a commercial rate of return on assets.6 Further commercial 
advantages of government ownership can include cross-subsidisation, protection 
from bankruptcy, and favourable regulatory conditions.7 
Where a government-owned entity has a net advantage over its privately owned 
counterparts, it can set its prices below private-sector rivals, even though it is not 
necessarily more efficient in its operations than those entities.8 This means that 
public sector entities which have advantages over private sector entities might be 
able to undercut private sector entities because of a reduced cost of production 
resulting from these advantages, and possibly put up a barrier to entry for potential 
competitors.9 In other words, the government-owned entity can use the advantages 
by virtue of its ownership to be able to price privately owned entities out of the 
market where those entities may, in effect, have been more efficient than the 
government-owned entity. 
                                               
4
 Ben S. Bernanke, Nilss Olekalns and Robert H. Frank, Principles of Macroeconomics (McGraw-
Hill, 2nd ed, 2008) 29. 
5
 Philip Clarke and Stephen Corones, Competition Law and Policy: Cases & Materials (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 14. 
6
 National Competition Council, National Competition Policy, (1993) 296. 
7
 Zahirul Hoque and Jodie Moll, ‘Public sector reform: Implications for accounting, accountability 
and performance of state-owned entities – an Australian perspective’ (2001) 14(4) The International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 304, 310. 
8
 National Competition Council, above n 6, 297. 
9
 The Treasury, Australian Government National Competition Policy Report 2005-07, (2007) 46. 
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However, there are also disadvantages associated with being a government-owned 
entity. These disadvantages include: greater accountability obligations; requirements 
to provide various community service obligations; and a greater superannuation 
expense.10 Further disadvantages of government ownership can include government 
control over employee matters (including wages and industrial relations matters) and 
the management and running of the organisation.11 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
recommends that the best way to implement a competitive neutrality framework is by 
starting with an evaluation of current legislation and administration in which the 
state-owned entities operate, and then to make changes that will attempt to have 
those entities operating in the same legislative and administrative environment as 
privately-owned entities. This is important in order to be able to compare the costs of 
the public and private sectors.12 
The principle of competitive neutrality, therefore, requires that “government owned 
businesses competing with private sector businesses should compete on the same 
footing: business activities of government owned bodies should not enjoy any net 
competitive advantage simply as a result of their public-sector ownership.”13 This 
includes making both government owned businesses and privately-owned entities 
subject to the same taxation and regulatory regimes. 
In October 1992, the then Prime Minister, Paul Keating, formed a Committee of 
Inquiry whose task it was to formulate a national competition policy. Headed by 
Professor Frederick Hilmer, National Competition Policy (‘The Hilmer Report’) was 
released in 1993.14 The policy sought to implement a consistent national approach to 
encourage greater competition in the Australian economy. One of the ways it sought 
to do this was to attempt to remove any competitive advantage government owned 
businesses might have by way of any tax advantages.15 
                                               
10
 National Competition Council, above n 6, 297. The Enterprise Agreements for public sector entities 
frequently require contributions in excess of the superannuation guarantee rate. 
11
 Hoque and Moll, above n 7, 310. 
12
 OECD, State owned enterprises and the principle of competitive neutrality, (2009) 326. 
13
 Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic), Guide to National Competition Policy, above n 1, 19. 
14
 National Competition Council, above n 6, v. 
15
 Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic), Guide to National Competition Policy, above n 1, 3. 
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The Hilmer Report (1993) made recommendations regarding the implementation of a 
national competition policy in Australia. At the time, the intended result was that the 
removal of any net competitive advantages enjoyed by government owned 
businesses, and the levelling of the playing field would result in a fair market 
environment and improved efficiency and productivity.16 
However, two important points need to be made here. Firstly, the introduction of 
competitive neutrality does not mean that all government owned entities need to be 
privatised, although that course of action is an option which will be examined further 
in this thesis. The push is not for privatisation of government owned entities, but 
rather only for corporatisation. Privatisation results from the government’s 
relinquishment of its assets or businesses, usually through sale to the private sector. 
Corporatisation involves the structuring of government businesses into corporations, 
similar to those which are privately owned. It entails implementing a similar legal 
and management structure as the private sector17 and requires the corporatised entity 
to operate as a commercial entity.18 It seeks to imitate private sector conditions while 
retaining government ownership.19 Corporatisation is one of the methods required 
under competitive neutrality as it can remove a state-owned business’ net 
competitive advantage.20 Corporatisation is discussed further in section 3.2.1. 
Secondly, outsourcing of government operations is not required in order for an entity 
to comply with the competitive neutrality guidelines. The only thing that is required 
is for government owned corporations to be managed and run as competitively as the 
private sector.21 The difference between privatisation, corporatisation, and 
outsourcing is examined in section 3.2. 
Hamilton and Denniss assert that one of the main aims of the National Competition 
Policy (NCP) is to produce goods and services at a lower cost, especially those goods 
                                               
16
 Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic), Competitive Neutrality Policy Victoria, (2000) 4. 
17
 Stephen Bottomley, ‘Government business enterprises and public accountability through 
Parliament’ (Research Paper No18, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2000). y 
18
 Queensland Treasury, National Competition Policy Implementation in Queensland: Competitive 




 Government of Western Australia, Policy Statement on Competitive Neutrality, (Perth: WA 
Treasury, 1996) 12. http://www.finance.wa.gov.au/cms/uploadedFiles/Economic_Reform/policy-on-
competitive-neutrality.pdf.  
21
 The Treasury, Australian Government National Competition Policy Report 2005-07, above n 9, 49. 
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and services produced by government owned entities.22 They argue that because 
public companies produce essential services that are then used by industry to produce 
other goods and services, then it will automatically follow that a reduction in costs 
and improvement in efficiency of these public sector entities will have a flow-on 
effect and be of more significant benefit to the economy.23 Hamilton and Denniss 
believe that the outcome of this will result in an overall lower price for the final 
product, an increase in exports, and an increase in employment.24 One needs to 
consider at this point whether the introduction of the NCP was the appropriate way to 
achieve this, or whether there might have been other more appropriate methods of 
achieving these outcomes. 
1.3.2 Alternative tools available to achieve competitive neutrality 
There are a number of different tools used to achieve the ultimate objective of 
competitive neutrality. These tools include taxation neutrality, debt neutrality, rate of 
return requirements, regulatory neutrality, and full cost pricing principles25 explained 
in chapter 3, and aspects of which will be expanded in the case studies in chapters 5 
and 6. 
The focus of this study is taxation neutrality, in particular, the NTER. The NTER 
was selected for this study because it has not been the subject of any detailed study in 
the past and therefore this research seeks to make a substantial contribution to the 
literature in this area. It was also selected because of ease of access to the relevant 
information.26 
This study will focus on two case studies: a monopoly (for example, water) and an 
industry with competition from the private sector (for example, electricity). Looking 
at a monopoly will allow the research to consider whether there is a need for a 
monopoly to be subject to the NTER, especially since NTER entities which are in a 
naturally monopolistic market are usually subject to price regulation. The role of 
pricing regulators is to set prices based on the most efficient use of resources. 
                                               
22
 Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss, ‘Generating emissions? The impact of microeconomic reform 
on the electricity industry’ (2001) 20(3) Journal of Applied Economics and Policy 15, 24. 
23
 Claire Thomas, ‘Why national competition policy?’(1996) 55(2) Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 100, 100. 
24
 Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss, above n 22. 
25
 The Treasury, Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement, (1996) 13-14. 
26
 Note that the author has access to policy documents and manuals that may not be readily available 
to the broader community. 
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Looking at the electricity industry will enable a comparison between publicly and 
privately-owned entities. Also, since the electricity industry has its own pricing 
regulator, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), this will eliminate any potential 
problems caused by differences arising as a result of differences between pricing 
regulators, as is the case in the water industry, where state-based pricing regulators 
regulate water utilities. 
1.3.3 The National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER) 
As a result of the recommendations of The Hilmer Report, the Tax Equivalent 
Regime (TER) was introduced in the early to mid-1990s. The TER was introduced to 
ensure that government owned entities would be subject to paying tax equivalents. 
The TER was a Tax Equivalent Regime which was set and administered by each 
State, and which varied in its form and application from State to State – there was no 
one consistent method of application. Subsequently, in 2001, the National Tax 
Equivalent Regime (NTER) was introduced. Both regimes are still in operation and 
have the same objectives, being that they seek to tax government owned entities in 
the same or a similar manner that privately-owned entities are taxed, thereby 
removing any advantage that government owned entities had previously enjoyed by 
virtue of not having to pay any tax. Despite having the same objectives, they do have 
their differences. The NTER is administered nationally by the Australian Taxation 
Office and is based on the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997. On the other hand, TERs use an Accounting Profit Model to 
derive the taxable income and subsequent tax payable and are administered by each 
State’s Office of State Revenue.27 
This section provides a brief background of how the National Tax Equivalent 
Regime (NTER) operates in practice. 
The NTER is an administrative arrangement between the Federal and State 
governments under which the Federal income tax laws are notionally applied to 
selected government business entities owned by the State and Territories as if they 
were subject to those laws. This is done with the aim of achieving competitive 
neutrality. The resulting NTER tax is a liability owed and paid by these entities 
directly to the Owner State and Territory Governments – it does not form part of the 
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actual Federal income tax base. Apart from some specific modification, NTER 
entities are treated in the same way as privately-owned corporations. For example, 
NTER entities are required to lodge income tax returns, make quarterly or monthly 
PAYG instalment payments, are subject to audit and/or other compliance assurance 
activities by the Australian Taxation Office, have the ability to seek private rulings 
and are subject to penalties and interest charges.28 In order for an entity to be part of 
the NTER, the owner State or Territory must nominate the entity for inclusion into 
the NTER. Any government owned entities that are not subject to the NTER are 
automatically governed by their respective State’s TER, unless an exemption from 
paying tax equivalent has been granted. 
Any tax payments required to be made by the State-owned corporation as a result of 
tax obligations arising from the operation of the NTER are to be paid to the State 
Treasury of the State-owned corporation. The same State or Territory Treasury that 
benefits from the taxes paid by the NTER entity also owns that State-owned 
corporation. This means that the State-owned corporation pays both a tax and a 
dividend to its shareholder – the State or Territory Treasury. It could be argued that 
paying both tax and a dividend to the same entity is creating unnecessary 
administrative burdens. 
1.3.4 The need for tax neutrality 
Unfortunately, government owned corporations cannot be subject to an identical tax 
system as the private sector. For constitutional reasons29, the only way to subject the 
government owned corporation to a tax system similar to the private sector is through 
the payment of tax equivalents instead of actual taxation. Tax equivalent payments 
should closely mirror the system under which the private sector pays taxes.30 
However, the tax system that governs tax equivalents will not exactly mirror that of 
the tax system that governs the payment of tax by the private sector. One might 
question whether the differences in the two systems have resulted in an advantage to 
either the private sector or the public sector. It has already been indicated that not all 
the advantages that come with government ownership can be removed through the 
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introduction of a competition policy. This research will look at whether any 
advantages still exist, or whether there have been disadvantages to state-owned 
corporations through the operation of the NTER. 
A concern relating to the implementation of competitive neutrality is that tax is not 
considered to play a significant enough role in competition policy and is mostly 
ignored or seen to be of lesser importance when compared to other tools which are 
used to achieve competitive neutrality. Freebairn believes that different taxation 
policy options are considered to be of secondary importance on competition.31 
Furthermore, when considering the taxation issue of public-private partnerships, 
Lehman and Tregoning believe that although tax is a large feature of regulation, it 
attracts very little consideration in most texts and studies on the matter.32 Although 
tax is rarely the subject of any considered study, taxation can stand in the way of 
achieving social goals and infrastructure development.33 
There is a benefit to having a tax neutrality regime in place. A study undertaken by 
Sadiq and Richardson compared tax-paying entities to charities. Charities are 
exempted from tax in Australia. It was found that some charities carry on 
commercial business activities that put them in direct competition with other 
taxpaying entities. Having a tax advantage enabled those charities to produce the 
same product as the taxpaying entities but at a lower cost, and not necessarily more 
efficiently. This compromised the consistency and integrity of the taxation regime.34 
In applying the results of this study to the tax neutrality of publicly owned 
corporations compared to privately owned corporations, one can conclude that the 
integrity of the taxation regime can also be considered compromised if public 
corporations are not taxed in at least a similar manner to privately owned 
corporations. 
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This research aims to examine whether the NTER has been effective35, if and how it 
has altered the manner in which business is conducted within the NTER entities, and 
whether it has contributed to the goal of competitive neutrality. In addition to 
examining the NTER entities, comparison will also be made between NTER entities 
and private entities in the same industry. For example, comparing two electricity 
suppliers, one of which is in the NTER and the other which is privately owned; and 
comparing whether the NTER entity had to become more competitive and efficient 
as a result of the introduction of the NTER and the effect on the industry as a result 
of the introduction of the NTER. 
1.3.5 Other considerations 
1.3.5.1 Monopolies 
It is believed that the mere threat of competition can result in improved efficiency.36 
This is the rationale for the inclusion of monopolies in competitive neutrality 
measures and the reason that monopolies are subject to tax equivalent regimes. There 
may be no room in the market for actual competition due to the nature of the 
industry; however, just having legislation that does not prevent any competition and 
leaves an opening for potential competitors to enter the market is enough to achieve 
competition goals.37 Therefore, the threat of potential competition, no matter how 
unlikely, should lead to the monopoly becoming more efficient and, as such, result in 
lower prices. 
1.3.5.2 Pricing regulators 
State and industry differences can arise as a result of pricing regulators. Pricing 
regulators set the maximum price that a business can charge for its output. Price 
regulators usually operate in industries which are subject to a natural monopoly. The 
main reason for regulating prices in monopoly industries (for example, energy, 
water, railways) is to stop organisations in a monopoly market from abusing their 
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market power and thereby removing deadweight loss.38 Deadweight loss, or 
allocative inefficiency, occurs when the marginal cost of each good does not equal 
the marginal benefit that consumers derive from that good. Throughout Australia, 
there is one national pricing regulator and several state pricing regulators. The 
process and method which is used to calculate the prices businesses can charge varies 
from regulator to regulator.39 Therefore, when comparing an industry without its own 
price regulator, it can be expected that the price charged per unit of output can vary 
throughout the different States of Australia. This could advantage some entities over 
other equivalent entities in different States. This is further examined in chapter 6: 
Price regulation, the Tax Allowance and Actual Tax Payable. 
1.3.5.3 State Treasuries and dividend policies 
State Treasuries each set their own policies relating to the setting of dividends. The 
Financial Distribution Policy ‘requires Government businesses to determine an 
appropriate distribution policy based on a ‘modified’ residual approach.’40 Using this 
approach, a dividend “would be paid only if there were retained earnings left over 
after the firm has financed all investment projects capable of generating acceptable 
returns.”41 This policy enables Government businesses to agree on dividend targets 
and capital repayments. 
This could impact the extent to which the NTER has achieved competitive neutrality 
given that, State-by-State, the approach to taxation might be different depending on 
how the dividend is calculated, or whether the entity can expect to receive any tax 
refunds due to it. For example, an entity might be more diligent in applying 
favourable tax positions if it paid a set dividend when compared to an entity that paid 
a dividend that was set as a percentage of post-tax profits. Also, if the State Treasury 
decided not to refund tax, an NTER entity might not be as driven to minimise tax 
beyond a certain point. This is discussed in further detail in section 4.3.1. 
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1.3.5.4 The Competition Policy Review  
There have been many changes in the Australian economy and many technological 
and business advances since the Hilmer Report and the introduction of the National 
Competition Policy. The primary drivers of change in the Australian economy over 
the last twenty years have been: 
• The growth of emerging economies, including Asia, which has provided new 
opportunities for Australian business to supply these growing markets; 
• The aging population, which has seen a growth in health and aged care needs. 
Providing choice and a competitive health sector enables individuals to better 
meet their health care needs; 
• Rapidly developing new technologies which existing competition policy does 
not adequately cover.42 
At the time of the release of the Hilmer Report, global competition was new to 
Australia and technology was not as advanced. With the advances in technology and 
greater availability of information, competition policy and competition law needed to 
be reviewed and updated to reflect these changes. 
On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and Minister for Small Business 
announced that there would be a review of the competition policy.43 It had been 
twenty years since the Hilmer Report, and the Government decided that it was time 
to re-examine the role of competition in the economy and update the competition 
policy for all the changes that had occurred in the past twenty years. This review was 
referred to as a “Hilmer Mark II” review. The review was intended to be a “root and 
branch” review with the aim of examining current laws and the competition 
framework with the long-term view of increasing productivity and efficiency. It was 
hoped that the review would uncover means by which to improve the economy, 
create more jobs and encourage investment. It was hoped the result would be a rise in 
the living standards in Australia. 
The review was led by Professor Ian Harper and supported by a Review Panel (“The 
Panel”). 
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The Competition Policy Review Final Report was released on 31 March 2015. 
Elements of this report, which will be discussed in further detail in the following 
chapter, include: 
• Competition policy 
• The establishment of a new national competition body, the Australian 
Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) 
• Competition payments 
• Competitive neutrality 
• Competitive neutrality complaints; and 
• Infrastructure. 
1.4 Significance 
The research will add considered analysis to an area that has been in operation for 
over 15 years but has not, as yet, ever been the subject of any detailed analysis 
concerning its effectiveness. In the past, questions regarding the effectiveness of the 
NTER have been raised in Parliament, but no definite answer was able to be given. 
This research will be the first of its kind focusing on the NTER and will offer the 
Australian Taxation Office and State Treasury either reassurance that the system is 
working well, or it may highlight areas that need to be improved in order for the 
regime to achieve its goal of competitive neutrality. 
Furthermore, this research adds considerable literature to the Australian Energy 
Regulator’s (AER) review of the tax allowance and the tax paid. The AER 
commenced a review into why the regulated privatised electricity networks were 
paying less tax than the tax allowed by the AER in its pricing models, and why the 
state-owned electricity network businesses were paying more tax than allowed for by 
the AER in its tax allowance as part of its price determinations. Since this thesis 
examines whether the tax allowance could be a substitute to the tax equivalent 
regime, and closely examines the reasons for differences between tax paid and tax 
allowed by the price regulators, research conducted was used in submissions to the 
AER’s Review of Regulatory Tax Approach. This is an area of current public policy 
debate at a time when electricity prices are at an all-time high. At the time of writing, 
this review is ongoing, and aspects of the comparison of tax paid to tax allowance 
will be an area for further research. 
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1.5 Research methods 
Doctrinal research has been described as “research which provides a systematic 
exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship 
between the rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future 
developments.”44 McKerchar states that doctrinal research is most useful in 
determining the definition of a legal scenario in accordance with legal positivism.45 
Legal positivism involves identifying, analysing, organising and synthesising 
statutes, and decisions of the court as is required by “black letter of the law” 
research.46 
This research was conducted using inductive legal reasoning based on doctrinal 
research. The research sought to examine data from primary sources which 
established the reasons for the decisions made around the implementation of the 
NTER, and then attempted to quantify the impact of these decisions. 
The research used mixed methods and was both quantitative and qualitative, 
although doctrinal research is recognised as mainly comprising of qualitative 
research methods. The form of legal research undertaken in this thesis was based on 
inductive legal reasoning.47 The research utilised both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources used comprise cases and legislation.48 Secondary sources 
focused on scholarly works including textbooks, law journal articles, law reform 
publications, and legal encyclopaedias.49 Government policies, procedures and 
working documents were also accessed and examined. 
The qualitative research utilised submissions from the Competition Policy Review 
Issues Paper and Competition Policy Review Draft and Final reports, and the AER 
issues, submissions and draft papers. The use of these submissions aimed to obtain a 
better understanding of the differences in the behaviour of impacted entities and 
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differences in each entity’s understanding about what competitive neutrality is, who 
should be subject to competitive neutrality measures and whether this has been 
achieved in practice. 
The qualitative research involved an analysis of the NTER Manual. NTER Working 
Party meeting notes or circulars were accessed to provide additional data as to the 
administration and functionality of the regime. Traditional legal research methods 
were used to examine primary legal sources such as Parliamentary debates, 
legislation and decisions of Australian courts. Secondary sources including scholarly 
journal articles or scholarly books were also used.50 
The quantitative component of the research utilised a number of case studies. These 
case studies dealt with comparisons between State Owned Corporations and 
privately-owned companies when in direct competition with each other. Additional 
case studies examined the effectiveness of other methods of achieving competitive 
neutrality and considered the tax allowance set by a price regulator in comparison to 
the tax paid by an organisation. Also, a specific number of NTER features (for 
example, the removal of pre-CGT provisions for NTER entities on their entry to the 
NTER) were examined and their impact quantified. Although the number of 
participants studied in case study 5.3: Comparison with NTER entity with their 
privately-owned counterparts was small, this was a good representation of the market 
and findings were supported in the case study in section 6.5: Comparison of tax paid 
by NTER entity with privately-owned entity. The findings were also consistent with 
those by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and PwC in the Regulatory Tax 
Review (refer to section 6.4.4). In that review, the AER and PwC had access to the 
data of more players in the market. 
1.6 Chapter outline 
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the key issues and background of the 
research and outlines the objectives which will be answered throughout this thesis. 
Chapter 2 is the first of the literature review chapters. It provides an outline and 
history of the National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER). As part of this, it provides 
details of the market environment that resulted in the need for a national competition 





policy and the recommendations of the Hilmer Report. Further, the chapter covers 
the introduction of the National Competition Policy in Australia, and both benefits 
and criticism of the National Competition Policy and the Hilmer Report. In addition, 
the OECD recommendations about what constitutes a good competitive neutrality 
framework are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 continues the discussion about competitive neutrality and defines 
competitive neutrality based on the Hilmer Report, the Competition Principles 
Agreement, the National Competition Policy, and State and Territory definitions. The 
chapter also considers who should be subject to competitive neutrality measures and 
provides a brief background to alternative tools available to achieve competitive 
neutrality, including corporatisation, commercialisation, cost reflective pricing and 
privatisation. 
Chapter 4 moves from a discussion of competitive neutrality to focusing more 
specifically on the NTER, dividend policies relating to State and Territory 
Treasuries, and other matters relating to the taxation of the public sector. It considers 
specific features of the NTER which might advantage or disadvantage NTER 
entities. Chapter 4 also provides the first case studies of the thesis. The first case 
study considers instances where the ATO will stray from applying the tax law to the 
advantage of NTER entities. The second involves the treatment of capitalised labour 
and whether entities needed to amend prior year returns and pay any outstanding tax 
on the release of ATOIDs, outlining the correct tax treatment of this expense. 
Chapter 5 examines different regulatory structures and compares NTER entities with 
their privately-owned counterparts. It considers different regulatory structures in the 
form of debt neutrality and privatisation. It looks at why state-owned businesses are 
required to borrow from their owner State or Territory Treasury where there are other 
financing options available in the market. It also quantifies the impact on financial 
ratios of classifying the gains made on the privatisation of Ausgrid and Transgrid in a 
tax neutral manner. 
Chapter 5 also examines why tax was the policy used to achieve competitive 
neutrality, and considers monopolies and competition policy, and looks specifically 
at the water and electricity industries and how they operate in Australia. A further 
case study in chapter 5 considers whether tax neutrality can be abolished and instead 
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replaced with a larger dividend payment, thus removing the tax equivalent payments 
and replacing them instead with a larger dividend payment. 
Lastly, chapter 5 compares NTER entities with their privately-owned counterparts 
and considers whether NTER entities do pay more tax than their privately-owned 
counterparts, and whether they are less efficient overall. These case studies rely on 
the financial statements, annual reports, and the tax transparency data available in 
reports released by the ATO each year. 
Chapter 6 looks at price regulation, the tax allowance and tax payable. It examines 
the role of the price regulator in competitive neutrality, by setting prices it deems to 
be efficient for businesses operating in monopoly markets. It also looks at whether 
the tax allowance can be used in the place of the current tax equivalent regime. 
Further, this chapter looks at work currently undertaken by the Australian Energy 
Regular (AER) in comparing the tax allowance with the tax paid by regulated entities 
in the electricity network sector. 
Lastly, chapter 7 provides a conclusion and outlines the limitations of the study, 




2 An outline and history of the NTER 
and competitive neutrality 
2.1 The need for a national competition policy 
The federal government aims to create competitive markets wherever possible.51 The 
perceived advantage of competitive markets is that they advocate efficiency and 
advance community well-being. Although this section presents the reasons 
competition is beneficial to the economy and the reasons for needing a national 
competition policy, creating a competitive market is not the solution in all 
circumstances. Instances where the introduction of a competitive market would be of 
limited value include those sectors which are subject to natural monopolies and those 
with a high level of research and development (R&D). The creation of a competitive 
market may be of little benefit in naturally occurring monopolistic markets. The 
reason for this is that the threat of any competition entering into the market is low 
due to the very nature of those industries. That is, a monopolistic market is 
characterised by high fixed upfront costs and smaller subsequent marginal costs 
which ensure that the market can be served for a lower cost by being serviced by 
only one organisation rather than by more than one organisation. A competitive 
market is of little value in a market that contains a high level of R&D activities, or 
any other significant externalities, as these externalities are un-priced by-products.52 
The need for a competition policy was summarised by the then Chairman of the 
Trade Practices Commission, Professor Allan Fels, at a conference on the National 
Competition Policy, as follows: 
• “Competition in markets for goods and services is a prerequisite for 
economic efficiency 
• Markets left on their own very often achieve competitive outcomes 
• But in many cases, market forces need to be supplemented by the active 
application or pro-competition policies 
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• And that in certain other cases, competition can best be achieved by 
government withdrawal from markets, for example by deregulation, 
privatisation and by abolishing licensing provisions.”53 
However, the advantage of creating a competitive market over an administered 
market arrangement relates to the issue of efficiency. A competitive market provides 
an incentive to operate more efficiently, whereas an administered market 
arrangement does not.54 A discussion of monopolies and their place in competitive 
neutrality will take place in a later section of this thesis, in section 5.2.1. 
The economic concept of efficiency is a significant social goal as it aims to ensure 
maximum economic surplus.55 Briefly, efficiency occurs when the allocation of 
resources achieves the maximum output possible. Competition policy plays a 
substantial role in encouraging efficiency, innovation and flexibility.56 
The Hilmer Report57 gave three main reasons for the need for a national competition 
policy. The first is that Australia largely operates as one national market where 
boundaries between the States and Territories are weakening with advancement in 
communication and transport. Secondly, certain markets have been sheltered from 
competition, for example, public utilities, some specific professions and sectors of 
the agriculture industry. Lastly, competition reforms have been implemented by 
sector, rather than there being a consistent national approach.   
As noted in section 1.3, the need for a national competition policy arose because 
government-owned entities have advantages over their privately-owned counterparts. 
These advantages can include, for example: exemption from taxation and charges; 
government guarantee on debts; lower interest rates on loans; and no requirement to 
achieve a commercial rate of return on their assets.58 Further advantages arising from 
government ownership can include cross-subsidisation, protection from bankruptcy, 
and favourable regulatory conditions.59 
                                               
53
 Professor Allan Fels, cited in John Kain, ‘National Competition Policy: Overview and Assessment’ 
(Research Paper No 1, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1994) 3-4. 
54
 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Reforms, Report No 33, above n 52. 
55
 Bernanke, Olekalns and Frank, above n 4. 
56
 Clarke and Corones, above n 5. 
57
 National Competition Council, above n 6, xvii-xviii. 
58
 National Competition Council, above n 6, 296. 
59
 Hoque and Moll, above n 7. 
31 
 
It has been found that competitive neutrality becomes an issue for consideration 
where the following situations exist: 
• There are differences between publicly and privately-owned organisations 
providing the same good or service; 
• This difference occurs only as the result of the ownership of the 
organisation; and 
• The difference results in either an advantage or disadvantage to the publicly 
owned organisation when supplying the good or service to the market.60 
Where a government-owned entity enjoys a net advantage over its privately owned 
counterpart, it can set its prices below its private sector rival, even though the lower 
prices might not necessarily be reflective of any efficiencies in production.61 This 
main advantage that public sector entities have over private sector entities could 
result in the government-owned entity being able to undercut private sector entities 
because of a reduced cost of production resulting from these advantages, and 
possibly to put up a barrier to entry for potential competitors.62 In other words, the 
government-owned entity is able to use the advantages by virtue of its ownership to 
be able to price privately owned entities out of the market where those entities may 
have, in effect, been more efficient than the government-owned entity. This 
demonstrates an inefficient use of resources which could, potentially, be put to better 
use in the private sector. 
The main competitive advantages that were targeted by the implementation of a 
national competition policy in Australia include: 
• Transparency and accountability: this requires state-owned corporations to 
have the same level of disclosure to shareholders and directors as is required 
by the private sector. 
• Taxation neutrality: this ensures that state-owned corporations and 
businesses are either subject to actual tax or tax equivalent payments, 
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thereby being made to operate in the same or similar tax environment as is 
required by the private sector. 
• Debt neutrality: this requires both the private and public sectors to be 
subject to the same debt financing costs. 
• Rate of return neutrality: this requires the same rate of return on assets to 
cover the appropriate costs of the organisations so that publicly owned 
corporations are not able to undercut privately owned corporations (to be 
expanded in a later discussion). 
• Regulatory neutrality: ensuring that the regulatory requirements and 
conditions are the same for all organisations, regardless of ownership.63 
There are also disadvantages associated with being a government-owned entity. 
These disadvantages can include: greater accountability obligations; requirements to 
provide various community service obligations; and a greater superannuation 
expense.64 Further disadvantages of government ownership can include government 
control over employee matters (including wages and industrial relations matters) and 
the management and running of the organisation.65 
In order to create a level playing field and achieve competitive neutrality, the OECD 
recommends that the following steps be taken: 
1. To take into account the way the business operates with the intention of 
increasing the possibility of creating a level playing field; 
2. To make appropriate disclosure of commercial activities to regulators and 
the general public; and 
3. To give special consideration to areas of non-neutrality.66 
The difficulty in determining the best competitive neutrality measure for state-owned 
corporations is that they face multiple demands which are usually not a consideration 
for privately owned corporations. This entails having to operate efficiently and meet 
equity requirements, while at the same time being able to achieve and maintain social 
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welfare goals which might not meet the test of profitability. The efficiency goal 
considers the delicate balance between reaching a desired level of efficiency while at 
the same time limiting the amount of pressure on public funds to provide such a level 
of efficiency. Meanwhile, meeting equity targets involves guaranteeing widespread 
access to services by making losses or providing services to areas which may be 
unprofitable. Lastly, being able to separate the social welfare and developmental 
goals is important in order to be able to determine whether the state-owned 
corporation is meeting its performance targets.67 
Further, the OECD (2011) argues that perhaps state-owned corporations are anti-
competitive by design. Capobianco and Christiansen argue that the reason States 
have continued to own the organisations is due to those organisations having to 
perform differently to private organisations. As an example, the majority of 
industries with a natural monopoly continue to be held by the government.68 This 
may not be entirely correct as a majority of water corporations in the United 
Kingdom are privately owned, and the last few years have seen a large number of 
state-owned infrastructure corporations privatised in Australia. 
By requiring government businesses to be corporatised into State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the government must: 
1. Specify the legal status, relationship with the government, regulatory 
frameworks and any exemptions or special treatment the entity will receive. 
2. Make sure that the markets in which private and public companies compete 
are operating in a competitive environment which is equal to both sectors to 
avoid market distortions and inefficiencies. 
3. Ensure a segregation between the State’s role as owner of the SOE and other 
State responsibilities that influence the market conditions under which the 
SOE operates.69 
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A challenge of implementing a regime which tackles the difficulties presented by 
competitive neutrality is knowing that often State-owned organisations will need to 
depart from the competitive neutrality measures. The main reasons State-owned 
corporations need to depart from competitive neutrality measures are: 
• In order to meet public service obligations 
• To use the state-owned corporation as an instrument for industrial policy 
• In order for the State to continue receiving a large cash flow from the 
organisation 
• To respond to public pressure related to state-owned corporations.70  
Prior to the introduction of the National Competition Policy (NCP) in Australia, there 
was no choice of electricity or gas providers, and consumers were often left with 
poor customer service. Also, Telstra held a monopoly over the telecommunications 
sector in Australia. There were supply restrictions and price control over consumer 
staples such as eggs, milk, rice and sugar; and retail trading hour restrictions and 
limited trading hours on weekends limited consumer shopping hours. Lastly, land 
conveyancing work could only be performed by lawyers prior to the introduction of 
the NCP.71 This has changed since the introduction of the NCP, conveyancing work 
being able to be performed by, for example, qualified conveyancers who are not 
required by law to be lawyers. Although these are small items, which are outside the 
scope of this paper (the focus of this paper being infrastructure), it serves as an 
illustration as to how far-reaching the NCP was throughout the economy, having an 
impact on most sectors that reach the domestic consumer directly. 
2.2 The need for tax neutrality 
Government-owned corporations cannot be subject to the same tax system as the 
private sector.72 The only way to subject the government-owned corporation to a tax 
system similar to the private sector is through the payment of tax equivalents instead 
of actual taxation. Tax equivalent payments should closely mirror the system under 
which the private sector pays taxes.73 However, it can be appreciated that the tax 
regime that governs tax equivalents will not exactly mirror that of the tax regime that 
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governs the payment of tax by the private sector. One could question whether the 
differences in the two systems have resulted in any advantages to either the private 
sector or the public sector. It has already been seen that not all the advantages that 
come with government ownership can be removed through the introduction of a 
competition policy. This research will look at whether any advantages still exist, or if 
there are any disadvantages. 
Of concern is that tax is not considered to play a significant role in competition 
policy and is largely ignored or seen to be of lesser importance when compared to 
other tools which are used to achieve competitive neutrality. Freebairn believes that 
different taxation policy options are considered to be of secondary importance in 
competition policy.74 Furthermore, when considering the taxation issues surrounding 
public-private partnerships, Lehman and Tregoning believe that although tax is a 
large feature of regulation, it attracts very little consideration in most texts and 
studies on the matter.75 Although tax is rarely the subject of any considered study, 
taxation can stand in the way of achieving social goals and infrastructure 
development.76 
Charities 
There is a benefit to having a tax neutrality regime. A study undertaken by Sadiq and 
Richardson compared tax paying entities to charities. Registered charities are 
exempted from tax in Australia. It was found that some of these charities carry on 
commercial business activities that put them in direct competition with other 
taxpaying entities. Having a tax advantage enabled those charities to produce the 
same product as the taxpaying entities but at a lower cost, and not necessarily more 
efficiently. This compromised the consistency and integrity of the taxation regime.77  
Phoenix trading 
Phoenix trading is the practice of setting up a company with the intention of 
incurring debt, including taxes, and then winding up the company to avoid repaying 
that debt and the directors then setting up another company which acquires the assets 
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of the recently wound-up company and trades in a very similar manner. Phoenix 
trading abuses the limited liability available to directors of companies.78 The Cole 
Royal Commission in 2003 found that phoenix trading in the building and 
construction industry is a significant issue. Phoenix trading results in competitive 
neutrality issues. By avoiding paying debts, companies engaged in phoenix trading 
have a competitive advantage over those which do not engage in that illegal practice.  
There has been evidence of net tax tendering in the building and construction 
industry, where tenders are submitted without the inclusion of tax as part of the costs 
of delivering the tendered job because there is an intention to liquidate the company 
and thereby avoid paying the company tax.79 In the building and construction 
industry, businesses which “play by the rules” are unable to compete with those 
businesses which engage in phoenix trading. It has been found that businesses which 
engage in phoenix trading as a way of avoiding payment of their tax liabilities have a 
20% competitive advantage over those that do not.80 
This example illustrates the competitive advantage that can be enjoyed by those who 
are able to avoid tax and illustrates why tax neutrality is important in all industries. 
Competitive neutrality 
In applying the results of this study to the tax neutrality of publicly owned 
corporations compared to privately owned corporations, one can conclude that the 
integrity of the taxation regime can also be considered compromised if public 
corporations are not taxed in at least a comparable manner to privately owned 
corporations. 
However, there will be times when tax neutrality is either not an option or not 
achievable. In these circumstances, the OECD suggests considering the before and 
after-tax rate of return targets. For example, if a State-owned corporation is exempt 
from tax but is using an after-tax rate of return on its assets, it would be able to 
charge lower prices than its privately-owned counterparts, since the tax component 
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built into the after-tax rate of return would not be payable. In this circumstance, 
requiring the use of a before-tax rate of return puts both privately owned and publicly 
owned entities on equal footing, since there isn’t an additional tax component (from 
which the publicly owned entity is exempt) in the target rate of return.81 Using an 
after-tax rate of return on assets will give state-owned corporations an advantage. 
This is because an after-tax rate of return will include an inbuilt allowance for tax 
liabilities. Where a government-owned corporation pays no tax, this allowance will 
give that corporation an advantage over its privately-owned counterparts, since the 
government-owned corporation receives an allowance for a tax that it has not 
actually paid and one for which it is not liable to pay. However, if a before-tax rate of 
return is used to determine prices, both privately owned and publicly owned 
corporations are put on the same level playing field because a before-tax rate of 
return does not allow a state-owned corporation to recover a tax allowance where it 
is not liable for tax. As a result, a before-tax rate of return does not allow a state-
owned corporation to set prices lower than privately owned corporations as a result 
of a tax allowance it does not and is not liable to pay.82 
2.3 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) recommendations 
In 2009, the OECD released a paper83 relating to competitive neutrality principles 
and state-owned corporations and recommended that the best way to implement a 
competitive neutrality framework is by starting with an evaluation of current 
legislation and administration in which the State-owned enterprises operate, and then 
making changes that will attempt to have those entities operating in the same 
legislative and administrative environment as privately-owned entities. This is 
important in order to be able to compare the costs of the public and private sectors. 
A competitive neutrality framework seeks to reform the economic setting in which 
privately and publicly owned organisations compete. The aim of introducing a 
competitive neutrality framework is to create an environment whereby all entities can 
compete on the same equal footing regardless of their ownership structure. A further 
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aim of the competitive neutrality framework is for costs to be reported in such a way 
as to enable easy comparison of financial results between public and private 
sectors.84 
The OECD (2012) recommends considering the following issues when addressing 
the question of whether and how to implement a competitive neutrality framework: 
• Levels of government: When introducing a competitive neutrality 
framework, it needs to be decided which levels of government should be 
subject to those competitive neutrality measures. This means a decision 
needs to be made on whether to include national, regional and/or local 
governments in the competitive neutrality framework. 
• Commercial nature of the activity: For an entity to be commercial in nature 
it needs to operate in a commercial manner and uphold the principles of 
commerciality.85 This means that all social objectives that provide no 
profits, and sometimes even losses, need to be excluded from the 
competitive neutrality framework. 
• Actual/potential competitors: It is not a requirement that there be actual 
competitors in the market in order for the competitive neutrality framework 
to be relevant. The importance is around there being no legislation which 
prohibits competitors or competition.86 The industry in which an entity 
operates can sometimes exclude any real competition, however, so long as 
the legislation does not prohibit any potential competition from entering the 
market, and there is scope for that entity to have potential competitors at 
some time in the future. 
• Cost/benefit analysis: The benefits of introducing a competitive neutrality 
framework must outweigh the costs of introducing the said framework. If 
there are to be substantial costs and change to administration for little 
benefit, the result would not be cost effective.87 In this scenario, competitive 
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neutrality measures would not be introduced. There will be further 
discussion in following sections as to how this was done in Australia. 
2.4 Competitive neutrality in Australia 
The Hilmer Report88 found that competition law alone would not address all the 
issues raised by the subject of competitive neutrality. The competitive neutrality 
policy aimed to address the issues that could not be covered by competition law. The 
policy is implemented by government policy agencies because: 
• Competition law does not cover the topic of competitive neutrality. The 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and its preceding Trade Practices Act 
1974 do not contain any provisions for competitive neutrality. Competitive 
neutrality falls under the Australian Treasury and has been developed and 
implemented within the government. It consists mainly of policies and inter-
government agreements. 
• The policy seeks to encourage and aid implementation while allowing for 
flexibility. 
• The National Competition Council operates a complaint mechanism which 
includes the possibility of monetary fines for breaches of competitive 
neutrality.89 
Hence the National Competition Council and Competitive Principles Agreement 
were put in place to fill the gap that was not covered by competition law. This view 
is supported by the OECD, which states that “many competitive neutrality issues 
would not be reached by competition law, either because the relevant government 
businesses do not have market power or the advantages they receive do not qualify as 
abuses covered by competition law.”90  
Hilmer considered whether competition law should cover all aspects of competitive 
neutrality, or whether to implement a system that relies on the co-operation of the 
States and Territories. The decision was made to rely on a more cooperative style.91 
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However, it was found that there was a need to implement some legislation to cover 
the field of competitive neutrality in order to achieve a “level playing field”.92 In the 
words of the Hilmer Report when considering the use of legal rules or cooperative 
approaches for the implementation of competitive neutrality: 
“The Committee considered a range of possibilities in this area, including the 
development of a national law that prohibited government agencies from competing 
against private firms unless they met requirements based on the above principles. 
The Committee ultimately favoured a more cooperative approach, however, 
reflecting considerations of comity in a federal system as well as concerns that the 
threat of legal sanctions might deter desirable pro-competitive reforms.”93 
Most of the competitive neutrality measures concerning State-owned businesses were 
made via agreements between the States and the Commonwealth, for example, the 
Competition Principles Agreement made through the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) or via the use of regimes, for example, The National Tax 
Equivalent Regime. There is a heavy reliance on cooperation between the States and 
the Commonwealth for implementation and administration of the competitive 
neutrality policies. 
The outline of competitive neutrality in Australia is further discussed in section 2.5, 
below. 
2.5 Timeline of competition policy in Australia 
This section serves to provide a brief timeline of events which occurred as part of the 
introduction of competition policy in Australia. It will provide a brief summary and 
map which will be a useful guide for the sections that follow. 
Appendix 9.1 provides a diagrammatical timeline of the main events leading to the 
introduction of the NTER in mid-2001. 
As outlined in Appendix 9.1, a Committee of Inquiry was first formed in October 
1992, which was tasked with developing a national competition policy for Australia. 
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This Committee then released its “National Competition Policy” (‘The Hilmer 
Report’) in 1993. 
Following on from the recommendations of The Hilmer Report, the States, through 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) went on to sign the Competition 
Principles Agreement (‘CPA’) in 1995. The CPA set out the aims of the competition 
principles but allowed each State to determine how and to whom to apply the 
competitive neutrality principles. 
It was around this time, and in keeping with the objectives of The Hilmer Report, 
that the States each created their own Tax Equivalent Regimes (‘TER’s). The 
National Tax Equivalent Regime (‘NTER’) was then introduced in 2001 to 
nationalise the tax regime for certain elected government-owned entities. The entities 
which enter the NTER are nominated to do so by their State or Territory Treasury. 
Given that there have been many changes in the Australian economy since the 
Hilmer Report and the introduction of the National Competition Policy in 1993, the 
Government decided to re-examine the role of competition in the economy and 
update the competition policy. The announcement to review the competition policy 
was made on 4 December 2013 by the Prime Minister and Minister for Small 
Business. 
The Terms of Reference paper was released on 27 March 2014 by the Minister for 
Small Business. This was followed by an Issues Paper on 14 April 2014, which 
called for submissions by interested parties to be submitted by 10 June 2014. 
The Competition Policy Review Draft Report was issued at the end of September 
2014, with the Competition Policy Final Report released on 31 March 2015. 
2.6 The background of the National Competition 
Policy 
In October 1992, the then Prime Minister, Paul Keating, formed a Committee of 
Inquiry whose task it was to formulate a national competition policy. Headed by 
Professor Frederick Hilmer, National Competition Policy (‘The Hilmer Report’) was 
released in 1993.94 The policy sought to implement a consistent national approach to 
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encourage greater competition in the Australian economy. One of the ways it sought 
to do this was by removal of any competitive advantage government-owned 
businesses might have over their private sector counterparts by way of tax 
advantages.95 
The Hilmer Report (1993) made recommendations regarding the implementation of a 
national competition policy in Australia. At the time, it was hoped that the removal 
of any net advantages enjoyed by government-owned businesses, and the creation of 
a level playing field would result in a fairer market environment and improved 
efficiency and productivity.96 The terms of reference of the report outline the four 
principles, as follows: 
• No anti-competitive conduct is permitted if it is not in the public interest. 
• If anti-competitive conduct is in the public interest, it should be able to be 
proved in a review and assessment. 
• The same rules are to apply across the market, regardless of ownership. 
• Any changes or amendments to the competition policy should: 
- remove unessential barriers to trade and competition with the aim of 
establishing open, integrated domestic markets, and 
- reduce complication and administrative duplication.97 
The above principles formed the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of 
the Hilmer Report.98 
2.7 The six recommended elements of a National 
Competition Policy 
The Hilmer Report recommended six elements of a national competition policy, as 
follows: 
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1. Put restrictions in place which limit anti-competitive behaviour among 
organisations 
2. Ensure that there are no restrictions on competition unless they are needed 
3. Change publicly owned monopolies to create an environment that 
encourages competition 
4. Open up avenues for third-party access to better enable a competitive 
environment 
5. Discourage monopolistic pricing 
6. Encourage “competitive neutrality” between privately and publicly owned 
corporations.99 
To encourage the States and Territories to implement the competitive neutrality 
measures, the Australian Government introduced tranche payments. These payments 
were made to states and territories which had implemented the recommendations of 
the National Competition Policy. Payments in the first tranche in 1994-95 were $200 
million. In the second tranche in 1999-2000, payments totalled $400 million. The 
third tranche in 2001-02 saw payments increased again to $600 million. These 
payments were ceased after 2005-06.100 
When considering competitive neutrality, two important points need to be made here. 
Firstly, the introduction of competitive neutrality does not mean that all government-
owned entities need to be privatised. Secondly, outsourcing of government 
operations is not required in order for an entity to comply with the competitive 
neutrality guidelines. The only thing that is required is that the government-owned 
corporations behave in a manner that is as competitive as the private sector.101 Nor 
does the NCP recommend the abolition of community service obligations, the sale of 
public assets or the reduction of infrastructure services to rural and regional areas of 
Australia.102 
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2.8 Issues in implementation 
A number of issues might arise during the implementation of competitive neutrality 
measures, including: 
• “The determination of the appropriate rate of return on capital employed; 
• The valuation of assets which will include the adoption of a deprival 
valuation methodology; 
• The determination of the period for recovery of competitively neutral costs; 
• The identification of the base for cost recovery; and 
• The adoption of private sector pricing practices, including the adoption of 
practices recognising other than full cost only in the short term.”103 
Where an entity is subject to price regulation, most of these issues are addressed by 
the price regulator. This is discussed further in chapter 6: Price regulation, the Tax 
Allowance and Actual Tax Payable. 
2.9 Benefits of the National Competition Policy and 
the Hilmer Report 
The OECD has commented that Australia has the most comprehensive competitive 
neutrality framework in the world. This framework is supported by separate 
implementation and a complaints handling mechanism.104 
In 2011, the OECD noted105  that Australia’s competitive neutrality policy has been a 
success because: 
• it significantly developed the restructuring and improvement of government 
organisations in Australia; 
• significant efficiency gains were realised when the competitive neutrality 
policy was implemented by large state-owned organisations; and 
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• it was found that the introduction of a competitive neutrality policy in 
Australia considerably eradicated any advantages associated with 
government ownership.106 
2.9.1 Lower prices 
Hamilton and Denniss assert that one of the main aims of the National Competition 
Policy (NCP) is to produce goods and services at a lower cost, especially those goods 
and services produced by government-owned entities.107 They argue that because 
public companies produce essential services that are then used by industry to produce 
other goods and services, it will automatically follow that a reduction in costs and 
improvement in efficiency of these public sector entities will have a flow-on effect 
and be of more significant benefit to the economy.108 Hamilton and Denniss believe 
that the outcome of this will be an overall lower price for the final product, an 
increase in exports, and an increase in employment.109  
The Productivity Commission conducted a study in 2005 which sought to quantify 
the benefits of the introduction of the NCP to that date. That study found that the 
introduction of the NCP resulted in lower prices, as follows: 
• A reduction in electricity prices of 19% between the early 1990s and 2005. 
• In the second half of the 1990s, rail freight charges fell by 8% for wheat and 
up to 42% for coal. 
• A reduction in port charges by up to 50% throughout the 1990s. 
• A reduction of greater than 20% in telecommunications charges since the 
mid-1990s. 
• Since deregulation in 2000, the cost of milk had fallen by 5% between 2000 
and 2005 notwithstanding an 11 cent per litre levy to finance an assistance 
package for farmers.110 
However, the Productivity Commission also noted that it is not possible to attribute 
all these price reductions solely to the introduction of the NCP.111 This means that it 
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is not possible to isolate the benefits derived by the introduction of the NCP, but 
rather to assume that the introduction of the NCP played a part in creating an 
economic environment where such price reductions were the outcome. 
Although this study is not current, it is the only one of its kind that has sought to 
measure the impact of the introduction of the NCP. Subsequent studies have focused 
on specific areas and industries. Where relevant, these are discussed in future 
sections of this thesis. For example, since 2005, there has been a dramatic increase in 
electricity prices throughout Australia. This is covered in more detail in section 
5.2.2.2: The electricity industry. 
2.9.2 Efficiency 
The implementation of regulatory reform under the National Competition Policy 
(NCP) has resulted in greater efficiency. This can be seen in the instance of pricing 
regulators. Pricing regulators set the maximum price a utility can charge for the 
goods or services based on the most efficient cost of providing that good or service, 
as determined by the pricing regulator.112 The utility is then faced with the task of 
finding ways of lowering its cost of production to be as closely in line with the price 
determination as possible or otherwise risk making a loss. 
The initial effect of the Hilmer Report on efficiency improvements has been 
demonstrated in the electricity industry. Findings on initial efficiency improvements 
resulting from the introduction of the NCP found that capital productivity, labour 
productivity, and total factor productivity have all improved by over 20% between 
the introduction of the NCP and 1999.113 This figure reflects the early efficiencies 
gained as a result of the introduction of the NCP. Since this time, electricity prices 
have seen a dramatic increase. The electricity industry and the reasons for price 
increases in recent years are discussed in section 5.2.2.2: The electricity industry. 
It has also been found that there has been an increase in output, and therefore a 
resultant increase in income, across regional Australia.114 
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All these improvements in efficiency are believed to be due to the market changes as 
a result of the implementation of the NCP. 
2.9.3 Economic performance 
The Productivity Commission asserts that the introduction of the NCP has been 
paramount for Australia’s strong economic performance. Vital economic 
improvements attributed to the NCP at the time of publication of that report include: 
• Strong uninterrupted economic growth of over 13 years (at date of writing, 
it has been 27 years of strong uninterrupted economic growth); 
• An increase in household income; and 
• The lowest unemployment rate in three decades.115 
The flow-on effect of this has been increased taxation revenue.116 
2.9.4 Other benefits 
Scales117 found that there were four main benefits as a result of the introduction of 
the NCP. Firstly, the NCP has resulted in a stronger economy, with an increase in the 
GDP of 5.5% per annum118, the creation of jobs, and an increase in wages. 
Furthermore, these benefits are extensive. Thirdly, the State and Federal government 
will see an increase in their revenue. And lastly, contribution to the reform will differ 
according to government hierarchy.119 
The introduction of competition into the energy and telecommunications markets has 
provided consumers with a choice of supplier. This has improved products and 
services as the market players try to attract new customers and retain their existing 
customers.120 
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Further benefits from the NCP include the more efficient use of water as a result of 
water reforms; and an increased return to producers as a result of decreased 
government control surrounding the marketing of lamb and grain.121 
The NCP was implemented on a national scale and sought to provide a consistent 
approach to competition.122 This has, therefore, fostered greater cooperation between 
the State governments.123 
Although there have been transitional costs, it has largely been found that the 
benefits the NCP has produced have outweighed the costs of implementation. 
Furthermore, most of the costs of implementation have now been incurred, whereas 
the benefits of the NCP will be ongoing.124 
2.10 Criticisms of the National Competition Policy 
Although the introduction of the NCP has delivered many benefits to the economy, 
some researchers argue that there have also been a number of disadvantages or 
omissions from the NCP. 
Firstly, although the aim of introducing the NCP was to remove any competitive 
advantage public entities might have over private entities, the Queensland 
Department of Treasury argues that the introduction of the NCP will not remove all 
the advantages that publicly owned entities enjoy.125  
Furthermore, although the CPA states that “competition policy is not about 
maximising competition per se, but about using competition to improve the 
community’s living standards and employment opportunities,”126 Hess and Adams 
argue that, in the search for cost efficiency, the NCP has failed to consider the role of 
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public interest.127 The NCP contains no policies to improve or maintain social 
outcomes.128 The Hilmer Review, whose recommendations resulted in the creation of 
the NCP, also did not consider the public interest, instead considering driving 
economic efficiency as being the main means of achieving public interest. However, 
the Committee accepted that circumstances would arise which would require 
disregarding competition and efficiency goals in favour of other community 
objectives.129 
Hess and Adams believe that practical problems disregarded in the introduction and 
implementation of the NCP include: 
• unclear scope; 
• a need to expand the skillset to understand competition and NCP 
requirements; and 
• the public benefits tests contain policy and implementation deficiencies.130 
This would suggest that the NCP is limited in what it can reasonably achieve and 
perhaps other alternatives that can contribute to the goals need to be considered. 
2.11 Criticisms of the Hilmer Report 
2.11.1 Economics 
Although the subject of economics in general is outside the scope of this thesis, a 
discussion of the principles that underpin the Hilmer Report is necessary. This is 
because it has been argued that the Hilmer Report was built around economic 
theories that do not exist in practice. 
The economic theory of second best holds that all the elements required in order to 
maintain equilibrium in a market cannot occur at the one time. The second-best 
equilibrium is what results when market imperfections are present. In the context of 
the national competition policy, this means that it is incorrect to assume that an 
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increase in competition will result in an increase in welfare because the market is not 
perfect.131 
A further criticism of the Hilmer Report surrounds its use of economic models. 
Economic models are used to estimate the outcome of making policy changes. The 
use of these economic models involves a number of assumptions that do not exist in 
the real world. It is argued that these models should not be used as the basis for 
setting government policy.132 The models used by Hilmer Report made a number of 
assumptions as a basis for setting national competition policy. The concern is that the 
Hilmer Report cannot be assumed to make correct conclusions as the assumptions in 
its economic models are simplified and incomplete.133 One cannot rely on an 
economic model to provide certainty in an unknown situation.134 This means that 
while, in theory, the recommendations of the Hilmer Report would work, in practice 
this may not be the case because the recommendations of the Hilmer Report were 
designed for a perfect world but are operating in an imperfect world. 
This is further considered in discussions of the economic theory of perfect 
competition. Perfect competition holds that the more competition there is in the 
market, the closer the prices will be to marginal cost. This, therefore, results in 
greater efficiency in the allocation of resources. However, because the market is not 
perfectly competitive, all the participants need to be made perfectly competitive in 
order for this theory to work in practice.135 Limitations to the operation of perfect 
competition in this environment have been identified as industry structures 
(monopoly, oligopoly, duopoly136), taxes, and too much competition.137 This is of 
concern in regard to the Hilmer Report as it was based only around models of perfect 
competition. The recommendations, therefore, need to be tested to determine whether 
what was proposed has worked in practice. The relevance of the above discussion is 
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that the thesis will look at whether the assumptions of the Hilmer Report in regard to 
tax neutrality worked in practice. 
2.11.2 Community Service Obligations (CSOs) 
Of importance in implementing competitive neutrality and encouraging 
commercialisation are issues of full cost pricing; how community service obligations 
(CSOs) are accounted for; and the removal of inconsistencies that arise as a result of 
government ownership.138 
CSOs are those activities that, under normal business circumstances, an organisation 
would choose not to provide, or would provide at a much higher cost to the consumer 
because they are deemed uncommercial. However, because the public sector 
provides services deemed to be essential to society, these services need to be 
provided regardless of whether the decision to provide them makes commercial 
sense.139 Under the Hilmer Report, these subsidised CSOs do not need to be removed 
for the purpose of determining competitive neutrality.140 This could put the 
government-owned corporations at a disadvantage when compared to privately 
owned corporations. 
2.11.3 Other Hilmer Report concerns 
In addition to the above criticisms and concerns, another concern is that the model 
proposed in the Hilmer Report will be of benefit to the Commonwealth at the 
expense of the States.141 It relies greatly on co-operation between the Federal and 
State/Territory Governments, and a willingness from the States and Territories to 
sacrifice sovereignty in economic activities for the national good.142 Lehman and 
Tregoning point out that this structure does not exist in the United Kingdom and, as 
such, this has led to a more lenient view towards tax minimisation.143 
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A further concern is that the Hilmer Report has provided a “one shoe fits all” 
approach. This is a problem when applying the “one shoe fits all” approach to 
different industries. There is an argument that there should be industry-specific 
regulation rather than applying the same simplified rules to all industries.144 This has 
ended up being the case with price regulation for some industries. This issue will be 
covered in ‘The electricity industry’ section 5.2.2.2. 
Lastly, a weakness of the Hilmer Review is its strong focus on domestic issues at the 
expense of considering the global market of which Australia is also a player.145 This 
became a major issue in the time since the Hilmer Review was released, and was one 
of the reasons for the 2013 review of the competition policy (refer to section 2.14). 
2.11.4 Criticisms of efficiency 
Costs need to be measured on an equivalent basis in order to determine which entity 
has the lowest cost of production. The allocation of resources to the corporation that 
does not have the lowest cost of production would be an inefficient allocation of 
resources, regardless of whether the corporation was publicly or privately owned.146 
This underpins the reason for the introduction of the concept of a level playing field 
– that an adequate and reasonably accurate comparison can be made in order to 
determine the most efficient, and therefore most reasonably priced, goods and 
services. 
Hamilton and Denniss believe that “debate about what is ‘efficient’ in Australia has 
been confused by discussion of what is competitive, and when market failure exists 
this will result in policy failure”.147 This suggests that an increase in competition 
does not necessarily mean an equivalent increase in efficiency. In particular, when 
considering environmental issues, an increase in efficiency is not necessarily a good 
thing as it has resulted in an increase in additional greenhouse emissions. This will be 
discussed further below. 
2.11.5 Environmental issues 
Hamilton and Denniss argue that a big concern of the introduction of the competition 
policy has resulted in a substantial increase in greenhouse gas emissions in the 
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electricity sector. They maintain that while competition policy involves the setting of 
an economic environment that allows for the lowest prices, the economic tools used 
to combat environmental issues are through the raising of prices. This means that the 
two objectives are incompatible. They maintain that the environmental impact has 
not been taken into account in determining main objectives of the NCP (being to 
lower costs and increase efficiency).148 This view is supported by Kain, who states 
that the Hilmer Review “pays scant regard to the non-pecuniary social costs of 
economic growth such as environmental degradation and increased traffic accidents, 
yet these are legitimate economic costs which should figure prominently in any 
concept of the ‘public interest’.’149 
This example illustrates that the market is not perfect and that there are concerns that 
the National Competition Policy is having undesired effects in some situations. 
Although the main reason for the introduction of the NCP has been to achieve the 
best level of efficiency in the market, and therefore the lowest possible prices, there 
are times when this is not the best outcome. Particularly when it comes to 
environmental issues, higher prices can produce the best outcomes of achieving a 
consumer’s most efficient use of resources, in this case electricity. This can be seen 
in the discussion on electricity prices in section 5.2.2.2.1 where South Australia has 
higher electricity prices because its electricity is generated using “greener” 
methods.150 
2.12 Tax neutrality in Australia 
Under the Australian Competitive Neutrality Guidelines, there are three methods of 
achieving tax neutrality in Australia. The first involves government owned 
businesses paying actual tax. Many government owned businesses are already 
separate legal entities which pay Commonwealth and State taxes. The second method 
of achieving tax neutrality is through a taxation equivalent regime. This method 
involves calculating a tax liability according to current taxation legislation and 
making tax equivalent payments to the Official Public Account. This is explained 
further in the following section. The third method of achieving tax neutrality is 
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through making tax neutrality adjustments. This method involves calculating tax as 
though it were payable, but no actual physical tax payment is made.151 This third 
method, the Tax Neutrality Adjustment (TNA) method, is to be considered only 
when determining a pricing strategy. It is to apply to baseline costing for public 
sector bids.152 This thesis will examine mainly the second method – achieving 
competitive neutrality using a tax equivalent regime. 
2.13 The National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER) 
As a result of the recommendations of The Hilmer Report, the Tax Equivalent 
Regime (TER) was introduced. The TER was introduced to ensure that government 
owned entities were subject to paying tax equivalents. TERs use an Accounting 
Profit Model to derive the taxable income and subsequent tax payable and are 
administered by each State’s Office of State Revenue.153 The Accounting Profit 
Model requires the government business to make tax equivalent payments equal to 
applying the company tax rate to the accounting profit. It does not consider the 
complexities of the tax system and tax legislation and does not require adjustment for 
tax to accounting differences. In addition, TERs are administered by each State. 
A number of years later, in 2001, the National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER) was 
introduced. Whilst both regimes are still in operation and have the same objectives, 
being that they sought to tax government owned entities in the same or a similar 
manner that privately-owned entities are taxed, thereby removing any advantage that 
government owned entities had previously enjoyed by virtue of not having to pay any 
tax, they do have their differences. The NTER is administered nationally by the 
Australian Taxation Office and is based on the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
The NTER is an administrative arrangement between the Federal and State 
governments under which the Federal income tax laws are notionally applied to 
selected government business entities owned by the States and Territories as if they 
were subject to those laws. This is done with the aim of achieving competitive 
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neutrality. The resulting NTER tax is a liability owed and paid by these entities 
directly to the Owner State and Territory Governments – it does not form part of the 
actual Federal income tax base. Apart from some specific modification, NTER 
entities are treated in the same way as privately-owned corporations. For example, 
NTER entities are required to lodge income tax returns, make quarterly or monthly 
PAYG instalment payments, are subject to audit and/or other compliance assurance 
activities by the Australian Taxation Office, have the ability to seek private rulings 
and are subject to penalties and interest charges.154 In order for an entity to be part of 
the NTER, the owner State or Territory must nominate the entity for inclusion into 
the NTER. Any government owned entities that are not subject to the NTER are 
automatically governed by their respective State’s TER, unless an exemption from 
paying tax equivalent has been granted. 
2.14 The Competition Policy Review 
There have been many changes in the Australian economy since the Hilmer Report 
and the introduction of the National Competition Policy. At the time of the release of 
the Hilmer Report, global competition was fairly new to Australia and technology 
was not as advanced. With the advances in technology and greater availability of 
information, competition policy and law needed to be updated to reflect these 
changes. Competition policy and law needs to be adaptable to new products entering 
the market and also to new methods of distribution and not stand in the way of new 
sources of competition.155 
On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and Minister for Small Business 
announced that there would be a review of the competition policy. It had been twenty 
years since the Hilmer Report and the Government felt that it was time to re-examine 
the role of competition in the economy and update the competition policy for all the 
changes that had occurred over the past twenty years. This review has been referred 
to as a “Hilmer Mark II” review. The review was intended to be a “root and branch” 
review with the aim of examining current laws and the competition framework with 
the intention to increase productivity and efficiency. It was hoped that the review 
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would uncover a means by which to improve the economy, create more jobs and 
encourage investment. The ultimate outcome was hoped to result in a rise in the 
living standards in Australia. 
The review was led by Professor Ian Harper and was supported by a Review Panel 
(“The Panel”). 
The Terms of Reference paper was released on 27 March 2014 by the Minister for 
Small Business. This was closely followed by an Issues Paper on 14 April 2014. This 
paper sought submissions by interested parties by 10 June 2014.  
The Draft Report was issued at the end of September 2014, with the Final Report 
released on 31 March 2015.  
The aim of the review was not to formulate an entirely new competition policy, but 
rather to revive the competition reform that had waned somewhat over the previous 
decade.156 
The Review Panel concentrated on three principal areas. Firstly, the panel was 
concerned with examining the unfinished remaining National Competition Policy 
reforms. In particular the panel considered areas in which competition can be applied 
further. Secondly, the Review Panel examined institutional and governance 
arrangements. This was done with the intention of directing the path of the reform for 
the next twenty years. Lastly, the Panel focused on competition law and whether it 
was adequate for the required objectives.157 
The Competition Review Final Report highlighted three main drivers of change in 
the future. The first is the industrialisation of developing nations, the rise of Asia and 
the expanding middle class in Asia. The second is the ageing Australian population. 
Lastly, the effect digital technology has on the economy has been identified as a 
major driver of change in the future.158 
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The Issues Paper sought submissions from interested parties and the general public. 
The Paper discussed competitive neutrality and asked the following questions of 
those who chose to respond: 
• “Does competitive neutrality policy function effectively, and does it apply 
to the appropriate government business activities? 
• Has the method of implementing competitive neutrality principles improved 
competition and productivity? 
• What are the disadvantages that private businesses face when competing 
with government business activities? 
• Could the mechanism for dealing with competitive neutrality complaints be 
improved?” 
The top five issues raised in the submissions were competition law, competitive 
neutrality, misuse of market power, small business concerns, and the operation of the 
ACCC.159 
The top five issues identified in the final report were misuse of market power, retail 
trading hours, road transport, planning and zoning, and supermarkets.160 
A number of the recurring themes in the submission made by interested parties will 
be discussed below. 
2.14.1 Competitive neutrality complaints 
The comments around competitive neutrality complaints fell into four main areas: 
• The lack of incentive for compliance with the removal of the tranche 
payments. 
• The lack of a formal requirement to enforce any competitive neutrality 
complaint recommendations. 
• No enforcement outcomes for those who choose not to comply with the 
competitive neutrality recommendations resulting from an investigation into 
a competitive neutrality complaint. 
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• No uniform agreed upon method of treating complaints across the States – 
each State has in place its own rules on dealing with competitive neutrality 
complaints. 
These common themes formed part of the submissions from a number of 
organisations, including the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the 
Business Council of Australia, the Productivity Commission, the Law Council of 
Australia – Business Law Section, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 
Queensland and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. 
2.14.2 Submissions about the NTER 
The Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) discussed the NTER in their 
submission to the review.161 They submit that the NTER has been largely successful 
and outline that, because of the introduction of the NTER, each respective State 
government receives two streams of payment – one resulting from a dividend 
payment from the State-owned corporation (SOC) to the State, and the other from 
NTER tax equivalent payments to the State. 
However, as a result of privatisation, the State stops receiving the NTER tax 
equivalent payments as the tax payments after privatisation are no longer tax 
equivalent payments and become “real” tax payments to the Federal government 
once an entity is privatised. Once privatised, the state forgoes the tax equivalents that 
were received from the SOC when it was under State ownership and, as a result, 
loses an income stream. 
WSAA argues that the loss of the income stream reduces the incentive for State 
governments to privatise and recommends that tax payments by privatised entities 
should continue to be made to the State.162 This view was first mentioned in a report 
by the Productivity Commission on Public Infrastructure.163 This will be further 
expanded in section 5.1.2.2. 
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Further, WSAA reasons that there is no loss of value associated with privatisation – 
that the taxation income stream is transferred from the State government to the 
Federal government.164 
This author argues that this is incorrect. Various elections, especially around the tax 
depreciation of assets at the time of privatisation, can result in a large difference in 
tax deductions claimed, and as such, result in a much lower tax income stream, 
particularly where the entity being privatised has a large asset base, which is often 
the case in government businesses, especially infrastructure. In addition, tax 
structuring is available to privately owned organisations which is not available to 
NTER entities, enabling privately owned organisations to legally minimise their tax 
in ways that are not available to NTER entities. This would also reduce the tax 
revenue collected from privatised entities, as will be demonstrated later in case 
studies comparing tax paid by state-owned and privately-owned organisations.  
2.14.3 Who should be subject to competitive neutrality measures 
Competitive neutrality measures should apply to significant government businesses 
only where the benefits of applying the measures outweigh the costs involved. 
However, the threshold for what is considered a ‘significant’ business activity varies 
across the states.165 
“Box 13.1: Significant government business activity 
The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office asks two 
questions to 
determine whether government entities are operating a significant business 
activity.390 
Question 1: Is the entity conducting a business? 
a) Does it charge for goods or services (not necessarily to the final consumer)? 
b) Is there an actual or potential competitor (either in the private or public sector), 
noting that 
purchasers are not to be restricted by law or policy from choosing alternative sources 
of 
supply? 
c) Do managers of the activity have a degree of independence in relation to the 
production or 
supply of the good or service and the price at which it is provided? 
If the answer is yes to all these questions, then the entity is conducting a business. 
Question 2: Is the business significant? 
The following business activities are automatically considered significant for the 
purposes of 
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competitive neutrality policy: 
• all government business enterprises and their subsidiaries; 
• all Australian Government companies; 
• all business units; 
• baseline costing for activities undertaken for market-testing purposes; 
• public sector bids over $10 million; and 
• other government business activities undertaken by prescribed agencies or 
departments 
with a commercial turnover of at least $10 million per annum. 
Competitive neutrality arrangements apply to significant business activities but only 
to the extent 
that the benefits of the arrangements to the community outweigh the costs.”166 
This definition creates a problem where government business activities are not 
considered to be significant, but are still in competition with the private sector. This 
is discussed in section 2.15.4: Competitive neutrality. 
2.15 The Competition Policy Review Final Report 
The Competition Policy Review Draft Report was released on 22 September 2014. 
Submissions to this Draft Report were due back to the Panel by 17 November 2014. 
The Competition Policy Review Final Report was released on 31 March 2015. This 
section will discuss the sections of that report which are relevant only to competitive 
neutrality. 
2.15.1 Competition policy 
Competition policy has traditionally mainly applied to public monopolies and 
government businesses. The Panel believes that competition policy should not be 
limited to just these sections of government, but rather should apply to all 
government services.167 The government services targeted by this recommendation 
include all areas of government which might be in competition with the private 
sector. For example, health and education168, and human services169. In addition to 
expanding the scope of competition policy to include government services, the Panel 
also believes that competition policy should also continue to apply to local 
government.170 
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Restrictions to competition should be introduced only where they are in the public 
interest; and only if the costs outweigh the benefits of introducing competition 
policy.171 
The Panel recommends that the following principles should be applied when 
implementing competition policy: 
• “Competition policies, laws and institutions should promote the long-term 
interests of consumers. 
• Legislative frameworks and government policies binding the public or 
private sectors should not restrict competition; 
• Governments should promote consumer choice when funding or providing 
goods and services and enable informed choices by consumers; 
• The model for government provision of goods and services should separate 
funding, regulation and service provision, and should encourage a diversity 
of providers; 
• Governments should separate remaining public monopolies from 
competitive service elements, and also separate contestable elements into 
smaller independent business activities; 
• Government business activities that compete with private provision, whether 
for-profit or not-for-profit, should comply with competitive neutrality 
principles to ensure they do not enjoy a net competitive advantage simply as 
a result of government ownership; 
• A right to third-party access to significant bottleneck infrastructure should 
be granted where it would promote a material increase in competition in 
dependent markets and would promote the public interest; and 
• Independent authorities should set, administer or oversee prices for natural 
monopoly infrastructure providers.”172 
The Panel recommends allowing jurisdictions the flexibility to implement policies 
based on the above principles as they see fit.173 
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2.15.2 A new National Competition Body 
The Panel recommended that the National Competition Council should be abolished 
and a new national competition body, named the Australian Council for Competition 
Policy (ACCP), should be established. The role of the ACCP would be to provide 
leadership and aid in implementation of the competition policy.174 The panel will be 
formed by an inter-governmental agreement, which will outline the process for 
appointing members, and the scope of the functions of the ACCP. It will be overseen 
by a Ministerial Council, and will be accountable to all the jurisdictions. The 
members’ goal is to take into account how the competition policy will apply 
nationally rather than campaigning for the issues that affect their own jurisdictions. 
Member responsibilities are to be allocated to Treasurers.175 Funding for the ACCP 
will come from the Commonwealth, States and Territories.176 
The ACCP should: 
• Promote and educate about the competition policy. 
• Monitor the progress of the implementation of the agreed reforms and 
provide an annual report on the progress of this implementation. 
• Find areas where competition could possibly be improved in all of 
government. 
• Advise the government on regulatory matters and market strategy, for 
example privatisation. 
• Research new developments in competition policy, both within Australia 
and internationally. 
• Implement ex-post assessment of merger decisions177 
The ACCP will take the role of advocator, which often falls by default on the ACCC. 
This recommendation will see the role of advocator being removed from the ACCC 
and will occupy the main purpose of the ACCP.178 The ACCP will also have an 
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advisory role as it seeks to advise governments on changes and how to adapt the 
competition policy accordingly.179 
2.15.3 Competition payments 
As part of Recommendation 48, the Productivity Commission will be required to 
research the effect of the reforms on revenue. If the effect of the implementation of 
these reforms is inconsistent across the jurisdictions, the Panel recommends the 
reintroduction of competition policy payments to ensure that the benefits are flowing 
to those earning them.180 
2.15.4 Competitive neutrality 
It has been over a decade since some jurisdictions have updated their competitive 
neutrality policy statements. The Australian Government’s competitive neutrality 
policy statement was last revised in 1996.181 As such, the Panel recommends that a 
review and update of competitive neutrality policies is required. In addition, there is 
also scope to improve the guidelines regarding competitive neutrality when applied 
to the commencement of government business and the timeframe allowed before 
which the government business begins to earn a commercial rate of return.182 
An additional review of the conditions used to define significant business activities is 
also required.183 As discussed in section 3.1.8: Definition of Government 
Commercial Entity and section 2.14.3: Who should be subject to competitive 
neutrality measures, it can be seen that the definition of what constitutes a 
government commercial entity is not consistent across the States. It is hoped that this 
Competition Policy Review will allow for a clearer and more consistent approach. 
However, it is not merely the significance of the business activities which should 
qualify it for competitive neutrality measures. There have been instances where the 
government activities would not qualify as significant, but these activities cause 
problems for small business wanting to compete against them.184 Examples of this 
include:  
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• Instances where local councils have charged for waste collection through 
council rates, thereby blocking the private sector from being able to 
compete at lower prices, more services and more choice for ratepayers.185  
• Where local councils compete with private businesses in the field of child 
care centres, aged care facilities and gyms.186 
• Local councils which provide free access to council grounds for use by 
motorhomes, which makes it difficult for local caravan parks to compete 
with the free access the council is providing.187 
The Panel believes that it is possible that some of the above complaints fall outside 
the current policy, for example, if the government activity does not meet the current 
definition of a significant government business.188 However, this problem can be 
remedied by applying the full-cost pricing principles.189 
Although each State will still be enabled to adopt its own approach to competitive 
neutrality, the Panel hopes that through improved transparency by public reporting 
on compliance with the competitive neutrality policy and complaints handling, the 
States will be able to determine best practice in regard to competitive neutrality 
policies.190 
2.15.5 Competitive neutrality complaints 
The number of competitive neutrality complaints has fallen drastically. Between 
1996 and 2012, 112 competitive neutrality complaints were investigated. This fell to 
only five complaints during 2011-12.191 Whilst it could be argued that this is due to 
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the improvement in government businesses compliance with competitive neutrality 
requirements192, it could also be an indication that the general public is not aware that 
there is a requirement of government businesses to adhere to competitive neutrality 
obligations.193  
The need for better reporting of competitive neutrality complaints was raised in a 
number of submissions.194 
As a result, the Panel recommends that competitive neutrality complaints processes 
should become more transparent and effective. There should be a competitive 
neutrality complaints body which is independent of government. The government 
should be required to respond publicly in response to the outcome of a competitive 
neutrality complaint. Lastly, the independent complaints body will be required to 
submit an annual report regarding the complaints and their investigation into the 
newly formed Australian Council for Competition Policy.195 
2.16 Inquiry into the competitive neutrality of the 
National Broadcasters 
On 29 March 2018, a review into the competitive neutrality of the National 
Broadcasters commenced. This Inquiry was tasked with examining whether the ABC 
and SBS were complying with the principles of competitive neutrality.196 
The Inquiry received 6,839 submissions and was completed in September 2018. It 
was found that “the national broadcasters are applying a ‘best endeavours’ approach 
to competitive neutrality requirements but recommended they improve their 
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transparency, reporting and other processes relating to their competitive activities 
and Charter performance.”197 
National Broadcasters are exempt from tax under their own governing Acts. 
However, the Panel “notes that to the extent that taxation issues are relevant to 
Competitive Neutrality Policy relating to the National Broadcaster, the evidence is 
that the National Broadcasters in effect comply with competitive neutrality 
requirements.”198 
2.17 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an outline and history of the National Taxation Equivalent 
Regime and competitive neutrality. It examined the competitive environment that 
drove the need for competitive neutrality, and the reports and agreements made in 
Australia that put a competitive neutrality structure and tax equivalent regime in 
place. It also considered circumstances where competitive neutrality was not an 
adequate solution; and briefly considered alternative tools to achieving competitive 
neutrality. In addition, it considered the impact of the Competition Policy Review in 
2013-15, and the impact this had on competitive neutrality and the NTER. 
The following chapter will provide more detail about the NTER and the taxation of 
government-owned organisations. It will seek to outline differences between the 
application of tax laws to public and private organisations, and will expand to 
examine laws which are outside the scope of the NTER. 
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3 Definition of Competitive Neutrality 
and alternative tools to achieve 
competitive neutrality 
3.1 Definition of Competitive Neutrality 
The term “competitive neutrality” has been given a number of different definitions. 
This section will outline the different definitions. 
3.1.1 The OECD 
The OECD states that “competitive neutrality occurs where no entity operating in an 
economic market is subject to undue competitive advantages or disadvantages”.199  
3.1.2 The Hilmer Report 
The Hilmer Report defines competitive neutrality as: 
“Competition policy does not require that all firms compete on an equal 
footing; indeed, differences in size, assets, skills, experience and culture 
underpin each firm’s unique set of competitive advantages and disadvantages. 
Differences of these kinds are the hallmark of a competitive market economy. 
In some cases, however, firms competing in the same market face different 
regulatory or other requirements, potentially distorting competition and raising 
efficiency and equity concerns. While some submissions to the Inquiry 
expressed concern at such differences operating between private firms, by far 
the most systematic distortions appear to arise when government businesses 
participate in competitive markets. In particular, government businesses were 
often seen as enjoying a unique set of competitive advantages by virtue of their 
ownership, including exemption from tax. Policies dealing with these kinds of 
distortions can be described as elements of “competitive neutrality”…”200 
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3.1.3 The Competition Principles Agreement 
The States entered into the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) on 11 April 
1995. Each State and the Commonwealth entered into the agreement which  
“set out a comprehensive nationally-coordinated microeconomic reform 
program (the National Competition Policy) that broadly aligned with the 
Hilmer Committee recommendations. The agreements also contained 
undertakings to implement pre-existing intergovernmental reform agreements 
in the sectors of electricity, gas, water and road transport (the Related 
Reforms).”201   
The CPA defines competitive neutrality as: 
“The objective of competitive neutrality policy is the elimination of resource 
allocation distortions arising out of the public ownership of entities engaged in 
significant business activities:  Government businesses should not enjoy any 
net competitive advantage simply as a result of their public sector ownership.  
These principles only apply to the business activities of publicly owned 
entities, not to the non-business, non-profit activities of these entities.”202 
3.1.4 The National Competition Policy 
The National Competition Policy said of competitive neutrality:  
“Competitive neutrality principles seek to encourage competition and better 
use of the community’s resources by ensuring that government businesses 
operating in a market in which there are actual or potential competitors do not 
gain any net competitive advantage because of their public ownership. In 
essence, competitive neutrality principles are aimed at ensuring that significant 
government owned businesses operating in contestable or potentially 
contestable markets face the same market disciplines as their private sector 
competitors.”203 
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3.1.5 The States and Territories definitions 
The CPA did not put in place a national implementation plan for the implementation 
of the competitive neutrality principles. Each State was then free to implement and 
interpret the competitive neutrality principles as they saw fit. Various definitions of 
competitive neutrality were adopted by each State, as outlined in Appendix 9.2. The 
key similarities in the definitions used by all States are centred around the concept of 
public and private organisations competing on an equal footing, thereby enabling fair 
competition. A number of the States also touch on efficiency and the most efficient 
use of resources. 
However, as can be seen from Appendix 9.3, there are a range of different criteria 
that each State Government uses to determine whether the activities of that 
government’s business would qualify it to be subject to the competitive neutrality 
measures. The most commonly used criterion is the importance of competition in 
their relevant market (which then begs the question of why monopolies are subject to 
competitive neutrality measures at all if they do not have, and are unlikely to ever 
have, any direct competition – this will be discussed in more detail later), and the 
scale of operations, as the cost would outweigh any benefit of subjecting a small 
scale operation to the competitive neutrality measures. 
In CPA, NCP, Hilmer Report and State-by-State definitions, the common theme of 
competitive neutrality is that no publicly owned entity should enjoy a net competitive 
advantage against its privately owned counterparts, merely as a result of its 
government ownership. Furthermore, the interest around putting in place a 
competitive even footing in which both publicly and privately-owned entities can 
compete is based around resource allocation and ensuring that resources are used in 
the most efficient manner possible. 
3.1.6 Cost/Benefit analysis 
Whilst all the States have these as their fundamentals, the CPA does not specify how 
the States should go about implementing competitive neutrality and to which 
departments or organisations they should apply. This lack of a national 
implementation plan has resulted in variation between States as to determining who 
should be subject to competitive neutrality measures. 
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The CPA requires competitive neutrality measures to be put in place and to apply to 
government-owned businesses only where the benefits of putting in place such 
measures outweigh the costs involved. 
Potential benefits to be gained by putting in place competitive neutrality measures 
can include: 
• greater competition in the market; 
• an improvement in the comparability of financial performance between 
government business activities and their private sector equivalents; and 
• a well-defined separation between commercial and non-commercial 
objectives, resulting in transparency around whether the business is able to 
meet its objectives.204 
Expenses associated with the introduction of competitive neutrality measures can 
include: 
• administrative costs relating to the introduction of competitive neutrality, 
for example, costs associated with the drafting of legislation and regulation, 
and changes to policies; 
• costs involved with changing an organisation’s culture and management 
approach; 
• replication of the regulatory and commercial environment faced by private 
sector entities in order to ensure that the government business is competing 
in the same environment; 
• costs of compliance associated with competitive neutrality; for example the 
cost of ensuring compliance with the tax equivalent regime; and 
• overseeing conformity with competitive neutrality measures, and 
administering a department to take care of complaints.205 
3.1.7 To whom (or what) should competitive neutrality measures 
apply? 
The OECD discusses the problem with defining a government commercial entity. 
Due to the lack of a clear definition of the term, in some jurisdictions, competitive 
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neutrality policies are only applied to State-owned enterprises (SOEs) whereas in 
other jurisdictions the competitive neutrality policies are applied to all commercial 
government activities.206 
The range of entities that should be subject to competitive neutrality is extensive. 
The OECD (2012) considers that all government owned entities operating as a 
commercial entity with either actual or potential competitors should be subject to 
competitive neutrality measures.207 
There are a number of factors that can affect the level and degree of competitive 
neutrality. These include the ownership structure, the institutional form or explicit 
aims for particular economic agents. Issues of competitive neutrality relate not only 
to public versus private ownership. As discussed in Chapter 2, issues of competitive 
neutrality can also arise in the not-for-profit sector, where a competitive advantage 
can be realised by the non-for-profit sector by virtue of special exemptions arising 
from its non-for-profit status.208 
The reasons for striving for competitive neutrality are twofold. Firstly, there is the 
economic aspect, which aims to enhance allocative efficiency in the economy. 
Allocative efficiency holds that only goods which are in the highest demand will be 
produced in an economy. Allocative efficiency ensures that goods and services are 
produced at the lowest possible cost to the consumer. Secondly, the political aspect 
seeks to ensure public service obligations are met and ensures that the government 
acts as regulator to make sure that all market players are playing by the rules.209 
The OECD (2012) considers that “the most effective way of obtaining competitive 
neutrality is arguably to establish an encompassing policy framework, including 
suitable complaints handling, enforcement and implementation mechanisms and in 
consistency with international commitments.”210 Australia, and a number of 
European countries, have been the best examples of this to date. 
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Australia has an Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office 
(AGCNCO) which sits within the Productivity Commission. The AGCNCO 
investigates complaints related to competitive neutrality and then publishes its 
findings on its website. AGCNCO will not investigate complaints that are not related 
to Australian Government business, or complaints that: 
• “are frivolous, vexatious, not made in good faith, or are made by someone 
with an insufficient interest in the matter of the complaint 
• do not warrant investigation having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances.”211 
Since 2008, there have been three complaints which have been investigated and 
published on the Productivity Commission’s website. The complaints were brought 
against NBN Co, PETNET Australia Pty Ltd, and Defence Housing Australia. The 
complaint investigated across all three government-owned organisations was 
regulatory neutrality. Both PETNET and NBN Co were investigated for possible 
pricing and earning a commercial rate of return breaches. In addition, PETNET was 
also investigated for a possible breach of debt neutrality. 
In investigating regulatory neutrality, the AGCNCO found that Defence Housing 
Australia did not gain a regulatory advantage merely as a result of government 
ownership. NBN Co had no breach of regulatory neutrality as no determinations of 
the kind had yet been made. However, PETNET was found to be disadvantaged by 
tighter regulations than those which apply to its privately owned counterparts. 
Both PETNET and NBN Co were found to have fair pricing models, however both 
were not expected to achieve a commercial rate of return because they had not begun 
operating fully as a business at the time of the investigation. It is to be expected that 
commercial rates of return and making profits are difficult to achieve during the 
start-up phase of a business and are not necessarily a breach of the competitive 
neutrality guidelines.212 It was noted for both that there was a need to adjust their 
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cost base for any advantages they may have received as a result of government 
ownership. 
3.1.8 Definition of government commercial entity 
There is a lack of clear definition as to what constitutes a government commercial 
entity, or even what constitutes commercial or non-commercial activities as evident 
in each State’s interpretation of the CPA. As discussed previously, given that the 
CPA has not specified which departments or entities should implement competitive 
neutrality policies, there has been variation between the States as to which entities 
should be subject to competitive neutrality measures. 
Appendix 9.3 outlines the main methods used by each State to determine which of 
each State’s departments and entities should be included in competitive neutrality 
measure. The second section of that appendix outlines what each State defines as its 
significant business activities.213 It is these activities to which each state applies its 
competitive neutrality policies.  
As can be seen in Appendix 9.2, the definitions of which activities to apply 
competitive neutrality policies to varies greatly between the States. This disparity 
could mean that competitive neutrality policies could be implemented in some States 
but not necessarily in others. 
The definition of a commercial entity and which entities should be subject to 
competitive neutrality measures was raised in a number of submissions to the Issues 
Paper relating to the Competition Policy Review. Issues raised in these submissions 
then formed part of the Competition Policy Review Draft Report. The Panel stated 
that:  
“Concerns around competitive neutrality were raised with the Panel, 
particularly where businesses, in many instances small businesses, compete 
with local government. While the government activities may not be 
‘significant’ as judged by relevant guidelines, the breadth of sectors where key 
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issues were raised points to this as a potential obstacle to small business 
competing in a range of markets.”214  
This was discussed in section 2.15.4. 
3.1.8.1 Government business and Australian Consumer Law 
The question of what defines a government business is not covered by legislation. 
Rather, reliance is made on court decisions to determine whether an activity can be 
considered to be a business. For a government agency to be conducting a business, 
its activities need to be “sufficiently systematic and regular, and sufficiently similar 
to commercial activities that private persons might engage in, to justify being 
characterised as a business”.215 
The definition of government business is important as it determines whether the 
Trade Practices Act applies to government entities. A number of cases considered 
what defined a government business, including JS McMillan Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth,216 Corrections Corporation v Commonwealth of Australia,217 NT 
Power Generation v Power and Water Authority,218 and ACCC v Baxter 
Healthcare.219 Justice Griffiths asserts that the difficulty in defining the term 
“carrying on a business” when applied to government activities comes about as a 
result of taking into account what the courts have considered to satisfy requirements 
compared to those which failed the tests for being considered to be carrying on a 
business.220  In the JS McMillan and Corrections Corporation cases221, it was held 
that the government activities did not constitute carrying on a business. In JS 
McMillan222, Justice Emmett stated that it cannot be held that the repetition of an 
activity constitutes the carrying on of a business; there are government functions that 
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cannot be considered to constitute the carrying on of a business; and there needs to 
be a distinction between those activities of government which are purely regulatory 
or governmental, and those which could be considered to be running a business. 
However, in the NT Power Generation223 case, which concerned NT Power 
Generation’s refusal to allow access to its power lines, the High Court reversed the 
decision of the Full Court and, in doing so, stated that NT Power Generation denying 
access constituted the carrying on of a business and constituted a misuse of market 
power under section 46 of the then TPA. In the Baxter Healthcare224 case, Baxter 
Healthcare argued Crown Immunity. The Court said there was “a risk of confusing 
governmental, commercial or even political interests with legal, equitable or 
statutory rights and interests.” It was held that Crown immunity did not apply and the 
Court found that Baxter Healthcare breached both section 46 and 47 of the then TPA. 
To remedy this, the Harper review sought to replace the term “carrying on a 
business” with “engaging in trade or commerce” when seeking to apply the 
Competition and Consumer Act (2010) to government endeavours.225  
It could be a recommendation that instead of relying on government to determine 
who should be subject to the NTER, these guidelines and framework developed for 
the TPA instead be applied. 
3.1.9 The building blocks of competitive neutrality 
The OECD recommends that governments wishing to implement competitive 
neutrality policies should consider the following eight building blocks: 
1. Streamlining government business can influence the playing field. Where a 
natural monopoly exists, the competitive activities can be separated from the 
non-competitive activities to enable competitors to enter the competitive 
part of the market.226 In Australia, this is evident in the electricity sector, 
which consists of the network and the retail branches. The network sector 
relates to the infrastructure – the cables, poles, electricity substations, and so 
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on. The electricity retail sector comprises the direct sales of electricity to the 
end user. 
2. Identifying and allocating costs of business activities to encourage 
transparency. 
3. Rates of return (ROR) requirements for SOCs should be the same as those 
for private corporations in commercial and competitive activities. 
4. There should be transparency relating to any compensation provided for 
public policy activities. 
5.  & 6. As much as possible, SOCs should be subject to the same tax and 
regulatory requirements as privately owned corporations. 
7. Debt neutrality also needs to be explored and considered as a means of 
creating a level playing field. 
8. Procurement policies and procedures need to be transparent and 
competitive.227 
3.1.10 Criticisms of competitive neutrality 
The Queensland Government presents three issues against introducing competitive 
neutrality.228 Firstly, there is a concern of declining services and increases in pricing 
if government monopolies are corporatised. Furthermore, not all government 
activities will result in profitable decisions. This is due to the fact that, when 
providing essential services (for example, electricity or water), some decisions that 
are not profitable need to be made in order to meet the needs of the public. It is the 
role of the government to provide them, regardless of whether or not it is a sound 
commercial decision to do so. Lastly, if governments were to charge according to 
what it was costing them, a price increase might result where they were providing 
services at below cost.229  
On the second point, it should be noted that competitive neutrality principles require 
that CSOs be separated and excluded from the application of competitive neutrality 
measures. On the last point, price regulators decide what a monopoly can charge and 
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will only allow for efficient costs to be passed on to the consumer. This is discussed 
further in Chapter 6: Price regulation, the tax allowance and actual tax payable. 
The OECD recommends that competitive neutrality problems “could be reduced by 
reforming the governance arrangements of government businesses so that these 
businesses have a commercial focus, operate efficiently, and face all normal business 
costs, such as requirements to earn a rate of return and pay taxes”230 It could be 
argued that this is not enough, especially if the Hilmer Report recommendations are 
based on models of perfect competition that do not exist in the real world. However, 
critiques of perfect competition are outside the scope of this thesis. 
3.2 Alternative tools to achieve competitive 
neutrality 
There are a number of different policy approaches which can be used to achieve the 
aim of competitive neutrality, being:  
• taxation neutrality, which will involve removing any tax exemptions 
enjoyed by State-owned entities;231 
• debt neutrality, which will require State-owned businesses to pay similar 
borrowing and financing costs as their privately-owned counterparts;232 
• rate of return requirements, which require that significant government 
owned organisations earn a commercial rate of return over the long-term, 
and pay a commercial dividend;233 
• regulatory neutrality, which requires that both publicly-owned and 
privately-owned businesses be subject to the same regulatory 
environment;234 and  
• full cost pricing principles.235 Full cost pricing refers to a price calculated by 
adding the direct cost of producing a unit of output with a mark-up to allow 
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for overheads and profits. It is typically used in instances where it is 
difficult to forecast demand and to ascertain a market price.236 
However, competitive neutrality can also be achieved by implementing one of the 
following measures: 
• Corporatisation 
• Commercialisation, or 
• Cost reflective pricing.237 Cost reflective pricing reflects the true cost of 
producing a unit of output without relying on government subsidisation to 
cover any shortfalls.238 
Some of these measures (corporatisation, commercialisation, or cost reflective 
pricing) are used in conjunction with the policy approaches mentioned above 
(taxation neutrality, debt neutrality, rate of return requirements, regulatory neutrality, 
and full cost pricing principles). For example, many government-owned enterprises 
have been corporatised, but are also subject to tax neutrality, debt neutrality, and so 
on. 
The measure selected will be dependent on “a number of factors including the costs 
and benefits of applying the policy, the organisational context of the activities 
exposed to competition, the level of resources used in the supply of the good or 
service, and any special requirements such as increased accountability.”239 Although 
there are a number of measures available to achieve competitive neutrality, the 
preferred method is corporatisation.240 
The position taken by Coates was that if a public company was to be in competition 
with a private company, then the public company should take the same form and 
structure as a private company.241 
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In addition to the above measures, this section will also consider the privatisation of 
typically state-owned businesses. 
3.2.1 Corporatisation 
In Australia, there are a number of vehicles through which government can deliver 
its services to the community. Government entities operate on an accountability 
spectrum, illustrated below. 
New South Wales Government, Review of the legislative framework that provides for the governance 
and accountability of state-owned corporations, (2013) 24. 
http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/159093/SOC-Review_Issues-Paper.pdf 
 
Government services can be delivered using a department structure through to taking 
the form of a state-owned corporation (SOC). The Commercial Policy Framework 
covers public trading enterprises (also known as ‘public non-financial corporation 
sector’) which are non-commercial, commercial, and state-owned corporations. 
Corporatisation aims to increase the rate of return on public assets when compared to 
the returns available on other similar market investment 
opportunities.242Corporatisation is considered the best method to use for achieving 
competitive neutrality. Corporatisation is used in instances where the organisation 
has: 
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• “clear and non-conflicting objectives; 
• managerial responsibility, authority and autonomy; 
• effective performance monitoring; 
• effective rewards and sanctions related to performance; and 
• competitive neutrality in input and output markets.”243 
Corporatisation involves running the organisation as though it were a private sector 
organisation, and the introduction of various measures to enable this goal to be 
achieved. Corporatisation typically involves the introduction of a number of the tools 
used to achieve competitive neutrality, including the payment of taxation 
equivalents, achieving a commercial rate of return, the introduction of debt guarantee 
fees and compliance with the same regulations that apply to organisations in the 
private sector.244 
Corporatisation often involves using the SOC model. There are two types of SOC 
models – the company SOC model and the statutory SOC model. 
A company SOC is limited by shares and subject to the Corporations Act. It is also 
regulated by ASIC. Shares in a company SOC are held by eligible Ministers and 
voting shareholders have the power to run the company SOC. The sale of a company 
SOC can only take place under an Act of Parliament.245 Company SOCs are 
registered as public companies limited by shares.246 
A statutory SOC is not subject to the Corporations Act. Voting shares are held only 
by the Treasurer and one other minister appointed by the Premier. The Minister is 
able to have more control over the running of a statutory SOC than a company 
SOC.247 
Currently, only Victoria, Tasmania and the Commonwealth allow for both statutory 
and company SOCs. The rest only allow for statutory SOCs, except NSW, which is 
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currently undertaking a review of the SOC Act legislation and structure of state-
owned corporations.248 
Where corporatisation is not suitable, competitive neutrality can be achieved through 
the introduction of other competitive neutrality measures, including debt neutrality, 
tax neutrality, regulatory neutrality and full cost pricing.249 
3.2.1.1 Criticisms of corporatisation 
There have been a number of criticisms levelled at corporatisation. Sheil (2000) 
disagrees with the use of rate of return as an accurate measure for determining 
efficiency and productivity. Sheil notes that one can only increase the rate of return 
by either increasing revenue or decreasing expenses. However, there may be barriers 
to doing so in those industries concerned.250 These measures are usually determined 
by pricing regulators in Australia. So many of these measures, including debt to 
equity ratio, are set by the pricing regulator, which will only allow for price increases 
based on an ideal, well-managed, privately owned organisation model. 
A further criticism comes in the form of political influence. A State government can 
influence indirect power and control over a State-owned corporation by appointing 
the directors who then sit on the board and control the State-owned organisation. 
These directors may feel indebted to the Minister but, at the same time, have to 
comply with all the legislative duties required of directors.251 This means that some 
directors of SOCs may never be truly independent because of conflicting duties of 
running the organisation in the best way possible, whilst at the same time being 
obligated to make decisions that will result in a favourable outcome for the Minister 
who appointed them. 
Smith252 (2000) presents the Sydney water scare as an example of this. In 1998 
unsafe levels of Cryptosporidium and Giardia were found in Sydney’s drinking 
water. This contamination left Sydney’s water unsafe to drink for approximately two 
weeks. An inquiry into the incident later found that Sydney Water was faced with 
                                               
248
 Ibid 26.  
249
 Department of Treasury and Finance (NT), above n 204, 5. 
250
 Sheil, above n 242, 12. 
251
 Stephen Bottomley, ‘Regulating government-owned corporations: A review of the issues’ (1994) 
53(4) Australian Journal of Public Administration 521, 526. 
252
 Stewart Smith, ‘State owned corporations: A review’ (Briefing Paper No 11/2000, NSW 
Parliamentary Library Research Service, Parliament of NSW, 2000). 
82 
 
two conflicting objectives – the first being to operate as a commercial business and 
achieve its business objectives. The second was to produce quality drinking water 
that was safe to drink. These two objectives were not always compatible. It was 
found that these objectives and the business structure as a result of corporatisation 
had led to there being a communication barrier between the managing director, the 
board of directors, and the State government. This was partly to blame for the water 
crisis and has since been used as an example of how corporatisation of government 
owned entities may have failed.253 
However, Hoque and Moll argue that public sector entities that have been 
corporatized operate in an environment similar to that of the private sector. They 
state that this implies that any advantages or disadvantages as a result of government 
ownership are abolished.254 The public sector, by mere government ownership, is 
protected from the threat of takeover or bankruptcy.255 
A paper by PwC questions the objectives of private and public companies, arguing 
that the two have different objectives which cause the main differences seen in public 
and private companies.256 Privately owned companies, it argues, have a primary 
objective of maximising financial wealth, and thereby maximising dividends to 
shareholders. However, SOEs should strive towards strengthening the economy and 
maximising wellbeing and jobs.257 
PwC go on to state  
“SOEs should not be purely evaluated only on the basis of financial results 
(the profit and loss account), but more widely on how they contribute to 
societal value creation, taking an integrated and holistic view of their 
impact.258 
Therefore, PwC believes the following principles should be relevant for SOEs: 
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• “SOEs should not be run as a private company given the different business 
logic. 
• SOEs need to be actively owned, directed and evaluated in a more holistic 
way to include a wider range of impacts. 
• Cost-revenues are not enough. The SOE also needs to consider the impact 
on society. 
• SOEs need new principles for corporate governance. 
• SOEs must be bigger strategic players linked to the ambition of creating 
new jobs, growth and innovation. 
• SOEs can be an instrument for exponential value creation.”259 
3.2.2 Commercialisation 
The Financial and Performance Management Standard 2009 (FPMS) provides the 
framework under which statutory bodies operate in Queensland. It defines 
commercialisation as:  
“the process by which a department or a commercialised operation of a 
department, charges for the goods or services it provides and adopts, in varying 
degrees, other features of the commercial environment, including the principles 
of competitive neutrality, clear and non-conflicting objectives, an appropriate 
level of management responsibility, authority and autonomy and accountability 
for performance.”260 
“The commercialisation policy is built around 4 key principles: 
1. Competitive neutrality (competition with alternative providers on 
equal terms) 
2. Clear and non-conflicting objectives 
3. Management responsibility, authority and autonomy 
4. Accountability for performance.”261 
Commercialisation involves the implementation of measures that do not go as far as 
corporatisation. The main difference between commercialisation and corporatisation 
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is that, under commercialisation, the entity is not a separate legal entity and does not 
have its own board of directors.262 Commercialisation can include a number of the 
following attributes: 
• “Definition of commercial and non-commercial activities (in a business 
plan); 
• Clear, commercial performance targets; 
• Separate definition and funding of non commercial activities; 
• Removal of regulatory functions from the entity; 
• Valuation of assets based on deprival value; 
• The introduction of commercial gearing; 
• Payment of tax equivalents to the Treasurer; 
• Payment of applicable guarantee fees to the Treasurer; 
• Defined reporting requirements; 
• Ring-fenced (i.e.. Separated) accounts from the host agency (if any); and 
• A dividend policy based on agreed indicative payout ratio reflecting the 
cash needs of the owner government and the business.”263 
Commercialisation “entails the establishment of separate business units, full recovery 
of all costs, separate financial statements and rate of return requirements."264 
The introduction of commercialisation involves a number of steps. The first involves 
“establishing a general business environment between clients and service providers”. 
Following on from this, partial commercialisation involves “establishing formal 
commercial relationships between clients and service providers and a more 
commercial approach to the planning and management of the business unit and the 
agency.” This stage is most suitable to developing markets. Full commercialisation 
“involves the move to a competitive environment where clients have freedom to 
choose the source of supply.” This is best in mature markets which have a healthy 
level of competition.265 
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Where commercialisation is not suitable, other methods might be more attractive for 
improving efficiency. These include corporatisation, “greater utilisation of the 
private or community sector as a supplier or provider” or “franchises or alliances”.266 
3.2.3 Cost reflective pricing 
The use of the Cost Reflective Pricing method involves putting a dollar value on all 
the costs and benefits gained as a result of government ownership in order to obtain a 
net competitive advantage (or disadvantage). An output price is then determined 
taking into account this net competitive advantage. As per competitive neutrality in 
general, this method will only be used if the cost exceeds the benefits.267 
The costing process used in the Cost Reflective Pricing method involves: 
• “definition of the output, including measurement, verification and purpose 
of the output; 
• costing the output which will include full attribution of all costs, such as 
direct costs, overhead costs, IT support, administration and depreciation 
applicable to the output; 
• estimating the net competitive advantages (if any) resulting from 
government ownership; and 
• estimating an offsetting accounting adjustment for the net competitive 
advantage.”268 
3.2.4 Privatisation 
Privatisation usually involves the sale of state-owned enterprises to the private 
sector. The shift towards privatisation throughout the world began in the 1970s and 
1980s. Privatised assets were subsequently subject to regulation. Efficiency gains 
resulting from privatisation outweighed the costs of regulation.269 This will be 
discussed further in section 5.1.2: Privatisation.  
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Reasons for privatising state-owned business can include reducing State debt, using 
the money generated by the sale to fund other infrastructure projects, and 
encouraging efficiency.  
Abbott discussed the benefits of privatisation. 270 His work compared the 
privatisation of the electricity and gas industries in Victoria with the state-owned gas 
and electricity industries in New South Wales. Abbott found that the greatest benefit 
to privatisation was that the Victorian government was able to use the funds resulting 
from the sale of gas and electricity infrastructure to reduce debt and increase 
spending on other essential services.  
It has been argued that public owned entities are more likely to be less efficient than 
privately owned entities in the same industry, 271 mainly as a result of performance 
not being linked to pay. As such, there is no real incentive for a manager to maximise 
the wealth of a publicly owned organisation as they do not stand to benefit 
financially, and do not face the risk of insolvency or being taken over. However, 
when a comparison is made to those industries which have been privatised and are 
now privately owned, one can see that the result of private ownership has resulted in 
much of the wealth of the organisation being transferred to shareholders, dividends, 
and executive salaries, rather than maintaining the essential infrastructure.  
A study by Gowland and Aiken272 considered the cultural changes that occur when a 
state-owned corporation is subsequently privatised. They found that, despite popular 
belief, long-serving employees who were subsequently offered a position in the 
newly privatised organisation were not less efficient than private sector employees. 
Further, the newly privatised organisation shifted focus to becoming more 
commercial in its approach to controlling staff, profitability, and tax implications. 
There is further discussion about the effectiveness of privatisation in section 5.2.2.2: 
The electricity industry. 
                                               
270
 Malcolm Abbott, ‘The impact of energy asset privatisation on State government debt management 
and service provision in Victoria and New South Wales’ (2011) 70(1) Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 94, 103. 
271
 Bottomley, ‘Regulating government-owned corporations’ above n 251, 529. 
272
 David Gowland and Max Aiken, ‘Privatisation – A history and survey of changes in organisational 





Chapter 3 provided the background to how competitive neutrality was established in 
Australia. It first considered the OECD recommendations, and then moved to discuss 
the Hilmer Review which recommended taking steps to ensure that public businesses 
were governed in such a way as to enable competition from privately-owned entities 
to be on an equal footing. This chapter also detailed the steps and options available to 
the Government in deciding which methods to use in order to enable better 
competition between the public and private sectors. Furthermore, the chapter 
outlined criticisms of competitive neutrality and corporatisation.  
The next chapter will focus on the National Tax Equivalent Regime and how the 
taxing of the public sector has been put into practice since the introduction of 




4 The NTER, Dividend Policies, and 
the Taxation of the Public Sector 
This chapter examines aspects of the NTER and other tax laws which are targeted 
specifically at state owned corporations and businesses. These are instances where 
the ATO or Treasury may choose to modify the application of existing legislation, or 
where specific rules or legislation targeting only State-owned entities have been put 
in place. 
Underpinning the application of taxation laws to state-owned enterprises is s 114 of 
The Constitution. Although a detailed examination of s. 114 is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, the relevant issues are summarised below. Section 114 of The 
Constitution provides that the Commonwealth cannot impose any tax on the property 
belonging to any State. 
Section 114 of The Constitution states that: 
“A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth….impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the 
Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on property of 
any kind belonging to a State.”273 
There have been a number of cases that considered the taxing of property between 
the State and Commonwealth. The key cases were Queensland v Commonwealth274, 
South Australia v Commonwealth275, and The State Bank case.276 
In Queensland v Commonwealth, the Court considered whether the State of 
Queensland was liable to pay Fringe Benefits Tax on the fringe benefits it provided 
its employees. The Court held that fringe benefits on cars and housing did not violate 
s114 because the tax is imposed on the benefit, rather than on property. 
South Australia v Commonwealth considered whether the State’s superannuation 
fund would be liable for tax on interest earned and capital gains tax made. It was held 
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that the superannuation fund was taxable on interest earned but was not liable for tax 
on the capital gains it made. 
In the State Bank case, the Court determined that the State Bank was not liable to 
sales tax, as sales tax was considered to be a tax on property. 
Above, the taxing rights of the Commonwealth on the State were considered. The 
following will examine the NTER and why tax imposed on State-owned corporations 
can only be in the form of tax equivalents, and why the taxes are remitted back to the 
State rather than the Commonwealth. 
4.1 Features of the NTER 
The ATO administers the NTER in accordance with the ITAAs, subject to a number 
of modifications as set out in the NTER Manual. This section sets out those 
modifications and examines how they impact the NTER entities which are subject to 
them. 
4.1.1 Lack of ability to appeal 
Under the Taxation Administration Act 1953, taxpayers have rights to seek review of 
unfavourable decisions regarding the application of taxation laws. A disadvantage for 
NTER entities is the lack of appeal rights under the Tax Administration Act. The 
reason for this may be so that public funds are not wasted on cases involving two 
opposing governments. An NTER entity can apply for a private ruling under 
paragraphs 75-78 of the NTER Manual.277 Private ruling requests may be made to 
clarify the tax position an NTER entity should take in relation to an arrangement or 
transaction, and are to be made in accordance with Division 359 in Schedule 1 of the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953. 
However, under paragraph 82 of the NTER Manual:  
“NTER entities will not be entitled to seek an external review of, or appeal 
against, an NTER related decision of the Commissioner, whether under a 
provision of the relevant taxation laws, including section 14ZZ of the TAA 
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1953, or otherwise. Divisions 4 and 5 of Part IVC of the TAA 1953 will not 
apply accordingly.”278 
This provision is based on the nature of the agreement between NTER entities and 
the Tax Office, that is, that there is an informal relationship. This paragraph of the 
NTER Manual puts NTER entities at a serious disadvantage when compared to their 
private sector counterparts. A privately-owned company can appeal an ATO decision 
and take the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), whereas for an 
NTER entity, the ATO’s decision is final and there is no further recourse or option 
available to the NTER entity. If the aim of the NTER is competitive neutrality, and 
issues being examined by the NTER are likely to also affect the private sector, to 
disadvantage an NTER entity by denying appeal rights means that it is less likely for 
an NTER entity to seek advice on issues that might affect both private and public 
sectors; rather it will wait for the private sector to do so because the private sector 
has the option of appeal should the outcome be undesirable. For example, the tax 
treatment of gifted assets has been disputed. Rather than apply for a private ruling, 
the affected NTER entities waited for the private sector to raise this matter with the 
ATO. This is currently the subject of appeal in the Federal Court.279 This is discussed 
further in section 4.2.4: Case study: Gifted assets.  
The lack of ability to appeal was also a feature in the State Tax Equivalent Regime. 
Burton examined the intricacies and complexities of a State Tax Equivalent Regime 
which was administered by the Treasurer.280 In it, he explained that by assuming the 
position of tax authority and having the power to determine estimated tax equivalent 
payments resulted in the inability of State Authorities to challenge any 
determinations of the Treasurer. This is a problem for “where there is uncertainty as 
to the proper interpretation of the ITAA, the Treasurer is entitled to adopt the view 
most favourable to the Treasury, without fear of such a determination being 
challenged in the courts with any real prospect of success.”281 Interestingly, this 
policy continued to be a feature of the NTER despite the NTER being administered 
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by the ATO, and there being an availability of resources to enable challenge and 
appeal. This is because it would be deemed to be an inefficient use of resources (that 
is, a waste of taxpayer money) for government to challenge government in this field, 
and this matter in addition would generate negative publicity. 
4.1.2 Government imposed restructures or privatisations: A specific 
issue relates to the application of CGT 
At times, the owner State or Territory government can direct an NTER entity to 
restructure or privatise its business. Recent examples of State or Territory imposed 
privatisations include the privatisation of desalination plants, the sale of the “poles 
and wires” of the electricity network (in effect, the infrastructure of the electricity 
industry comprising the poles and wires which deliver electricity to homes and 
businesses) and the ports. These privatisations have taken place across the country, 
although to varying degrees. Some States have privatised many of their major assets 
in recent years, whereas others have not been subject to extensive privatisation. In 
these circumstances, NTER Manual paragraph 103A states that:  
“Such an imposed renegotiation, restructure or privatisation will be treated in a 
tax neutral manner for NTER purposes. (For example, on an imposed transfer 
of CGT assets, there will be no CGT consequences for the transferor and the 
transferee will inherit the CGT cost bases of the transferor.)”282 
However, paragraph 103B allows the NTER Administrator to approve a tax 
treatment it considers appropriate in the circumstances, after considering whether the 
NTER entity will receive an unfair tax advantage over its competitors and “the 
arrangements and structures that have previously existed in relation to the business 
operations of the NTER entities involved.”283 
Whilst this seeks to remedy the issue of tax arising as part of a decision that was not 
made by the NTER entity, it makes no sense as to why such a transaction will be 
made on a CGT neutral basis. If both tax and dividend payments are being made to 
the State or Territory treasury, allowing a transaction to be treated in a CGT neutral 
manner potentially distorts the return on equity for Treasury on privatisation of the 
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asset. When an equivalent privately-owned corporation sells an asset, it is expected 
that the company would have to pay tax on the sale, and any difference could then be 
available to either be returned to shareholders or put to another use. So, to treat the 
transaction in a different manner for an NTER entity means that, although the total 
financial amount being received by the State or Territory treasury is the same, the 
amount being received is not being classified correctly as income from the tax 
expense or a return on equity. This then results in the return on equity being inflated. 
Example – Sale of Sydney Desalination Plant 
Sydney Desalination Plant was built and operated by Sydney Water during the 2008 
– 2012 years. It was operated as a subsidiary under the parent entity, Sydney Water 
Corporation. The New South Wales Treasurer made the decision to refinance the 
Sydney Desalination Plant to use the funds generated by such a refinancing for vital 
infrastructure projects in NSW.284 The successful refinancing deal generated $2.3 
billion and, after repaying existing debt on the plant, saw over $300 million returned 
to the State.285  
Given that this was a State imposed privatisation, exemption could have been sought 
under paragraph 103 of the NTER Manual to exempt the transaction from capital 
gains tax and have the purchaser, a consortium including the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan Board, inherit the existing CGT cost base of the assets which formed 
part of the sale. Paragraph 103 of the NTER Manual was amended a few months 
prior to the privatisation to limit the treatment to, amongst other things, “…(i) a 
privatisation by way of an asset sale, an entity sale, the grant of a long term lease, the 
grant of a long term licence, or the grant of a long term statutory or other right.”286 
This option was not pursued, and it enabled the consortium to apply Division 58 
(Capital allowances for depreciating assets previously owned by an exempt entity) of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 to the tax value of assets the consortium 
acquired.   
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As a result of not seeking the exemption, income tax paid by Sydney Water on the 
gain on sale of Sydney Desalination Plant assets was $78.398 million.287 Although 
the transaction was completed in the 2012 financial year, any dividends or taxes 
relating to the transaction were paid in the 2013 financial year. 
This example seeks to quantify the impact on the dividend received by the State, and 
the impacts on equity ratios if the CGT exemption had been taken up:  
Dividend payout ratio: Where no tax exemption was granted 
The dividend payout ratio is calculated using the formula: 
Dividend payout ratio = Dividends / Net income 
The net income after tax for 2013 is $415.179 million.288 During the 2013 financial 
year, Sydney Water paid a total dividend of $368 million to New South Wales 
Treasury. This dividend comprised $242 million as the normal dividend from 
operations, and an additional dividend of $126 million being the net proceeds of the 
refinancing of Sydney Desalination Plant.289 
Under the current arrangement, where tax of $78.398 million was paid, and $368 
million was returned as a dividend: 
Dividend payout ratio = $368m / $415.179m 
   = 88.64% 
Using the above data, and assuming that all the tax would have been repatriated as an 
increase in the dividend, in addition to the total dividend returned to the state in 
2013, the dividend payout ratio is as follows. 
Dividend payout ratio: Where there was a tax exemption 
Had Sydney Water sought to apply the tax-neutral option under paragraph 103A of 
the NTER Manual, the dividend paid to NSW Treasury as a result of this transaction 
would have been $446.398 million (an addition of the total dividend of $368 million, 
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and the tax of $78.398 million), and the dividend payout ratio would be calculated as 
follows: 
Dividend payout ratio = $446.398m / $415.179m 
   = 107.52% 
Rather than a dividend payout ratio of 88.64%, this would have risen to a dividend 
payout ratio of 107.52% had the tax neutral treatment been applied, an increase of 
18.88%. 
Earnings per share: Where no tax exemption was granted 
This same percentage increase is reflected in the earning per share ratio. Earnings per 
share is calculated as: net income / average outstanding common share. The total 
ordinary shares in Sydney Water in 2013 (and 2012) was 3,108,354,000.290 
Under the existing arrangement, where tax was paid on the refinancing, the earnings 
per share is calculated as: 
 = $415,179,000 / 3,108,354,000 
 = $0.1335688 
Earnings per share: Where there was a tax exemption 
Had no tax been paid on the refinancing of Sydney Desalination Plant, the net 
income would have increased from $415,179,000 to $493,577,000 (an increase of 
$78,398,000, being the tax paid on the transaction). The earnings per share under this 
scenario would have been: 
 = $493,577,000 / 3,108,354,000 
 = $0.15879 
The increase in earnings per share as a result of not taxing the transaction is 
$0.02522, or an increase of 18.88%. 
Conclusion 
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As can be seen from the above example, although NSW Treasury would have 
received the same income stream whether it had been paid one lump sum dividend, 
or as a split between income and tax, applying paragraph 103A would have resulted 
in a massive distortion of the ratios and gives a false picture of the overall financial 
health of the company. This also contravenes the principles of competitive neutrality 
because had a privately-owned entity engaged in a similar transaction, where a major 
part of the business was to be divested, there would have been no similar tax 
exemptions or favourable tax treatments available. 
This paragraph of the NTER Manual was used in order to grant a tax-neutral status to 
the privatisation of Ausgrid and TransGrid. All income and losses arising from those 
sales were treated in a non-assessable, non-deductible manner for tax purposes. Refer 
to section 5.1.3 for further discussion and analysis of these transactions. 
4.1.3 An informal relationship with the ATO 
The NTER Manual states that, while the relationship between the ATO and the 
NTER entities will be largely the same as that between the ATO and privately-owned 
organisation, the intention is “for the NTER to be carried on in a spirit of cooperation 
between the Commissioner, the States and Territories and the NTER entities. As 
such, the relationship between the Commissioner and the entities should be less 
formal than a relationship based purely on the law.”291 
This informal relationship will be discussed further in the case study which focuses 
on letters the ATO is willing to provide to NTER entities regarding tax treatments of 
transactions which might not strictly follow the letter of the law. 
4.1.4 Lack of ability to participate in structuring to minimise tax 
A major limitation of the NTER is that it does not allow for tax structuring 
opportunities that would otherwise be available to privately owned entities. For 
example, for private sector owned infrastructure, tax affairs are typically structured 
through the use of either a stapled company-trust structure, or a corporate structure 
funded by shareholder loans or redeemable preference shares (RPS). The result of 
such structuring typically enables many privately-owned infrastructure entities to 
achieve either nil, or close to nil, tax payable as a result. However, this type of tax 
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structuring is not permitted in the NTER and NTER entities typically have simpler 
tax structures, with many operating either as a standalone company, or as a simple 
and small consolidated tax group. Refer to case study 5.3: Comparison of NTER 
entities with their privately owned counterparts for more discussion of this issue. 
Trust structures are not permitted in the NTER. Structuring involving the use of 
trusts and various vehicles has enabled privately owned entities to minimise tax 
payable. This puts NTER entities at a disadvantage when compared to their private 
sector counterparts. This is because the opportunities to legally minimise tax are not 
available to NTER entities and, as such, it is expected that any comparisons between 
tax paid by an NTER entity and tax paid by a similar private sector counterpart in the 
same industry will show that the NTER entity pays considerably more tax and so 
appears to be less efficient from a tax perspective. However, the inefficiencies may 
not be due to things within the control of the NTER entity, but rather, due to 
competitive neutrality having failed in this instance. This is examined in section 5.3: 
Case study: Comparison of NTER entities with their privately owned counterparts, 
and section 6.5.1: Comparison of tax paid between privately owned and publicly 
owned companies in the electricity industry. 
If such tax structuring were to be permitted, all State and Territory governments 
would need to agree to the change. This would be unlikely because the States and 
Territories receive the tax equivalent payments and, as such, are unlikely to approve 
anything which would reduce their tax receipts.  
In addition, it appears that tax minimisation strategies employed by price regulated 
entities have not resulted in a lower tax allowance in the building block framework 
utilised in setting prices. This has resulted in privately owned entities receiving a tax 
allowance in their prices that is greater than tax paid. This is discussed further in 
section 6.4.4: The AER review of the regulatory tax approach in the energy sector. 
4.1.5 Imputation (franking) credits 
Imputation credits (also referred to as franking credits) were introduced to ensure 
that company profits were no longer taxed twice – once in the hands of the company, 
and a second time in the hands of the shareholder who received dividends from the 
company. Since dividend imputation was introduced in Australia in 1987, a 
shareholder in receipt of a company dividend distribution “grosses up” that 
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distribution for the franking credit (or company tax already paid). This franking 
credit is then allowed as a tax offset against the tax liability of the shareholder. 
Although excess franking credits are refunded to individual shareholders, companies 
are not entitled to franking credit refunds. 
Therefore, company tax can be considered to be a combination of corporate tax and 
personal tax.292 Officer states: 
“The proportion of company tax that can be fully rebated against personal tax 
liabilities is best viewed as personal income tax collected at the company level. In 
effect, the tax collected at the company level is a mixture of personal tax and 
company tax, the company tax being that proportion of the tax collected which is 
not credited (rebated) against personal tax.”293 
The NTER manual discusses the effect of franking credits on NTER entities twice. 
Firstly, paragraph 111A of the NTER manual states: 
“The 'gross-up' and tax offset treatment provided for by Division 207 of ITAA 
1997 will apply to franked dividends paid to NTER entities after 30 June 2002. 
An NTER entity must gross up any dividend by an amount equal to the franking 
credit on the dividend. The grossed up amount is included in assessable income 
and the NTER entity is entitled to a tax offset (non refundable) equal to the 
amount of the gross up.”294 
This treatment mirrors that available to the private sector. Private companies must 
also gross up a dividend and are then entitled to a non-refundable tax offset. 
However, on dividends paid, paragraph 112 of the NTER Manual states: 
“The issue of franking credits in relation to dividends is not expected to arise in 
the NTER since ultimately the only shareholder in NTER entities will be a State 
or Territory government.”295 
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Privately-owned companies are required to keep a record of tax paid in order to 
facilitate the passing on of these credits to their shareholders. They are required to 
keep a franking account and can pass on the franking credits to shareholders as part 
of a dividend distribution. 
Under this paragraph of the NTER Manual, NTER entities pay their dividends to 
their owner State or Territory treasuries without attaching any imputation credits. 
This is not an issue because the State and Territory Treasuries are government 
departments and, therefore, are not taxpayers or subject to any tax equivalents. There 
is no need for the State or Territory Treasuries to reduce their taxes by imputation 
credits received, because they are not subject to tax at all. Also, when considering 
this in line with Officer’s view above, this makes sense because none of the tax 
equivalents paid by an NTER entity can be considered to be personal tax payments at 
a company tax level. However, imputation credits are taken up when the price 
regulator sets prices for entities operating in a monopoly market. The effect of this is 
discussed further in section 6.5.4. 
4.2 Non NTER features affecting NTER entities 
Not all matters that influence the taxing of state-owned enterprises come from the 
NTER. Some matters extend beyond the NTER Manual and are contained in the tax 
legislation This section examines these sections of the tax legislation and the affect 
they have on state-owned corporations in a manner that is outside the reach of any 
tax equivalent regime. 
4.2.1 Division 1AB 
Division 1AB (s 24AK to 24AZ) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 exempts 
certain wholly-owned state and territory bodies (STBs) from income tax, thereby 
leaving these bodies as payers of tax equivalents. Therefore, for income tax purposes, 
NTER entities are exempt from income tax. Thus, any tax paid is in the form of 
“income tax equivalents” rather than income tax. Prior to the introduction of Div. 
1AB, and the NTER, section 23(d) of the ITAA1936 provided that the revenue of a 
public authority was exempt from income tax.  
Under s 24AK, the income of a wholly-owned state or territory body is exempt from 
income tax (unless the body is an excluded STB). To determine whether an entity is 
exempt from income tax under this division, s 24AL provides the following diagram: 
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Section 24AL provides the following diagram as a guide to help work out whether a 
body is exempt from income tax under this Division:  
 
 
An excluded STB is defined under section 24AT as an entity which: 
“(a)  at a particular time, is prescribed as an excluded STB in relation to that 
time; or  
(b)  is a municipal corporation or other local governing body (within the 
meaning of section 50-25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 ); or  
(c)  is a public educational institution to which any of paragraphs 50-55(1)(a) 
to (c) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 applies; or  
 (d)  is a public hospital to which any of paragraphs 50-55(1)(a) to (c) of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 applies; or  
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  (e)  is a superannuation fund.”296  
All NTER entities essentially fall into one of these categories and are not actual 
federal taxpayers, but rather, are subject to tax equivalents. This ties back to section 
114 of The Constitution which does not allow the Commonwealth to tax the property 
of the States. Therefore, any tax payable cannot be payable to the Federal 
government, and any tax assessed cannot be an actual “real” tax, but rather, in the 
form of tax equivalents. 
However, to allow for the administration of the NTER, the NTER manual provides 
for the following: 
“86. The relevant taxation laws are to be applied in all respects as if the 
following provisions were not applicable to the NTER entities:  
(i)  Section 50-25 of the ITAA 1997 (dealing with the income tax exemption 
afforded to public authorities); and 
(ii)  Division 1AB of the ITAA 1936 (dealing with the income tax exemption 
afforded to State/Territory bodies) 
87. For example, whether or not a tax deduction is allowed under section 8-1 of 
the ITAA 1997 is to be considered as if the reference in paragraph 8-1(2)(c) to 
gaining or producing exempt income did not apply to the extent that the above 
exemptions are involved.  
88. As a further example, section 51AD of the ITAA 1936 and Division 16D of 
the ITAA 1936 and Division 250 of the ITAA 1997, to the extent that these 
provisions might otherwise apply in relation to various arrangements (e.g. 
leases) under the NTER, do not apply if they are invoked only by virtue of the 
above exemptions applying to NTER entities.”297  
This paragraph of the NTER manual means that the tax laws will apply to nominated 
state-owned enterprises as though that division (Division 1AB) did not apply. 
However, instead of paying “real” tax (because on a Federal level, those laws exempt 
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the NTER entities from paying Federal income tax), the entities pay tax equivalents 
under the NTER manual. 
Although Div. 1AB exempts certain STBs from income tax under the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 and Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, it does not exempt STBs 
from other indirect taxes. These STBs retain their classification as a tax-exempt 
entity for other indirect taxes but are liable for those taxes. This has resulted in 
disadvantages to those STBs, discussed in section 4.2.3: Fringe benefits tax. 
4.2.2 Division 57 of ITAA 1936 
Division 57 of ITAA 1936298 applies in circumstances when tax exempt entities 
become taxable. Under this Division, when a tax-exempt entity becomes taxable each 
asset is deemed to be disposed and purchased at the adjusted market value at that 
time. 
Although not a technical feature of the NTER, the result of the application of this 
Division meant that all NTER entities, either on entry into the NTER or the 
predecessor STER, had to treat all assets as disposed of prior to entry into the NTER 
or STER and acquired on the date of entry into the NTER or STER. Despite the 
advantage of a higher cost base because of a deemed acquisition in either 1995 (for 
those that entered an STER) or from 2001 onwards (for those that entered the 
NTER), for many State-owned corporations which held old assets in their asset 
register, the application of this division meant that they lost the pre-CGT exemption 
for all assets purchased prior to 19 September 1985. 
This has disadvantaged all State-owned corporations by making all assets subject to 
capital gains tax and ignoring the purchase date of many assets acquired prior to the 
introduction of the capital gains tax legislation. 
Burton299 believes that this “spared the considerable expense of creating records to 
comply with the capital gains regime” but also agrees that this left State Owned 
Corporations at a disadvantage when compared to their private sector counterparts. 
However, he goes on to state that “there seems little point in the State Government 
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expending considerable amounts of its precious financial resources upon resolving 
complex taxation issues arising from this implementation.”300 
This treatment was mirrored at the national level, when Division 10 of Part IX 
ITAA36, which was passed in 1988, held that superannuation funds were taken to 
have acquired all their capital assets at market value on 30 June 1988, the date they 
became taxable for the first time.301 
4.2.3 Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) 
In addition to the disadvantage affecting State owned corporations due to the 
operation of Division 57 ITAA36, above, there is an additional disadvantage 
resulting from being a State-owned corporation which is not as a direct result of the 
operation of the NTER. This disadvantage relates to the operation of the Fringe 
Benefits Tax legislation and specific provisions within aimed at state-owned 
businesses. 
State-owned businesses are subject to Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) in the same manner 
as privately-owned organisations. Although s 114 of The Constitution does not allow 
the Commonwealth to tax the property of the States, it has been held that FBT is a 
tax on transactions rather than a tax on property, and therefore falls outside the reach 
of this section.302 
This has created some disadvantages to the state-owned enterprises, as they still 
classify as tax-exempt entities for the purposes of the FBT legislation. 
The Proof Committee Hansard: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit on 25 
August 2006 stated that competitive neutrality has not been applied in a small area of 
fringe benefits tax law.  
Fringe benefits tax is a Federal tax and its administration in relation to State-owned 
enterprise is not part of the NTER. The Fringe Benefits Tax legislation was 
introduced in 1986, prior to the introduction of the NTER.303 The Fringe Benefits 
Tax legislation points back to section 11.5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
for the definition of tax-exempt body. That section lists State and Territory bodies as 
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one of the types of entities that are tax exempt and refers back to Division 1AB of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The fringe benefits tax legislation does not 
recognise the NTER and so government-owned corporations are considered tax-
exempt bodies under Federal income tax laws.304  
The potential disadvantage of being classified as a tax-exempt body pertains only to 
the treatment of entertainment fringe benefits. When calculating the taxable value of 
meal entertainment, a non-tax-exempt entity has the option of three valuation 
methods: the 50/50 split method, the 12 week register method, or the actual cost 
method. 
For tax-exempt body entertainment, a fringe benefit arises, even if it would have 
otherwise qualified as a minor benefit. The tax-exempt body may elect to use the 
50/50 split method or the 12-week register method under Division 9A FBTAA. A 
fringe benefit will only occur for non-deductible expenditure for income tax 
purposes. For non-tax-exempt entities, the gross-up rules will treat expenditure in 
providing a fringe benefit as tax deductible. However, this is not the case for tax-
exempt bodies – the expenditure will retain its classification as non-deductible. In 
addition, a tax-exempt body is unable to reduce the taxable value of the fringe benefit 
by any employee contributions. 
Therefore, as a result of this section of the legislation not recognising the payment of 
tax equivalents, NTER and any other entities which pay tax equivalents are left at a 
disadvantage as the legislation still treats them as a non-tax payer. Although not a 
feature of the NTER, it still serves to illustrate how state-owned corporations can be 
at a disadvantage when compared to privately owned corporations. 
4.2.4 Case study: Gifted assets 
Objective 3 of the thesis considers variation from State-to-State as a result of 
differences arising from the workings of each State or Territory’s Treasury. This 
section will extend that examination further to consider variations resulting not only 
from state-to-state variations resulting from treasuries, but also from price regulator 
variations. 
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Gifted assets are typically an issue in the infrastructure sector. Assets can be gifted to 
either the private sector or the public sector alike. Gifted assets usually arise when: 
• Developers build infrastructure assets on common land which that developer 
is not permitted to own or operate under law. For example, a developer may 
build water, wastewater, stormwater or recycled water assets on common 
land as part of a development being built in Sydney. Under NSW laws, 
unless that developer has a Water Industry Competition Act (WICA) 
licence, the developer is not permitted to own or operate such assets. A 
WICA licence is needed by any person or entity who wishes to construct, 
maintain or operate any water industry infrastructure, or supply water or 
provide sewerage services by means of any water industry infrastructure, 
unless an exemption applies.305 Assuming the developer did not have a 
WICA licence (which is likely for most property developers), that developer 
would be required to transfer the asset to the State’s water utility, Sydney 
Water. If the water utility does not want to pay for the asset, the developer is 
left with no other choice but to transfer the asset at no cost, or “gift” the 
asset to the water utility. This type of scenario is common throughout the 
infrastructure industry, and would also apply if that developer had 
constructed electricity assets as part of the development. 
• Other government agencies might undertake public works that require 
existing infrastructure assets to be moved or rebuilt. For example, works on 
the construction of a new road might require existing water pipes to be dug 
up and relocated. When these assets have been moved or rebuilt, they are 
often transferred to the utility at no cost. 
• Improvements to existing assets can also be gifted. This can come about 
where, for example, a developer might require improvements to an existing 
asset or expansion of that asset in order to enable it to meet the needs of the 
development under construction. In these circumstances, the developer 
could carry out the work required or alternatively, pay for the improvements 
to be made by the owner of the asset. 
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These gifted assets can also be referred to as “developer contributions” and “capital 
contributions” (which can also refer to circumstances where cash is given to the 
utility rather than the developer performing the capital works). These terms are used 
interchangeably here. 
There is mismatch in treatment of these assets or contributions, which will be 
expanded further below. 
4.2.4.1 Regulatory treatment 
As outlined earlier, the regulated asset base (RAB) only includes assets that a utility 
has either purchased for consideration or constructed. The cost of these assets is 
recovered through prices that the price regulator sets. Since gifted assets have no 
element of cost to the regulated entity, they are excluded from the RAB. Therefore, 
the result is that prices set by the price regulator do not recover the capital costs of 
gifted assets. When considering these capital contributions in relation to the water 
sector, the Essential Services Commission of Victoria states that the regulatory 
framework aims to ensure that water businesses are able to recover the cost of their 
capital investments through prices. However, the revenue requirement to recover 
these capital costs is not changed by assets which have been covered by partial 
payments by customers or for assets which are outright gifted and pose no cost to the 
water business receiving them.306 
However, some price regulators are allowing for the value of these gifted assets to be 
included in the tax allowance. By doing so, the price regulator is allowing for the tax 
impact of these assets to be included in prices. This will be discussed further in the 
examples below. 
4.2.4.2 Accounting treatment 
Under AASB Interpretation 18, paragraph 11 states that “if an entity concludes that 
the definition of an asset is met, it shall recognise the transferred asset as an item of 
property, plant and equipment in accordance with paragraph 7 of AASB 116 and 
measure its cost on initial recognition at its fair value in accordance with paragraph 
24 of that Standard”. Therefore, for accounting purposes, any gifted assets are 
recognised as revenue in the year they are received and are included in the asset 
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register at the fair value of that asset. Fair value is considered to be the replacement 
cost of the assets as at the date of acceptance of the gifted asset. This is usually an 
estimate of the developer’s cost to construct the asset. 
Then, as at 1 July each year, a cash-generating unit test (CGUT) is performed. This 
test compares the potential revenue from assets existing at that point in time (less 
operating costs) to the accounting book value of the assets. Any differences between 
the potential revenue and the accounting book value of assets are then adjusted in the 
accounting asset register through either revaluations or impairments. 
Regulated assets relate to assets required in the delivery of monopoly-related 
services, and so are subject to price regulation by a pricing regulator. Non-regulated 
assets relate to assets which provide services that are subject to competition by other 
market participants. These services are not regulated by the price regulator. Most 
utilities have a portion of regulated and unregulated activities. 
In a simplified environment where a utility has only regulated assets which are all 
included in the RAB, potential revenue (less operating costs) of the existing assets 
will be the present value of the return on and return of the RAB. Therefore, if the 
book value of assets is greater than the present value of the future net cash inflows 
generated by the assets in the RAB, the book value of the assets will be impaired 
down. 
Unlike the simple example above, most regulated entities also have some non-
regulated revenue. The present value of non-regulated revenue is added to the present 
value of the return on and return of the RAB to determine the utility’s revenue 
potential for existing assets. 
In both situations above, the gifted assets are effectively impaired to zero in the book 
value via the CGUT, because there is no return on or return of expected for these 
assets. 
For example, the book value of assets as at 1 July 2009 might have been $100 
million, and throughout 2009-10, $1 million of gifted assets might have been 
received, bringing the total accounting book value of assets to $101 million. 
Assuming nothing else has changed during the year, when performing the CGUT test 
on 30 June 2010, the $100 million RAB is compared to the accounting book value of 
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$101 million, and the excess $1 million is written off as an impairment. This means 
the net effect of the gifted assets is nil – the $1 million included as income has been 
effectively matched by a $1 million impairment expense, giving a nil effect on profit 
(assuming no revaluation of assets has previously taken place in this simplified 
example). 
4.2.4.3 Tax treatment 
For tax purposes, any gifted assets are treated as assessable income under section 
21A – Non-cash business benefits.307 Section 21A(2) states that “if a non-cash 
business benefit (whether or not convertible to cash) is income derived by a taxpayer: 
(a) The benefit shall be brought into account at its arm’s length value reduced by 
the recipient’s contribution (if any); and 
(b) If the benefit is not convertible to cash – in determining the arm’s length 
value of the benefit, any conditions that would prevent or restrict the 
conversion of the benefit shall be disregarded.” 
Using the example above, the $1 million would be treated as assessable income. 
However, any impairment is not deductible for tax purposes, so the $1 million 
impairment will be added back during the preparation of the tax return as a non-
deductible expense. The net effect then results in $300,000 in tax payable on assets 
that generate no income for the business.  
However, the inclusion of the $1 million in assessable income then entitles the entity 
receiving the asset to a tax depreciation deduction over the life of the asset. 
As it currently stands, the inability of an asset to be converted to cash is not 
considered when determining arm’s length value.308 This presents a potential 
problem where the reason that most of these assets are gifted to begin with is because 
legally they are not allowed to be sold or to be run by any entity without the required 
licenses. 
A number of entities have begun grossing up any gifted assets for the tax payable as 
a result of receiving these assets, thereby shifting the tax liability to the entity 
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transferring the asset. In addition, these grossed up amounts are likely to be included 
as revenue too, resulting in the 30% tax also needing to be grossed up and effectively 
taking the total amount required from the developer to 43%.309 This can present its 
own problem as the price regulator may include an allowance for gifted assets when 
arriving at its tax building block allowance, only to have the regulated entity then 
seek to a gross up tax payment from the provider of a gifted asset. This potentially 
represents double-dipping of the amount of tax, both by way of inclusion in the tax 
allowance, and then by an additional cash contribution from the developer 
transferring the asset. 
Prior to the NTER, the STER (State Tax Equivalent Regime) had a special provision 
that exempted gifted assets from tax. Gifted assets are still being treated as exempt 
from tax in Queensland’s Local Government Tax Equivalents Manual. In that 
manual, Local Government Income Tax Equivalents Ruling (LITER) 98/20: Assets 
Acquired Free of Charge (Contributed Assets) holds that gifted assets are to be 
treated in a revenue neutral manner – that is, the gifted asset or contribution will not 
be treated as assessable income, and no deductions will be allowed in respect of the 
initial value.310 This treatment relates to those entities which selected Option 1 of 
LITER 98/19: Adoption of Current Cost Accounting,311 which involves applying all 
income tax laws in respect of the entity’s non-current assets. (Option 2 involves the 
use of the accounting asset register as a replacement for maintaining a separate tax 
asset register. This is outside the scope of this thesis.) 
4.2.4.4 Attempts to overcome the problem 
There have been a number of different ways of overcoming the issues that arise from 
gifted assets. These can include: 
• The price regulator allows for tax on the gifted assets when determining 
prices. This results in the cost of gifted assets being recovered through 
prices in the bills that all consumers pay. The overall effect is an increase in 
revenue and therefore taxable income. 
                                               
309
 PwC, ‘Capital contributions and infrastructure projects’ (1 May 2014) PwC TaxTalk Monthly  2; 
Paul Naglan and Charles Ferraro, ‘A hidden tax cost for infrastructure projects’ (2014) 49(6) Taxation 
in Australia 337, 339. 
310
 Queensland Treasury, Local Government Tax Equivalents Manual, (2010) 86. 
311
 Ibid 83. 
109 
 
• In some instances, the price regulator advises the regulated entity to charge 
the tax back to the entity doing the gifting. This results in the gifted asset 
also being recognised in the form of increased revenue; however, this time it 
is payable by the developer rather than by the bill payers. 
• The State owned entity’s State or Territory Treasury can adjust the dividend 
to reduce the tax effect of these gifted assets. In this case the return on 
equity ratios are affected as they are adjusted for the value of gifted assets 
received. 
• Or the State Treasury and the price regulator can do nothing, and the State-
owned corporation can end up worse off. This ultimately results in the entity 
“wearing” the cost of the gifted assets. 
Once gifted assets have been reported as income, and tax paid on the value, the 
receiving entity can claim tax depreciation deductions over the useful life of the 
asset. Therefore, the only real difference is the time value of money of the tax 
depreciation deductions versus the tax paid upfront. Because infrastructure assets are 
typically long-lived, this could be a significant loss for the receiving entity. 
4.2.4.5 Western Power – Capital contributions 
Western Power commenced charging a tax recovery rate on capital contributions 
from 5 January 2015. Previously, Western Power used to absorb any tax relating to 
capital contributions. However, after consultation with their regulator, the Economic 
Regulation Authority (ERA), it was decided that the tax on such contributions should 
be borne by the entity gifting the asset or making the contribution, rather than borne 
by the customer through increased prices.312 
The rate charged to the gifting entity is 13.9% of the value of the gifted asset or cash 
contribution.313 This is calculated by taking into account the upfront tax on the value 
of the asset or contribution, and the net present value of the future tax depreciation 
deductions allowed. 
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4.2.4.6 Water Corporation – Capital contributions and dividends 
The Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) issued a report which considered 
developer contributions relating to the Water Corporation.314 In this report, the ERA 
also considered the tax treatment of developer contributions. The ERA noted that tax 
is payable on any developer contributions, however, dividends paid to the State 
Treasury are paid exclusive of revenue from gifted assets. 
The ERA did note that over the life of the asset there is no net tax impact.315 This is 
because any amount assessed upfront will be deductible over the life of the asset. I 
argue that this is too simplistic a view because it does not take into account the time 
value of money; and that the tax paid upfront will be greater than the net present 
value of the depreciation deductions claimed over the life of the asset. 
4.2.4.7 Conclusion – Gifted assets/Developer contributions 
As can be seen through the various case studies and examples above, there is a 
discrepancy in the overall treatment of gifted assets and developer contributions. 
Whilst the tax treatment is fairly straightforward – the value of the asset or 
contribution is assessable upfront – the impact of the discrepancies between the 
treatment of different price regulators, and the treatment of different State and 
Territory Treasuries has resulted in an uneven playing field. However, this not only 
relates to an uneven playing field between publicly versus privately owned entities, 
but also between like entities.  
4.3 State to State variations arising from the 
workings of each State and Territory Treasury 
4.3.1 State treasuries and dividend policies 
State Treasuries each set their own policies relating to the setting of dividends. The 
Financial Distribution Policy ‘requires Government businesses to determine an 
appropriate distribution policy based on a ‘modified’ residual approach.’316 This 
policy enables Government businesses to agree on dividend targets and capital 
repayments. 
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This could impact the extent to which the NTER has achieved competitive neutrality 
given that, State-by-State, the approach to taxation might be different depending on 
how the dividend is calculated, or whether the entity can expect to receive any tax 
refunds it is due. For example, an entity might be more diligent in applying 
favourable tax positions if it paid a set dividend, when compared to an entity that 
paid a dividend that was set as a percentage of post-tax profits. 
It is argued that requiring State or Government Owned Enterprises to pay dividends 
is effectively removing any advantages they might have by being State owned and 
putting these entities on the same footing as privately owned organisations.317 In 
addition, Queensland Treasury argues that “the adoption of an explicit dividend 
policy will help dispel any misconception that the cost of equity finance is zero and 
facilitates comparison with private and public sector benchmarks”318 
The following will provide a comparison of each State and Territory’s Treasury 
regarding their dividend setting policies. 
4.3.1.1 New South Wales 
The dividend-setting policy for NSW Treasury is contained in its Financial 
Distribution Policy for Government Business. It provides a negotiation mechanism 
for the setting of dividends but sets a benchmark dividend payout ratio of 70% of 
post-tax profit. In doing so, however, NSW Treasury does not rule out the 
requirement for businesses to pay greater than 70% if that business has the capacity 
to do so.319 “Dividends should be expressed as a percentage of post-tax profits and 
adjusted where required for items including non-cash fair value movements in 
financial instruments.”320 
NSW Treasury is not in favour of any State-owned businesses keeping any cash or 
financial assets on hand that are in excess of its requirements.321 
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Victoria’s dividend setting guidelines are contained in its Corporate Planning and 
Performance Reporting Requirements guidelines. 
Victorian Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) have two guidelines regarding 
the setting of dividends, these being: 
• 50% of net profit after tax; or 
• 65% of pre-tax profit (where the GBE is not required to pay tax equivalents, 
or where there is a significant difference between income tax payable and 
income tax expense).322 
4.3.1.3 Queensland 
Dividends paid by entities owned by the State in Queensland are negotiated on an 
annual basis. There are no percentage guidelines as there are for other State or 
Territory Treasuries, but instead rely on an expectation that “once the capital 
structure and required rate of return on assets have been set, dividends would 
effectively be determined as a residual matter as the return on debt is fixed and debt 
has priority over equity in the distribution of revenues.”323 
4.3.1.4 Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory has a dividend guideline of 50% of after-tax profits. 
However, the Treasurer may alter this if the GBE has high debt levels, or there is 
high forecast future capital expenditure.324 
4.3.1.5 Tasmania 
The general dividend policy of Tasmania requires Tasmanian Government 
businesses to pay a dividend of 90% of net profits after tax, unless a lower 
percentage can be justified.325 
A lower dividend ratio may be considered in circumstances of: 
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• “the progression towards, or maintenance of, an appropriate capital 
structure; 
• cash flow requirements for working capital; 
• funding requirements for capital expenditure; and/or 
• contingency required for financial flexibility.”326 
4.3.1.6 Western Australia 
The West Australian dividend policy, as contained in the West Australian 
Government’s Statement of Corporate Intent for 2014/15, provides that a dividend is 
calculated based on 65% of the WATC’s after tax profits, subject to adjustments 
allowed by the Treasurer.327 
4.3.1.7 Conclusion 
The above section outlined the differences that State and Territory Governments take 
in setting dividends. Differences in how State and Territory Treasuries require 
dividends (percentage, set, and so on) will impact whether entities are more or less 
likely to pursue tax saving opportunities. For example, if an entity were likely to 
keep a greater percentage of any savings as a result of minimising their tax, they 
would be more likely to pursue tax savings than an entity that was paying out 90 or 
100% of post-tax profits in dividends. 
4.4 Case studies: Non-neutral treatment under the 
NTER 
4.4.1 Letter from the ATO 
Several NTER entities have entered long standing contracts. These old agreements 
were typically Build Own Operate (BOO) or Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
type contracts. Some of these contracts were entered into prior to the introduction of 
any tax equivalent regimes. The aim of these agreements was to encourage the 
private sector to invest in the public sector, either by building, owning and operating 
(BOO) infrastructure assets, or by building, owning, operating, and then transferring 
(BOOT) these assets at an agreed date in the future. 




 West Australian Treasury Corporation, Statement of Corporate Intent 2014/15, (2015) 16. 
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At the time the old standing contracts were entered into, government owned entities 
sought to make these types of agreements more appealing to the private sector by 
structuring them in such a way to shift all tax benefits to the private sector. At the 
time, this seemed a favourable thing to do – the government owned entities were not 
subject to any sort of tax equivalent regimes and were not taxpayers in any form, so 
any tax advantages would have been wasted; and the structuring of tax advantages 
made the agreements more appealing to the private sector. 
However, problems arose when the government introduced tax equivalent regimes. 
Once government owned entities were turned into taxpayers, they were 
disadvantaged by old agreements and contracts that benefited the private sector and 
saw these state-owned corporations at a significant disadvantage from a tax 
perspective. 
Even more so, when it came time to renegotiate old contracts, State owned 
corporations were put in an even more difficult position of attempting to negotiate an 
even remotely favourable outcome when the private sector party was unwilling to let 
go of previously won tax advantages. 
To attempt to remedy this problem, the NTER section of the Tax Office came up 
with a solution. With the agreement of the State treasury of the NTER entity in 
question, the ATO was willing to provide a letter of assurance to the NTER entity. 
This letter provides that the entity can treat these transactions in an agreed way 
without it being subject to any further audit or questioning by the ATO or their State 
Treasury. This is more favourable than applying for a formal tax ruling because these 
agreements would not result in a favourable outcome for the NTER entity if the strict 
letter of the tax law were to be applied. Thus, the ATO and the State or Territory 
treasury are willing to overlook the strict application of the tax law to allow for a 
more favourable outcome for the NTER entity. 
Appendix 9.4 outlines the specific circumstances relating to the issuing of one of 
these letters. 
Since this type of letter was made available within the NTER, there have been 
several letters of this type issued. Not all of them have related to agreements or 
contracts put in place prior to the introduction of the NTER or any State tax 
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equivalent regimes. They have also been allowed in instances where State or 
Territory directives have caused negative tax outcomes for NTER entities. In these 
cases, the State or Territory treasuries have given the NTER directives to structure 
agreements in certain ways, which then result in an undesirable tax outcome, which 
the NTER entity would never have entered had their owner Treasury not directed 
them to do so. However, there has been no mention of such agreements in the NTER 
Manual. The NTER Manual only covers government-imposed restructures and 
privatisation. It states: 
“103. A renegotiation of arrangements or a restructure by an NTER entity 
may be the result of requirements externally imposed on the NTER entity by 
its State or Territory government. This includes a renegotiation or a 
restructure involving the transfer of assets for no consideration from an 
NTER entity to another entity of its State or Territory government that does 
not have commercial returns as a primary objective and is not an NTER 
entity. 
A privatisation of an asset owned, or business activity carried on by an NTER 
entity may be externally imposed on the NTER entity by its State or Territory 
government…. 
103A. Such an imposed renegotiation, restructure or privatisation will be 
treated in a tax neutral manner for NTER purposes… 
103B. Alternatively, such an imposed renegotiation, restructure or 
privatisation may be treated in a manner which the NTER administrator 
approves as appropriate in the circumstances, including taking into account; 
• Whether the proposed tax treatment gives an NTER entity involved an unfair 
advantage over its competitors in other States or Territories; and 
• The arrangements and structures that have previously existed in relation to 
the business operations of the NTER entities involved.”328 
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It is a recommendation of this research thesis that the ATO should amend the NTER 
manual to include a section on these types of letters and agreements to enable 
transparency. 
4.4.2 Capitalised labour 
The ATO considered the issue of the deductibility of salary and wages paid to 
employees involved in the construction of capital assets. This was an issue mainly in 
those industries where large capital assets were constructed, that is, mainly 
infrastructure. However, this issue affected both privately owned corporations and 
several NTER entities alike. As part of their consultations with industry, the ATO 
discovered the salary and wages of those staff engaged in the construction of capital 
assets was being treated several different ways. Some companies were deducting the 
entire cost outright, others were capitalising the expense as part of the cost of 
construction of the asset, whilst others took the middle ground and capitalised the 
cost of those solely dedicated to the construction of capital assets and deducted the 
cost of those only partly dedicated to the construction of capital assets. 
In seeking to introduce a uniform method of treatment for the salary and wages 
related to the construction of capital assets, the ATO released two ATO Interpretive 
Decisions: 
• ATO ID 2011/42: Deductibility of salary or wages to the extent that 
employees are engaged in the self-construction of depreciating assets; and 
• ATO ID 2011/43: Deductibility of labour on-costs to the extent that 
employees are engaged in the self-construction of depreciation assets. 
The result of these ATOIDs was to rule that all salary and wage costs relating to the 
construction of capital assets were to be treated as capital and were not to be 
deducted for tax purposes. However, the privately owned federal taxpayers were 
advised that they had to go back and amend the prior four years of tax returns and 
pay any outstanding taxes resulting from the introduction and back-dating of this 
treatment. Meanwhile, State owned corporations in the NTER were advised that 
these changes would apply prospectively and therefore there was no need to go back 
and amend prior year tax returns.  
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In this example, the State-owned corporations were given an advantage despite the 
existence of the NTER, which has the role of putting the state owned and privately-
owned corporations on the same footing. They were left with an advantage over their 
privately-owned counterparts by not having to pay any additional tax on overclaimed 
salary and wage expenses. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 examined key features of the NTER, both those that might be an advantage 
to NTER entities, such as the tax neutral treatment of government imposed 
restructures and an informal relationship with the ATO, and those that could be a 
disadvantage to NTER entities, for example, the lack of ability to appeal, the lack of 
the ability for NTER entities to participate in tax structuring with the intention of 
minimising tax, and the non-requirement to abide by laws regarding imputation 
credits.  
Further, this chapter considered non-NTER related tax issues that affect NTER 
entities, for example, the operation of Division 1AB, Division 57 ITAA 1936, and 
gifted assets. This chapter was the first to contain the case studies utilised in this 
research. The first case study was the “letter of comfort” from the ATO, whereby the 
tax treatment of particular transactions is agreed upon (not to the strict letter of tax 
law), and NTER entities are given the assurance that the ATO will not challenge the 
treatment in future. The second case study examined the tax treatment of capitalised 
labour. It was found that, on the introduction of the ATOIDs relating to capitalised 
labour, NTER entities were permitted to apply this treatment on a prospective basis, 
whereas privately-owned entities were required to amend the prior four years of tax 
returns and pay any tax outstanding. 
The following chapter will continue to expand the literature to examine different 
regulatory structures. It will also involve the use of case studies and will analyse and 




5 Examination of privatisation, and a 
comparison of NTER entities with 
their privately-owned counterparts 
5.1 An examination of privatisation and the impact 
on competitive neutrality 
This section will involve an examination of other tools which may be used to achieve 
competitive neutrality, and how these tools were used in Australia. This section will 
also consider how effective these tools were in achieving competitive neutrality. This 
section will firstly focus on the use of debt neutrality and the impact it had on 
competitive neutrality. It will then move to a discussion and case study of 
privatisation. 
As previously discussed in the opening of chapter 3, the Hilmer Report and Harper 
Review both recommend the use of privatisation, corporatisation, the reform of 
specific advantages and disadvantages, and pricing directions to achieve competitive 
neutrality. This section will examine whether these strategies were successful in 
achieving competitive neutrality and whether they could be considered to be more 
successful than the introduction of the NTER in achieving competitive neutrality, 
and how the NTER interacted with these other methods. For example, we will 
examine some case studies which consider the interaction of paragraph 103A: 
‘Government imposed restructures and privatisations’ of the NTER Manual and how 
this paragraph was applied to the privatisations of Ausgrid and TransGrid. 
In addition, this section will examine the effect joining the NTER had on a state-
owned corporation. It will seek to examine the changes that needed to be made, and 
whether there were any efficiency gains as a result of needing to pay tax. In addition, 
it will explore whether tax forms a major part of contract negotiation and business 
decisions. 
5.1.1 Debt neutrality 
Debt neutrality is one of the competitive advantages that was targeted in the 
implementation of the national competition policy in Australia. It was believed that 
state-owned enterprises had an advantage over their privately-owned counterparts by 
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way of paying less for debt either through lower interest rates or subsidies. In 
targeting debt neutrality as an area of focus to achieve competitive neutrality, it was 
hoped that with the introduction of debt neutrality measures public and private 
sectors would both be subject to the same debt financing costs. 
However, each State treasury has its own financial institution which State-owned 
entities are required use for borrowing and financing. This financial institution 
operates in a sector where competition is readily available (through banks and other 
financial institutions) and yet it has no competition because its only clients are State-
owned enterprises which are discouraged from going to the private sector and 
seeking more competitive borrowing rates. Although entities might be able to obtain 
cheaper financing by going to the private sector (borrowing through banks), they are 
unable to do so without the approval of their State or Territory treasury. This has put 
State owned entities at a potential disadvantage when compared to their private 
sector counterparts. This could be an area for further research. It is merely being 
mentioned here as a comparison, and to illustrate instances where competitive 
neutrality measures might have failed. 
The details of each State’s borrowing corporation are as follows: 
• NSW: New South Wales Treasury Corporation (TCorp) 
https://www.tcorp.nsw.gov.au/html/ 
• Western Australia: Western Australian Treasury Corporation (WATC) 
http://www.watc.wa.gov.au/ 
• Victoria: Treasury Corporation of Victoria (TCV) 
https://www.tcv.vic.gov.au/ 
• Queensland: Queensland Treasury Corporation (QTC) 
https://www.qtc.com.au/  
• Northern Territory: Northern Territory Treasury Corporation (NTTC) 
http://www.treasury.nt.gov.au/BorrowingAndInvestment/Pages/default.aspx 
• South Australia: South Australian Government Financing Authority (SAFA) 
http://www.safa.sa.gov.au/ 




In addition, “significant government businesses in Australia are liable to factor in 
debt neutrality adjustments to their borrowing if they benefit from debt advantages 
due to their public sector ownership.”329 These debt neutrality adjustments ensure 
that competitive neutrality requirements are met, and that State-owned corporations 
do not receive any advantages by virtue of their government ownership. 
Australia’s system of debt neutrality is similar to the one in place in the United 
Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, SOEs are not permitted to borrow from the open 
market. The reason for this is to ensure SOEs do not gain any advantages from an 
implicit government guarantee. Instead, all financing by the SOEs must be attained 
from the National Loans Fund (NLF).330 
For this type of arrangement, where borrowing is required to be made from the State, 
the OECD recommends ensuring that the borrowing is done according to market 
rates and terms.331 
Australia ensures debt neutrality is met by engaging debt rating agencies to provide a 
credit evaluation of SOCs under the same criteria used for privately-owned 
entities.332 
An example of the level of government control over the State-owned corporations 
can be seen in Treasury Circulars. NSW Treasury has issued Treasury Circular 
TC98/07: Structured Finance Transactions, which puts restrictions around State-
owned agencies from entering any complex financing transactions, including: 
• “operating leases 
• finance leases 
• cross-border leases 
• securitisations 
• structured asset acquisitions; and 
• other similar transactions.”333 
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Requirements are in place under this Treasury Circular to ensure that agencies 
submit proposals for such transactions to NSW Treasury for assessment prior to 
committing to any form of this type of structuring. This results in State-owned 
corporations not being entirely independent of the State. The State is still able to 
influence control and exercise decision-making powers over the running of the 
entity. In this way, the State is also able to determine the level of risk the entity is 
allowed to take, and therefore can also have a part in decision-making. 
A comparison of the debt levels and high-level interest rates between publicly-owned 
and privately-owned energy companies is made in section 5.3: Case study: 
Comparison of NTER entities with their privately-owned counterparts. 
5.1.2 Privatisation 
The discussion of privatisation in this thesis is two-fold. The first part considers 
privatisation in the context of competition and competitive neutrality, and its 
effectiveness therein. In addition, it will consider examples and studies from overseas 
experiences with privatisation, and the effect of the regulatory regime on the 
effectiveness of privatisation. The second part considers the interaction of the NTER 
when NTER entities undergo privatisation. 
The OECD states that the definition of privatisation differs between OECD 
countries. For the purposes of its work, the OECD defines privatisation as: 
“As privatisation may be considered any material transaction by which the state’s 
ultimate ownership of corporate entities is reduced. This definition includes direct 
divestment by the state, divestment of corporate assets by government-controlled 
investment vehicles as well as the dilution of state positions in SOEs by secondary 
share offerings to the non-state shareholders. It may also include divestment of 
subsidiaries by SOEs, though this is more of a gray area: if SOEs for example 
shed subsidiaries in consequence of government decisions then the resultant 
transactions would normally be considered as privatisation. However, if partly 
state-owned enterprises decide to divest based on commercial considerations then 
it makes little sense to speak of privatisation – lest any merger and acquisition of 
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the said enterprises should be considered as “privatisation” and 
“nationalisation”.334 
For Australian purposes, privatisation involves the full or partial transfer of assets 
owned by the State to the private sector. Rather than including the sale of land or 
buildings, privatisation refers to the transfer of a business as a ‘going concern’. 
However, privatisation is not the private financing of large infrastructure projects, 
leasing or contracting out of services.335 
Privatisation raises cash for the State and eliminates subsidies by the government to 
the State-owned entity.336 However, where the State receives the initial cash injection 
by the sale of the assets, the State also loses the tax equivalent payments the 
privatised entity used to pay whilst under State ownership and the NTER. These tax 
equivalent payments then become actual federal tax payments under the Federal tax 
system once the business is privatised. There has been discussion about whether to 
allow States to continue to receive these tax payments from privatised entities. This 
is discussed further in section 5.1.2.2: Privatisation and the loss of tax payments to 
the State. In addition to losing the tax equivalent payments, the State also loses the 
dividend payments it used to receive, once it privatises its businesses. 
In addition to raising funds for the State, a further argument for the privatisation of 
State-owned businesses is to promote innovation and investment. Kressides (cited in 
Nepal and Foster), argues that privatisations improve innovation and investment in 
the electricity networks sector.337 Also, a result of privatisation is that businesses are 
free to structure their borrowing and financing any way they choose and are not held 
to public sector restrictions on borrowings.338 Public sector constraints on borrowings 
are covered in the debt neutrality discussion in section 5.1.1. However, a potential 
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disadvantage from privatisation is that the private sector will forgo objectives which 
are deemed to be socially valuable with the aim of maximising profits.339 
In addition, State-owned corporations are subject to different objectives set by their 
owner State or Territory government. Company law as it currently stands does not 
have any provisions which can stop the government setting these objectives for their 
corporatised businesses.340 These objectives were discussed in section 2.11.2. 
The National Tax Equivalent Regime plays a key role in the privatisation of State-
owned businesses. By requiring the State-owned business to be subject to a tax 
equivalent regime, NTER entities are required to abide by the ATO’s rules to keep 
accurate and complete tax records. This involves detailed tax asset registers and, in 
addition to the ATO’s record-keeping requirements, the accounting standards require 
the calculation of a tax provision and deferred tax assets or liabilities for the purposes 
of the Financial Statements. In so doing, the process of privatisation is improved, and 
is simpler and more transparent, as all the data needed for the tax due diligence 
required by the private sector as part of the sale process, is available and complete. 
This section will examine privatisation from the Australian context and will draw on 
research undertaken as to the effectiveness of privatisation overseas. It will consider 
the type of assets suitable for privatisation, privatisation and the regulatory regime, 
and privatisation effects on efficiency. It will also look more specifically at 
privatisation in the electricity sector, as this is a focus of this thesis. Lastly, this 
section will examine a case study of privatisation in Australia. 
5.1.2.1 Which assets should be privatised 
While a government might choose to go down the path of privatisation, not all its 
businesses are suitable for privatisation. Infrastructure Australia produced a report 
which considered which infrastructure assets are suitable for privatisation. It 
allocated them into the following categories: 
• “Those which have competitive markets and where the remaining publicly 
owned assets are suitable candidates for transfer to the private sector; 
                                               
339
 Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, cited in Nepal, Rabindra and John Foster, ‘Electricity networks 
privatisation in Australia: An overview of the debate’ (2015) School of Economics: University of 
Queensland 5. 
340
 OECD, Privatisation, competition and regulation, above n 338, 26. 
124 
 
• Those which are not competitive or have significant non-competitive 
segments, but in which appropriate regulatory structures currently apply, 
making them suitable candidates for transfer to the private sector; 
• Those which are not competitive or have significant non-competitive 
segments and where the regulatory framework is not yet suitably developed 
to allow privatisation, but where this can be achieved with structural and/or 
regulatory changes; and 
• Those which are unsuitable for transfer to the private sector, either because of 
significant structural or regulatory impediments, or sectors which are unlikely 
to yield upfront revenue from privatisation because they do not have 
sufficient non-Government earnings and/or they carry a very large 
community service obligation component.”341 
In order to prepare for privatisation, the government needs to take certain steps. Prior 
to privatisation, restructuring of government business needs to take place. Key to the 
success of privatisation is the separation of commercial and non-commercial 
objectives within the State-owned corporation.342 Further, within a natural monopoly 
segment, it is important to separate the monopoly parts of the business from those 
parts which can be competitive.343 For example, the electricity sector in Australia has 
been successfully separated into network, distribution and retail segments. Some of 
these components are natural monopolies, while others are able to be competitive. 
This is covered further in section 5.2.2.2. 
5.1.2.2 Privatisation and the loss of tax payments to the State 
Once the government privatises its assets, two things occur. Firstly, it ceases to 
receive dividends from the privatised businesses. Secondly, it also ceases to receive 
the tax equivalent payments made under the NTER. This is because the entity now 
being privatised is no longer subject to a tax equivalent regime, and instead becomes 
subject to Federal income tax. Tax payments, if any, are no longer made to the State, 
and are instead made to the Commonwealth. 
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The Senate issued “Privatisation of State and Territory assets and new 
infrastructure”. As part of this inquiry, submissions were sought from interested 
parties. The Water Services Association of Australia requested that, on privatisation, 
States and Territories should be compensated for the loss of dividends and tax 
equivalent payments that resulted from the privatisation of State-owned assets.344 
Although notional tax payments under the NTER are lost, the Productivity 
Commission held that  
“dividend imputation and productivity gains from privatisation could offset the 
loss of notional income tax payments. Specifically, if dividend imputation is 
complete and the purchaser of the enterprise can obtain full compensation of 
company tax through franking credits, a State Government would not lose from 
privatisation.”345 
However, tax payments typically reduce, at least in the initial years, after 
privatisation. This could be because of stamp duty relating to the transaction, or 
because of more aggressive tax treatments and structuring taken by the private sector. 
This is expanded further in section 6.5.2. 
5.1.2.3 Privatisation and efficiency 
There has been much debate and many studies around whether privatisation has 
resulted in increased efficiency and whether privatisation has resulted in an increase 
in prices (refer to section 5.2.2.2.1: The increase in electricity prices and privatisation 
for further discussion about whether the privatisation of much of the electricity 
industry has been the cause for the increase in electricity prices and bills). In the 
electricity industry, in particular, it has been found that privatisation has had no 
effect on electricity prices. The increase has largely been driven by aging assets 
which need to be replaced. The AER reported that “its regulatory determinations 
from 2009 to 2011 reflected increasing capital needs to replace aging assets, meet 
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higher reliability standards and respond to forecasts made at the time of rising peak 
demand.”346  
Notwithstanding this, the AER reports that privately-owned electricity companies in 
the distribution sector “generally appear more productive” than their State-owned 
counterparts.347 On the other hand, the Australia Institute reports that the increase in 
electricity prices could be due to the decrease in productivity experienced in the 
electricity sector since privatisation. It argues that whilst productivity has increased 
throughout the economy by 33.6%, it has instead decreased by 24.9% in the 
electricity sector.348 
Privatisation is generally believed to result in more efficiency. Infrastructure 
Australia argues that a transfer of privately owned infrastructure assets to the private 
sector “can often result in more efficient management of the infrastructure, remove 
conflicts of interest where the government is both owner and regulator and transfer 
responsibility for future investment in upgrades and expansions to the private 
sector.”349 It should be noted that there is no conflict of interest where the 
government is both owner and regulator. Price regulators, although owned by the 
government, provide an independent regulatory function and are not under any 
influence by any levels of government. The role of the price regulator is outlined in 
section 6.1.   
Infrastructure Australia goes on to state that efficiency gains can be made by 
privatising assets in the form of:  
• productivity efficiency gains: where infrastructure services are provided to 
consumers at a lower cost;  
• allocative efficiency gains: where the infrastructure assets are put to their 
most efficient use; and  
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• dynamic efficiency gains: where there is long-term innovation, sound 
investment and delivery of efficient services.350  
It is argued that although State-owned corporations are generally less efficient than 
their privately owned counterparts, where these businesses are operating in a natural 
monopoly industry, they are able to continue operating as there is no competition to 
challenge their position in the market.351 So where, in a contested market, a less 
efficient operator would have been out of business by the presence of a more 
efficient business, in a monopoly market, these businesses are able to continue their 
operations due to a lack of competition from more competitive players. However, 
this paper argues that efficiency is determined by the price regulator in allowing for 
what it considers to be efficient expenditure in its prices. This is examined in chapter 
6. 
Two reports indicate that State-owned corporations are inefficient in comparison to 
their privately-owned counterparts. “A Productivity Commission report in 2013 
found that some network businesses were inefficient, reliability standards were too 
high and management of peak demand was weak.”352 In addition, the “New South 
Wales Commission of Audit also concluded that publicly owned New South Wales 
electricity businesses are inefficient in comparison with those privately owned.”353 
However, studies carried out by IPART and the McKell Institute have found that 
electricity companies owned by the State are either more efficient or as efficient as 
their privately owned counterparts.354 The IPART and McKell Institute studies 
demonstrate that privatisation may not have resulted in efficiency.  
The literature appears to demonstrate an inconsistency in opinion about whether 
privatisation has resulted in increased efficiency. One of the factors that has an 
influence on the efficiency of entities could be price regulation, because the price 
regulator makes no distinction between private and public, and therefore, both types 
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of entities can be expected to be measured and held accountable using the same 
benchmarks. This will be discussed in the next section. 
5.1.2.4 Privatisation and the regulatory regime 
In monopoly industries, the effectiveness of privatisation in achieving efficiency 
gains, and whether these are passed onto the consumer, depends very much on the 
regulatory regime. An effective regulatory regime needs to be in place prior to the 
privatisation of a State-owned enterprise. 
International studies have found that privatisation will only result in improvements in 
efficiency if it is accompanied by an effective regulatory framework.355 This is 
because an effective regulatory framework is needed in order to ensure that any 
efficiency gains resulting from privatisation are passed on to consumers through 
lower prices. Without an effective regulatory regime, efficiency gains are at risk of 
being retained by the private sector. 
The Productivity Commission believes that the current incentive-based regulation 
regime is best suited to the private sector and that there is no longer a need for State-
owned electricity network businesses, since incentive-based regulation is best 
targeted towards privately owned businesses whose main targets are to minimise 
costs and maximise profits.356 If State-owned network businesses are not privatised, 
the Productivity Commission believes that there needs to be a change to the 
governance arrangements, including board members being appointed on merit, a 
requirement for the public disclosure of all ministerial directions, and the removal of 
non-commercial objectives.357 
However, the OECD has found that regulators often underestimate the profit and 
cost-cutting motives of newly privatised businesses.358 Also, The Australia Institute 
argues that the private sector will pay more for assets in a monopoly market as there 
is potential to earn more from these assets due to the lack of competition in the 
market. The result of paying above market value also comes with additional 
borrowings which also need to be funded by increased prices.359 A number of 
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regulators (for example, IPART and the AER) do not factor in any above market 
prices paid for assets – prices are set on the value of assets alone, not the prices paid 
for them. However, this could be an area for further research to determine whether 
any other price regulators allow for higher prices resulting from an above market 
price paid for monopoly assets. In relation to the additional borrowings and resultant 
additional interest expense, the price regulator sets a debt to equity ratio for each of 
its regulated businesses. Any borrowings above this amount are to be borne at the 
regulated entity’s own expense. 
5.1.2.5 Privatisation in the electricity industry 
The Productivity Commission investigated the electricity network sector and found 
that “state-owned network businesses have conflicting objectives, which reduce their 
efficiency and undermine the effectiveness of incentive regulation. Their privately-
owned counterparts are better at efficiently meeting the long-term interests of their 
customers.”360 The Productivity Commission went on to recommend that all State-
owned electricity network businesses should be privatised.361 
The Productivity Commission compared the operating expenses for State-owned and 
privately-owned electricity network businesses in Australia. It found that the State-
owned corporations in the electricity network sector were less efficient than their 
privately-owned counterparts, with the cost of production being higher in the State-
owned sector than the privately-owned sector. The graph below is an extract from the 
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This table shows that privately owned entities in the electricity network out-perform 
their State-owned counterparts and are able to deliver electricity at a lower operating 
cost than the State-owned sector for all numbers of customers surveyed. 
Given the above, it could reasonably follow that the private sector electricity 
networks would then pay more tax than their State-owned counterparts due to the 
availability of fewer tax deductions (resulting from more efficient, and therefore 
lower, operating expenses). However, the ATO also performed a comparison of tax 
paid between publicly owned and privately owned corporations and found that the 
publicly-owned corporations also paid more tax than their privately owned 
counterparts.363 (This is discussed further in section 6.4.4) This outcome indicates a 
potential problem in the NTER which could restrict how State-owned corporations 
are able to minimise their tax or could reinforce the view that State-owned 
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corporations are more conservative (or, for these purposes, less efficient) than their 
privately owned counterparts, including in the management of their tax affairs.364  
In the privatisation of the electricity networks in Australia, Chester states that 
employees were disadvantaged, whereas investors, owners and creditors were 
advantaged by the privatisations.365 Further, Nepal and Foster found that “the extent 
of gains to consumers from networks privatisation depends on the toughness of the 
regulator and the effectiveness of the underlying network regulation regime in a 
given regulatory institutional framework.”366 
When electricity network assets are initially privatised, electricity prices experience a 
rise. This rise can be minimised by effective price regulation. The long-term gains of 
privatisation to the consumer are dependent on effective price regulation to ensure 
the gains are passed onto the consumer.367 
Whilst there could be questions about whether the private sector would forgo service 
standards in the interest of greater profits and therefore greater returns to 
shareholders, the Productivity Commission states that there is no evidence that 
productivity, quality, reliability or cost performance standards are any lower in the 
private sector than they are in the public sector.368 
5.1.2.6 Overseas experiences with privatisation 
A number of countries embarked on privatisation much earlier than Australia. This 
section looks at overseas experiences of privatisation, where privatisation provided 
improvements, and where it failed.  
In Argentina, Columbia and Chile, privatisation came with additional expense to the 
government because contracts needed to be constantly updated and renegotiated. In 
addition, the government was required to provide additional funds at public expense. 
Also, US privatised uranium enrichment company U.S. Enrichment Corporation 
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needed a public bail-out. Stiglitz and Rosengard state that one of the reasons for the 
failure of privatisation is due to the abuse of monopoly power.369 
A study of the performance of privatised businesses in Egypt found that there was a 
significant improvement in performance when a before and after privatisation 
comparison is made. However, when non-privatised businesses in the same industry 
were also compared, there too was an improvement in performance. Therefore, either 
privatisation improves the performance in an industry or the privatisation had 
nothing to do with the improvement in performance, and that improvement could 
have come about as a result of other factors.370 The OECD has found that it is not 
privatisation which is the catalyst for improved performance, but rather, the 
introduction of competition into a market.371 
In addition, privatisation in the UK water industry has not resulted in the efficiencies 
expected. This is discussed further in section 5.2.2.1: The water industry. 
5.1.2.7 Division 58 ITAA97 
This section will briefly look at Division 58 ITAA97 which applies to newly 
privatised depreciating assets which were owned by a tax-exempt entity. For the 
purposes of Division 58, NTER entities are classified as tax-exempt entities as they 
are not Federal taxpayers. Division 58 caps the opening value of assets upon entry to 
the Federal tax regime.  
The options available to the purchaser of privatised assets are to value the opening 
written down value for tax purposes at either: 
• the notional written-down value (NWDV) of the asset at the time it transfers 
to the private sector; or 
• the undeducted pre-existing audited book value at the time it transfers to the 
private sector. 
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The application of this division limits privatised assets’ opening value to less than 
market value. Future tax depreciation is then determined using the values prescribed 
under the application of this division. 
5.1.2.8 Conclusion 
This section has briefly examined privatisation as an alternative for competitive 
neutrality and has illustrated that privatisation, has had mixed success. It is an area 
for further research to determine why it has succeeded in some instances and has not 
been as successful in others. With further research, this could possibly be improved 
for the future. However, it should be noted again that privatisation is only one of the 
options available for achieving competitive neutrality, and it has been found to be not 
as important in producing an improvement in results as the introduction of 
competition.372 Further, a key success factor in the privatisation of State-owned 
businesses is the integrity of the regulatory system underpinning the way business is 
done and prices are set in the privatised sector. 
5.1.3 Privatisation of Ausgrid and Transgrid: Case study 
The most recent privatisations in Australia have been undertaken via a sale and lease-
back transaction, usually using a finance lease with a 99-year lease term. Assets 
being privatised are transferred to the Crown, and those assets are then leased to the 
winning bidder, often a consortium, in exchange for a 99-year lease. At the end of 
the lease term, these assets transfer to the private sector. 
Two privatisations undertaken using this type of transaction were the privatisations 
of Ausgrid and TransGrid. This section will examine the privatisation of these two 
companies because they are both in the electricity sector, their privatisation attracted 
a lot of media attention, and because the ATO applied a paragraph of the NTER 
Manual that allowed the sales to be treated in a tax-neutral manner, meaning that no 
tax was paid by the owner NTER entities on the sale of these assets. Calculations of 
ratios will be performed to determine the effect of treating these sales as tax-neutral, 
and the effect this had on the overall results to these companies, and to the State. It 
will further be shown how the privatisation resulted in an outcome that makes it 
difficult to determine how much tax the companies are now paying, and why it 
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would be difficult for States to argue for the receipt of the Federal tax these 
privatised companies now pay. 
Transgrid 
Transgrid operates and manages the high voltage transmission network in NSW and 
the ACT.373 Transgrid was privatised via a 100% lease for 99 years in 2015 for a 
total of $10.273 billion.374 It was purchased by a consortium comprised of Spark 
Infrastructure, Hastings, Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec (CDPQ), and 
Tawreed Investments Limited.375 Total proceeds of $9.758 billion were remitted 
directly to the Crown and were treated as a distribution to the Restart NSW Fund.376 
On completion of the transaction, Transgrid was converted into the Electricity 
Transmission Ministerial Holding Corporation (ETMHC).377 
The breakdown of proceeds was as follows:378 
           $’000 
Cash proceeds received by former TransGrid SOC        61,513 
Purchase price adjustment paid to ETMHC post 16 Dec       15,137 
Stamp duty           438,000 
Cash proceeds remitted directly to the Crown    9,758,368 
Total proceeds       10,273,018 
 
Cash proceeds remitted directly to the Crown   9,758,368 
Repayment of NSW TCorp borrowings   (3,420,880) 
Payment of FY 14/15 2nd dividend instalment     (147,303) 
Total net cash proceeds      6,190,185 
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As part of the privatisation, the ATO issued a private binding ruling that held the 
long-term lease transaction was tax neutral under the NTER. This private ruling held 
that the gain on the long-term lease of the TransGrid network, the loss on the early 
settlement of debt, and other costs related to the transaction were to be non-
assessable and non-deductible for tax purposes.379 Paragraph 103A of the NTER 
Manual states that in relation to government-imposed restructures and privatisations:  
“Such an imposed renegotiation, restructure or privatisation will be treated in a 
tax neutral manner for NTER purposes. (For example, on an imposed transfer 
of CGT assets, there will be no CGT consequences for the transferor and the 
transferee will inherit the CGT cost bases of the transferor.)”380 (This is also 
discussed in section 4.1.2). 
Paragraph 103 states that: 
“This includes a renegotiation or a restructure involving the transfer of assets 
for no consideration from an NTER entity to another entity of its State or 
Territory government that does not have commercial returns as a primary 
objective and is not an NTER entity.”381 
Had TransGrid not been part of the NTER, any gains or losses on the sale of this 
business would have been assessable. A private business making such a disposal 
would not have been allowed a non-assessable, non-deductible tax treatment. 
Following the privatisation, the Electricity Transmission Ministerial Holding 
Corporation (ETMHC) was established to act as the lessor of the network assets.382 
ETMHC was granted a tax-exempt status as part of the privatisation when the 
TransGrid SOC was privatised and the assets moved to the Ministerial Holding 
Corporation.383 
The 2015-16 Related Crown Entity Annual Reports contained the details of the 
disposal of TransGrid SOC. In the table below, the first column is an extract of the 
TransGrid discontinued operations section of the Crown Related Entities’ 2015-16 
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Annual Reports. It can be noted that as a result of the tax ruling mentioned above, 
there is a non-assessable gain on lease and sale transaction and related costs of 
$991.183 million. The second column removes these non-assessable, non-deductible 
amounts and treats the entire transaction as taxable, as would be the case for the 
private sector.
Crown Entity return Amended
$,000 $,000
Pg 130
Financial Performance of Discontinued Operations
Revenue 418,556.0 418,556.0 
Expenses excluding finance costs (191,573.0) (191,573.0)
Finance costs (76,387.0) (76,387.0)
(Loss)/gain on disposal of property, plant and 
equipment 0.0 0.0 
Results from operating activities 150,596.0 150,596.0 
Loss on early settlement of debt portfolio (301,845.0) (301,845.0)
Gain on disposal of discontinued operation 3,635,210.0 3,635,210.0 
Total loss on early settlement & gain on disposal of 
discontinued operations 3,333,365.0 3,333,365.0 
Profit from discontinued operations before tax 3,483,961.0 3,483,961.0 
Income tax equivalent benefit/(expense) 284,288.0 (715,474.3)
Profit after tax for the period from discontinued 3,768,249.0 2,768,486.7 
Pg 135
Profit/(loss) before income tax expense 3,483,961.0 3,483,961.0 
Tax exempt profit/(loss) from 17 December 2015 
onwards (28,599.0)
3,455,362.0 3,483,961.0 
Income tax expense/(benefit) calculated at 
statutory income tax rate of 30% 1,036,608.6 1,045,188.3 
Non-assessable gain on lease and sale transaction 
and related (991,183.0)
Expenditure not allowed for income tax purposes (1,376.0) (1,376.0)
Origination and reversal of temporary differences 
recognised in relation to prior years (330,043.0) (330,043.0)
Adjustments in respect of current income tax of 
previous years 1,705.0 1,705.0 
Income tax expense/(benefit) recognised in profit 




As can be seen from the above table, assessing the non-assessable gain results in the 
change of the tax position from an income tax benefit of $284.2 million to an income 
tax expense of $715.47 million. This, in turn, changes the profit after tax from 
$3,768.249 million to $2,768.487 million, a decrease of 26.53%. 
The following will look at the impact of allowing such tax treatment on the financial 
ratios. 
Return on assets 
Return on assets = Net profit after tax / Total assets 
For the purposes of this exercise, the return on assets ratio will be calculated using 
the net profit after tax of the discontinued operations divided by the total assets 
disposed of. 
The 2015-16 Crown Related Entities’ Annual Report outlines the assets de-
recognised under the 99-year finance lease, and the assets disposed of through the 
sale.384 The total assets derecognised under the 99-year finance lease and disposed of 
through sale total $6,447,533.385 
The return on assets resulting from treating the transaction in a tax-neutral manner is: 
 = $3,768,249 / $6,447,533 
 = 58.44% 
The return on assets resulting from removing the non-assessable gain of $991.183 
million and the tax-exempt loss of $28,599 million is: 
 = $2,768,486.7 / $6,447,533 
 = 42.94% 
The removal of the tax-neutral status resulted in a reduction of the return on assets 
from 58.44% to 42.94%. By granting a tax-neutral ruling, the result overstates the 
return on assets. 
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Return on equity 
Return on equity = Net profit after tax / Total equity 
This ratio will seek to compare the net profit after tax of the discontinued operations 
with the total equity prior to the privatisation. It aims only to illustrate the difference 
in the ratio as a result of treating this transaction in a tax-neutral manner. 
The total equity in the financial statements immediately prior to privatisation was 
$2,092,931.386 
The return on equity resulting from the transaction is: 
 = $3,768,249.0 / $2,092,931 
 = 180.05% 
Had the transaction not been treated in a tax-neutral manner, the return on equity 
would have been: 
 = $2,768,486.7 / $2,092,931 
 = 132.28% 
Again, the treatment of the transaction as a tax-neutral transaction with gains and 
losses treated as non-assessable and non-deductible overstated the return on equity. It 
gave the appearance of a much greater return on equity than would have been the 
case for a privately-owned entity. 
Ausgrid 
Ausgrid was formerly part of EnergyAustralia. EnergyAustralia was restructured and 
assets which comprised the grid were broken away from the main company and 
formed into a separate company which was named Ausgrid. Ausgrid was privatised 
by way of a 99-year lease which transferred 50.4% to the private sector for $16.2 
billion on 1 December 2016.387 The remainder of Ausgrid is still held by the NSW 
Government. The privatised portion is held by AustralianSuper and IFM Investors.388 
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Ausgrid now operates as a partnership between the private sector and the public 
sector. Total proceeds of $15.7 billion were remitted directly to the Crown Entity and 
were also used as a distribution for the Restart NSW Fund.389  
The breakdown of proceeds was as follows:390 
           $’000 
Cash proceeds received by former Ausgrid SOC        61,400 
Purchase price adjustment paid to ADMHC post 16 Dec       37,400 
Stamp duty           489,000 
Cash proceeds remitted directly to the Crown  15,700,300 
Total proceeds       16,288,100 
 
Cash proceeds remitted directly to the Crown  15,700,300 
Repayment of NSW TCorp borrowings            (10,168,100) 
Payment of FY 16 dividend          (63,500) 
Payment of Government Guarantee Fee (GGF)     (223,100) 
Total net cash distribution        5,245,600 
Promissory note received from NSW Govt      3,852,100 
Net distribution reflected in statement of changes in equity    9,097,700 
 
Similar to TransGrid, above, Ausgrid SOC also received a private binding ruling 
from the ATO which treated the privatisation in a tax neutral manner under the 
NTER, where the gain on the lease, the loss on the early settlement of debt, and other 
expenses related to the privatisation were held to be non-assessable and non-
deductible for tax purposes.391 Similar to TransGrid above, this ruling would have 
been sought in relation to paragraph 103 of the NTER Manual. 
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Following the privatisation, the Alpha Distribution Ministerial Holding Corporation 
(ADMHC) was established to act as the lessor of the network assets.392 ADMHC was 
granted a tax-exempt status as part of the privatisation when the Ausgrid SOC was 
privatised, and the assets moved to the Ministerial Holding Corporation.393 
Similar to TransGrid, above, had Ausgrid not been a State-owned corporation subject 
to tax under the NTER, the option of treating such a divestment in a tax neutral 
manner, where all gains and losses are non-assessable or non-deductible for tax 
purposes, would not have been an option. This section will outline the outcome that 
such treatment had on the financial ratios. It will also estimate the gains and losses 
and tax which would have been assessed had the transaction not been treated in a tax 
neutral manner. 
Ausgrid SOC prepared financial statements to the day before it was privatised on 1 
December 2016. The Ausgrid website contains the Ausgrid SOC financial statements 
for the period 1 July 2016 – 30 November 2016. It also contains the financial 
statements for the Ausgrid Partnership for the period 20 October 2016 to 30 June 
2017. The Crown Related Entities’ 2016-17 Annual Reports contain details of the 
disposal transaction.394 The data relating to the disposal overlap between the final 
Ausgrid SOC financial statements and the Crown Related Entities’ 2016-17 Annual 
Reports. This section will use the two reports to piece together the details of the 
transaction. It will further move to look at the difference tax would have made to the 
transaction. 
In the table below, the first column is an extract of the Ausgrid discontinued 
operations section of the Crown Related Entities’ 2016-17 Annual Reports. It can be 
noted that as a result of the tax ruling mentioned above, there is a non-assessable 
gain on lease and sale transaction and related of $1,312.5 million, and a non-
deductible realised loss on retirement of long-term debt of $200.3 million. This 
represents a total net non-assessable gain of $1,112.2 million. The second column 
removes these non-assessable, non-deductible amounts and treats the entire 
transaction as taxable, as would be the case for the private sector. 
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Crown Entity return Amended
$M $M
Pg 183
Financial Performance of Discontinued Operations
Revenue 1,158.0 1,158.0 
Expenses excluding finance costs (640.6) (640.6)
Finance costs (200.8) (200.8)
(Loss)/gain on disposal of property, plant and equipment (10.5) (10.5)
Results from operating activities 306.1 306.1 
Loss on early settlement of debt portfolio (667.7) (667.7)
Gain on disposal of discontinued operation 4,375.0 4,375.0 
Total loss on early settlement & gain on disposal of 
discontinued operations 3,707.3 3,707.3 
Profit from discontinued operations before tax 4,013.4 4,013.4 
Income tax equivalent benefit/(expense) 1,014.8 (97.4)
Profit after tax for the period from discontinued 5,028.2 3,916.0 
Pg 187
Profit/(loss) before tax 4,013.4 4,013.4 
Income tax using the domestic corporation tax rate of 
30% 1,204.0 1,204.0 
Non-assessable gain on lease and sale transaction and 
related (1,312.5)
Non-deductible realised losses on retirement of long 
term debt 200.3 
Other non-deductible expenses 0.5 0.5 
Non-assessable income on the sale of property 1.5 1.5 
Over provision of tax in prior years (0.1) (0.1)
Reclassification of superannuation to continuing 
operations (1.6) (1.6)
Origination and reversal of temporary differences 
recognised in relation to prior years (1,106.9) (1,106.9)
Income tax expense/(benefit) recognised in profit or loss 
of discontinued operations (1,014.8) 97.4 
 
As can be seen from the above table, the removal of the non-assessable gain and non-
deductible loss results in a change in the tax position from an income tax benefit of 
$1,014.8 million to an income tax expense of $97.4 million. This, in turn, changes 
the profit after tax from $5,028.2 million to $3,916.0 million, a decrease of 22.12%. 
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The following will compare a few key financial ratios and how they varied when 
treating the transaction as a tax-neutral transaction, and as a taxable transaction. 
Return on assets 
Return on assets = Net profit after tax / Total assets 
For the purposes of this exercise, the return on assets ratio will be calculated using 
the net profit after tax of the discontinued operations divided by the total assets 
disposed of. 
The 2016-17 Crown Related Entities’ Annual Report outlines the assets de-
recognised under the 99-year finance lease, and the assets disposed of through the 
sale.395 The total assets derecognised under the 99-year finance lease and disposed of 
through sale total $16,072.9.396 
The return on assets resulting from treating the transaction in a tax-neutral manner is: 
 = $5.028.2 / $16,072.9 
 = 31.28% 
The return on assets resulting from removing the non-assessable gain on lease and 
sale transaction and related of $1,312.5 million and non-deductible realised loss on 
retirement of long-term debt of $200.3 million is: 
 = $3,916 / $16,072.9 
 = 24.36% 
The removal of the tax-neutral status resulted in a reduction of the return on assets 
from 31.28% to 24.36%. By granting a tax-neutral ruling, the result overstates the 
return on assets. 
Return on equity 
Return on equity = Net profit after tax / Total equity 
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This ratio will seek to compare the net profit after tax of the discontinued operations 
with the total equity prior to the privatisation. It aims only to illustrate the difference 
in the ratio as a result of treating this transaction in a tax-neutral manner. 
The total equity in the financial statements immediately prior to privatisation was 
$3,679.4 million.397 
The return on equity resulting from the transaction is: 
 = $5,028.2 / $3,679.4 
 = 136.66% 
Had the transaction not been treated in a tax-neutral manner, the return on equity 
would have been: 
 = $3,916.0 / $3,679.4 
 = 106.43% 
Again, the treatment of the transaction as a tax-neutral transaction with gains and 
losses treated as non-assessable and non-deductible overstated the return on equity. It 
gave the appearance of a much greater return on equity than would have been the 
case for a privately-owned entity. 
Conclusion 
The privatisation of TransGrid and Ausgrid saw tax rulings issued which treated the 
transaction as a tax neutral transaction, with gains and losses being non-assessable 
and non-deductible for tax purposes. This treatment would not have been available to 
a privately-owned entity on the disposal of one of its businesses. In addition, this 
treatment is inconsistent with the treatment of the disposal of the Sydney 
Desalination Plant, the disposal of which was assessable under the NTER (although 
Sydney Water did not seek to have this transaction treated in a tax neutral manner for 
NTER purposes). This illustrates that this paragraph of the NTER manual can be 
used in such a way as to give a government-owned entity a tax advantage that is not 
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available to the private sector, but also, that it can be applied inconsistently to NTER 
entities. Although the transfers of Ausgrid and Transgrid were to a State-owned 
entity that does not have commercial returns as a primary objective and is not in the 
NTER, the entities transferring the assets (in this case Ausgrid and Transgrid) are not 
exempt from having commercial returns as their objective.  
The result of this favourable tax treatment resulted in large income tax benefits 
where, in fact, without these rulings, both entities would have experienced an income 
tax expense. The size of the benefit received was substantial too, being $991.183 
million for TransGrid and $1,112.2 million for Ausgrid. 
5.2 Why tax was the policy used to achieve 
competitive neutrality in this case 
Tax was used alongside a number of other tools to achieve competitive neutrality. 
With the introduction of the Hilmer Report recommendations, it was decided that a 
number of the tools to achieve competitive neutrality would be used. So rather than 
tax being the only method used to achieve competitive neutrality, it formed a small 
piece of the larger puzzle. The Hilmer Report recommended the use of 
corporatisation, privatisation, reforming any advantages or disadvantages that State-
owned businesses might have over their privately-owned counterparts, and pricing 
directions (through the form of price regulation).398 All of these recommendations 
have been put in place, to some degree.  
Indeed, the OECD recommends tax neutrality as just one of a number of tools to 
achieve competitive neutrality and recommends that governments use a number of 
these tools together to achieve a more even playing field.  
The OECD recommends: 
• “Streamlining the operational form of government business 
• Identifying the direct costs of any given function 
• Achieving a commercial rate of return 
• Accounting for public service obligations 
• Tax neutrality 
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• Regulatory neutrality 
• Debt neutrality and outright subsidies 
• Public procurement.”399 
When considering how to achieve competitive neutrality, the Hilmer Report 
recommended that competitive neutrality is achieved in four different ways: 
• Privatisation 
• Corporatisation 
• Through the reform of specific advantages and disadvantages; and 
• Through pricing directions.400  
Issues of financing and tax neutrality were briefly mentioned under Corporation and 
Reform of Specific advantages and disadvantages. While this is more sparse and less 
thought-out than the OECD recommendations, this could be due to the Hilmer 
Report pre-dating the OECD recommendations by about 20 years. 
A report subsequently submitted by Australia to the OECD outlining the measures 
taken to achieve competitive neutrality noted that the Australian competitive 
neutrality policy mainly focused on tax neutrality, debt neutrality, regulatory 
neutrality, and achieving commercial rate of return requirements (Roundtable on 
Competitive Neutrality in Competition Enforcement – Note by Australia). 
The Harper Review stated that competitive neutrality should focus on 
corporatisation, privatisation and full cost-reflective pricing. In addition, the main 
measures taken to achieve competitive neutrality were as mentioned above in 
Australia’s submission to the OECD (that is, tax neutrality, debt neutrality, 
regulatory neutrality, and achieving commercial rate of return requirements). 
5.2.1 Monopolies and competition policy 
“Monopoly pricing” occurs where an entity has the ability to restrict output or charge 
higher prices as a result of there being no other competition in the market. There are 
two scenarios where monopoly pricing can occur.  
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The first is where an entity exists in a natural or legislated monopoly. The 
government has attempted to remedy this by regulating prices. However, “economic 
efficiency has seldom been the sole or even principal criterion in regulating prices, 
with governments often choosing to regulate to favour categories of consumers or to 
achieve other social or political objectives. Price regulation of this kind may come at 
a cost to economic efficiency.”401 There is further argument that allowing a 
monopoly to charge high prices without putting in place pricing regulation will 
encourage competitors to find a way to enter into that market.402 
In addition, regulation does have its disadvantages. Costs of administration can be 
quite high. A lot of government investment is required to make regulation work. 
Also, regulatory schemes can result in market distortions as private companies 
attempt to maximise their profits within regulatory guidelines.403 
The second takes place in unregulated uncontestable markets. It is important to 
understand the industry and whether barriers to entry are high in order to determine 
whether monopolistic pricing is at play or pricing is merely due to a competitive 
return on capital.404 
Where a monopoly is unregulated and privately owned, the organisation can take 
advantage by being in a position of having no competition by increasing prices and 
reducing quality, resulting in large profits.405 
The Hilmer Report only recommends regulation or price control as a last resort if 
there are no other options. Price regulation does not solve the problem of there being 
a lack of competition in the industry in question and, as such, should only be used if 
there are no better alternatives or other options.406 
Although monopolies by nature have no competition, it is believed that the mere 
threat of competition can result in improved efficiency.407 This improved efficiency 
as a result of a threat of competition is the reason why monopolies have been 
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included in competitive neutrality measures and are subject to tax equivalent 
payments. There may be no room in the market for actual competition due to the 
nature of the industry; however, just having legislation that does not prevent any 
competition and leaves it open for potential competition is enough to achieve 
competition goals.408 As such, the threat of potential competition, no matter how 
unlikely, should lead to improved efficiency and lower prices. 
“The NCP reforms have placed downward pressure on the cost of 
infrastructure services and increased choice across the economy. Twenty years 
ago, infrastructure markets were characterised by vertically integrated, 
government-owned monopolies that were not responsive to changes in 
consumer tastes or needs. This has largely changed through competition policy. 
While most infrastructure markets have been substantially reformed, the Panel 
has heard numerous examples that suggest progress has been patchy, the 
degree of reform differs substantially among sectors and much more needs to 
be done to provide greater choice and better service levels for consumers and 
businesses.409 
The introduction of competitive neutrality and the application of the CCA to 
government businesses encouraged private businesses to invest and compete 
alongside government-owned businesses. E.g., there are now many privately-
owned electricity generators competing alongside the remaining government-
owned generators. Private operators have also entered the market in rail, with 
most freight services now privately owned and operated.410 
In contrast, there has been little private investment in urban water supply, 
except for desalination plants. These plants are reliant on government contracts 
and are shielded from demand risk.”411 
This section highlighted the importance of separating out non-monopoly components 
of industries, and creating market conditions conducive to competition. 
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5.2.2 The electricity and water industries 
This section briefly examines the electricity and water industries in Australia. The 
discussion will then branch out to a more detailed study of the water industry 
(section 5.2.2.1) and the electricity industry (section 5.2.2.2). 
Comparisons were made between the OECD average and Australia’s results of 
productivity. These comparisons focused on capital and labour productivity for a 
number of sectors of the economy for the period between 1970 and 1985. 412 The 
comparisons lead to the conclusion that the most unproductive sector of the economy 
was that of Australia’s public utilities (electricity, gas and water). However, when 
these results were compared for the period between 1985 and 1991, it was found that 
the highest rate of growth in productivity came from these public utilities. Borthwick 
came to the conclusion that these sectors were likely to experience even more 
productivity gains from the introduction of the Hilmer reforms.413 
5.2.2.1 The water industry 
The water industry in Australia operates as a monopoly and is State-owned. There is 
currently little competition in the water industry. However, water competition 
legislation is gradually being introduced to allow private competition to enter the 
water market. 
The water industry in Australia has not seen the same level of structural reform and 
vertical separation as has taken place in the electricity sector (discussed further 
below in section 5.2.2.2). A more commercial focus was introduced in the water 
industry in 1994 with the signing of an agreement by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) which called for reforms to the pricing regimes in place at 
that time. This COAG agreement was further updated by National Water Initiative, 
which was signed by Australian governments in 2004. This agreement required water 
prices to be set by independent pricing bodies.414 As a result, there has been a move 
to a commercial cost recovery framework, whereby price regulators take into account 
efficient expenditure and set prices which allow for recovery of these efficient costs. 
However, the water sector has not seen the same level of privatisation which has 
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taken place in the electricity sector. (The electricity sector is discussed further in 
section 5.2.2.2, below). However, there are a number of private water businesses in 
the rural water sector which supplies water to irrigators in New South Wales and 
South Australia.415 
The water sector is currently divided into the following segments: 
• bulk water supply and treatment: “bulk water assets include dams and 
reservoir storages for water supply, desalination plants and water recycling 
plants.” 
• water distribution and retailing: “the water pipeline networks and retailing 
services provided to end users.” 
• Wastewater: “assets associated with collecting, treating and disposing of 
wastewater in urban areas. This would include wastewater pipeline networks 
and associated treatment plants.”416 
Water authorities are typically price takers. The effect of a price reduction on the rate 
of return can have no influence on productivity in the water industry. Any price 
reduction can simply be financed by under-pricing environment costs or bringing 
forward any future benefits.417 
Further, as a result of corporatisation, non-commercial activities which were once the 
responsibility of the water entity have been shifted to other government departments. 
This shift, coupled with replacement of contract labour, has distorted any labour 
productivity measures.418 This means that traditional methods of assessing labour 
productivity have become incorrect. In addition, the cost of providing water services 
may be too high for some residents to afford.419 
As discussed in section 3.2.1.1: Criticisms of Corporatisation, political influence 
plays a part in the running of utilities. Berg argues that inefficiencies in the water 
industry can be caused by excessive political influence; such influence can result in 
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the promise of low prices which then leave the utility with not enough money to fund 
essential capital works.420 
As it currently stands, the State-owned water corporations operate under the relevant 
SOC Act of their State; each water corporation also operates under its own 
legislation (for example, The Sydney Water Act 1994, The Hunter Water Act 1991, 
and so on), and the Water Act 2007.  
Australia’s water industry will now be compared to the UK, where all its water 
utilities have been privatised and are run by private equity groups.421 At the time of 
privatisation, it was hoped that the result would be greater efficiency and an 
improvement in the water network at much lower prices than would have otherwise 
been the case, had the network been operated by a publicly owned corporation.422 
However, the result has been that the private owners have focused on maximising 
shareholder and senior executive wealth at the expense of the network.423 Thames 
Water did the bare minimum to comply with the regulator’s requirements and no 
more than that. Rather than managing the company to prepare for drought or large 
capital expenditure, the company borrowed enormous amounts of money to increase 
the wealth of the shareholders and senior executives.424 This borrowing to fund 
increased wealth for shareholders and senior executives has resulted in Thames 
Water then needing to seek grants from the government to carry out essential 
infrastructure works. 
The current system of State-owned monopolies in the water industry appears to be 
the better one when considering the above examples. As a State-owned monopoly, 
the owner State or Territory government is able to draw both a tax and a dividend 
from its water utility and should not need to finance the water utility as result of 
providing excess private sector shareholder returns. 
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5.2.2.2 The electricity industry 
In Australia, the national electricity market is divided into four segments:  
• Generation involves the creation of electricity through a number of methods, 
including the burning of fossil fuels, and the use of wind or solar power; 
• Transmission relates to the method of transferring this electricity through the 
use of high voltage power lines to power stations; 
• Distribution which is concerned with the delivery of low voltage electricity to 
consumers through the use of power lines and poles; and 
• Retail which deals with the metered sale of electricity to customers.425 
The electricity industry is split into network and distribution segments. The network 
deals with the production of electricity while the distribution is the retail branch and 
deals with the transportation of electricity to homes and businesses. 
A government body, the National Energy Market (NEM) was created in 1996 to 
facilitate the trading of electricity between NSW, Victoria, Queensland and the 
ACT.426 The NEM operates as a wholesale electricity market which allows electricity 
generators to sell electricity to electricity retailers who then sell the electricity to 
customers.427 
The electricity industry is regulated by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The 
AER was created under the NEM to set prices for the electricity network, monitor the 
electricity market, and support the ACCC.428 The AER sets prices for the 
transmission and distribution sectors, whereas the Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) sets the prices for the generation sector. In NSW, Victoria, and 
South Australia, the electricity retail sector is not price regulated, whereas all other 
States have their own government regulators who set the retail price component.429 
As such, part of the setting of prices is regulated across most of the country, unlike 
the water industry in which each State has its own pricing regulator. 
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The South West Interconnected System (SWIS) was created in Western Australia 
when the state owned Western Power Corporation was split into Verve Energy (the 
electricity generation sector of the electricity industry in Western Australia), Western 
Power (the transmission and distribution arm), Synergy (the retail side of the 
electricity sector) and Horizon Power (which is the regional electricity supplier).430 
The separation of Western Power Corporation into separate state-owned corporations 
by division has enabled the creation of a wholesale electricity market in that region, 
and a general move towards more competition in the electricity sector in Western 
Australia.431 Although there has been progress in the introduction of the SWIS, the 
electricity sector in Western Australia still remains less competitive as a whole than 
the NEM.432 
Retail competition was introduced into NSW and Victoria, enabling consumers to 
choose their own retailer. As a result of increased competition, prices fell, and 
efficiency increased in the industry.433 
There are differences of opinion as to whether competition has improved efficiency. 
Prof John Quiggin has found that the privatisation of the electricity sector has largely 
failed. He has found that the privatisation of the electricity sector has delivered no 
benefits to the consumers, and has instead resulted in high price rises. The rate of 
return of 10% used by privately owned electricity companies is too high when 
considering the low level of risk involved in the industry. Additionally, the cost of 
capital of 10% used by privately owned corporations is much higher than the 3% cost 
of capital used by State-owned electricity companies. Prof Quiggin went on to argue 
that the public ownership of critical infrastructure is the best option.434  
Although Prof Quiggin argues that the cost of capital used by privately owned 
corporations is higher than that used by companies owned by the State, this is 
incorrect to an extent. The alternative view is that the rate of return for electricity 
network businesses is determined by the AER, and the AER does not distinguish 
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between privatised and non-privatised entities when deciding this rate. In current 
times, rates for both private and public companies are high, and both take into 
account investment and asset replacement.435 To support this argument, a report by 
Ernst and Young in 2013, and a further study by Dr Lynne Chester, an energy 
researcher at the University of Sydney, have both found that the increase in 
electricity prices has been less in privatised states (Victoria and South Australia) than 
states in which electricity is still government owned (at that time – New South Wales 
and Queensland).436 
Further studies have found that privatisation has neither increased nor decreased 
electricity prices.437 However, several of the companies in the distribution sector of 
the electricity industry appear to spend more than they should.438 Most of the 
companies in the electricity distribution sector are still government-owned (refer to 
the table in section 5.3). The question of whether privatisation resulted in an increase 
in electricity prices and bills is discussed further in the next section. 
5.2.2.2.1 The increase in electricity prices and privatisation 
Although the initial introduction of the NCP saw a drop in electricity prices of 19% 
(refer to section 2.9.1), subsequent years have seen a dramatic increase in electricity 
prices Australia-wide. This increase coincided with the privatisation of a number of 
electricity companies and assets. Naturally, the question was asked about whether the 
privatisation of the electricity industry had led to the increase in prices. 
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), whose role it is to set the rules 
for the retail electricity segment and undertake work for the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG),439 reported that the electricity price could be separated into 
three separate components: 
• the wholesale generation and retail component – that is, the ‘competitive’ 
portion; 
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• the costs related to transmission and distribution – that is, the ‘network’ 
portion; and 
• costs related to the government’s environment policies.440 
However, a typical residential electricity bill across the NEM was comprised of: 
• “Network costs (48%) 
• Wholesale costs (22%) 
• Environmental costs (7%) 
• Retail and other costs (16%) 
• Retail margins (8%)”441 
The largest component of costs on an electricity bill is the transmission and 
distribution components, and these have both been trending upwards regardless of 
whether the companies have been privatised or kept in government hands.442 
It has been found that the main cause of the drastic increase in electricity prices has 
been higher network charges, which have increased by greater than 90% in the five 
years to 2012-13. This increase is largely due to a high rate of return set by the AER 
for things such as proposed investment and replacing aging assets. These high rates 
of return apply regardless of ownership.443 Hence, the cost of the “poles and wires” is 
the largest item on the consumer’s electricity bill.444 
In addition, it has been found that a key factor in the price of electricity has been how 
the electricity is created. Electricity produced from the burning of coal is generally 
cheaper than electricity produced from gas or wind. Thus, where Victoria relies on 
electricity produced from coal, it follows that their electricity will be cheaper than 
that in South Australia, which relies on more renewable methods for electricity 
generation.445 
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In 2017, Ken Baldwin446 completed a review for The Conversation, about whether 
renewable energy is now cheaper than coal for electricity generation. He found that, 
as at 2017, the cost of generating electricity through the use of wind power was $60-
70/MWh, while the cost of generating an MWh of power using coal was less than 
$40. However, these figures are based on the use of existing assets. Ken Baldwin 
goes on to explain that the projected cost of building new assets would price coal at 
$75/MWh; whereas it is $60-70/MWh for wind.447  
As discussed in the previous section, Dr Lynne Chester has found that privatisation 
has not had any effect on the price of electricity. In addition, both the AER and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) have found in separate studies that there has 
been no correlation or link between privatisation and the rise in electricity prices and 
bills.448 The price rise has been across both privatised and State-owned corporations. 
Based on research already completed, it can be concluded that although electricity 
prices have been increasing in all States, privatisation has had little effect on this 
increase. The increase has mainly been due to higher rates of return in the network 
sector of the electricity industry. This is largely due to levels of investment required 
in order to maintain the infrastructure needed to deliver a constant and steady supply 
of electricity.449 
5.2.3 Making a single payment to Treasury 
As discussed earlier, State and Territory Treasuries receive two streams of income 
from their State Owned Enterprises. They receive a dividend payment and the tax 
equivalents made by the SOCs. In addition, the Treasuries also receive the 
government guarantee fee from their SOEs, but as this is outside the scope of this 
research, it will not be discussed in great detail. 
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The question could be asked whether it is necessary for the State to receive both the 
tax and dividend, and whether this is an inefficient use of resources to determine both 
streams of payment separately. 
One could propose the removal of tax equivalent payments (and the tax equivalent 
regimes) and have SOCs pay a larger dividend to the State or Territory Government. 
Alternatively, both payment types, tax equivalents and dividend payments, can be 
made redundant and replaced with a single payment to the State or Territory 
Government. 
It will be argued here that both streams are indeed necessary and are not the cause of 
inefficiency in Government operations (although it does place an administrative cost 
on the entity to have to calculate both). 
In order to consider this, one needs to consider the difference between tax and 
dividends. Tax, whether actual tax or a tax equivalent, is an expense. It forms part of 
other business expenses, is reported in the profit and loss statement, and reduces net 
profit after tax. On the other hand, a dividend is a return on the Government’s equity 
investment. A dividend is not an expense. Rather, it is a distribution of part of a 
company’s net profit or reserves which are reported in the Statement of Changes in 
Equity section of the Financial Statements. 
Therefore, if a State Owned Enterprise were not to pay separate tax equivalents and 
instead return a larger dividend, this would present a distortion and a false inflation 
of the Government’s return on equity. As a result, the dividend received by the 
Government would not be a true reflection on their investment, as the tax would be 
rolled up as part of the dividend paid. This could result in inefficiencies being hidden 
by showing a larger return on equity than would be available from a privately-owned 
organisation and would result in the competitive neutrality issues that were trying to 
be avoided by introducing tax equivalent regimes in the first place. This will be 
illustrated in a case study in section 5.2.4. 
Removing any tax equivalent payments that are currently required by Government 
businesses would effectively under-value the entity’s expenses, and over-inflate the 
return on equity, thereby returning the market to an uneven playing field. 
157 
 
Furthermore, in considering the removal of a tax equivalent regime and the dividend 
policies, and replacing them with a single payment by SOCs to their owner State or 
Territory Treasury, problems would arise with the correct classification of such a 
payment. Would it be an equity payment? A return on equity? Or an expense? The 
ability to correctly separate and classify such a payment into equity or expense would 
be vital to maintaining any semblance of competitive neutrality. This would also lead 
to the financial statements of a publicly owned entity to be incomparable to those of 
a privately owned entity. 
Burton supports this view by stating that the introduction of tax equivalent payments 
saw what was previously a single payment to Treasury divided into a dividend 
component, a tax equivalent component, and a government guarantee fee.450 Burton 
further argues that part of the intention of introducing commercialisation comes with 
the view of privatisation, and the requirements of separating payments made to 
Treasury into tax equivalent, dividend and government guarantee fee would enable 
comparison of the real rate of return, as would be expected by the shareholders of a 
privately owned corporation.451 
Although National Tax Equivalent Regime payments may not be made with the 
future long-term view of privatisation, they still provide a transparent, easy means of 
comparison of the financial results of a state-owned against a privately owned 
organisation. This comparison will be made in the case studies. 
5.2.4 The effect of removing tax and instead paying a larger 
dividend to the owner State or Territory Treasury: Case study 
This section seeks to numerically quantify the outcome of abolishing tax neutrality 
and the payment of tax equivalents and instead increasing the dividend returned by 
each NTER entity to their owner State or Territory Treasury. The data presented in 
this case study relates to the financial year ended 30 June 2017. The theory behind 
this was discussed above in section 5.2.3. 
5.2.4.1 Financial ratios 
The financial ratios used in this case study are those which are impacted by a change 
in dividend or taxes. The suitability of the ratios was taken from the AER review of 
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Profitability Measures for Electricity and Gas Network Businesses.452 A review of 
the ratios is outlined below. Some businesses calculate these ratios using the average, 
for example, average total assets, or average equity. Since this case study provides 
only a comparison of the impact of the removal of tax, only closing values have been 
used. 
Return on assets 
The return on assets formula used in this case study is: 
 Net profit after tax / Total assets 
This ratio provides a measure of profitability, and companies aim to have a high 
return on assets ratio. However, the outcome of this ratio will depend on how capital 
intensive the business is. Generally, the more capital intensive a business, the lower 
this ratio. Since this thesis is focused on the infrastructure sector (water and 
electricity), it is to be expected that the return on assets will be much lower compared 
to other less capital-intensive businesses. 
This ratio was used because it is expected that the removal of the tax (and so using 
just the net profit number), and the removal of any tax assets in the balance sheet, 
will alter the ratio. 
Return on equity 
The return on equity is calculated using the following formula: 
 Net profit after tax / Total equity 
This ratio is a measure of profit and efficiency. It is also commonly referred to as 
“return on net worth”. 
This ratio was used in this case study because it is expected that the removal of tax 
expense and the removal of tax assets and liabilities in the balance sheet (which 
would have a flow-through effect to equity) will alter the ratio. 
Debt to equity 
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There are a number of different ways of calculating this ratio. Some entities use the 
total liabilities, whereas others use long-term debt. For the purpose of this case study, 
there are two ratios which have been utilised. The formulas are as follows: 
 Total liabilities / Total equity (to be referred to as “liabilities to equity”) 
 Total liabilities / Total assets (to be referred to as liabilities to assets”) 
These formulas are being used because this will enable the comparison of total 
liabilities to total assets, and separately, to total equity, once any tax assets and 
liabilities have been removed and equity adjusted accordingly. 
Net profit margin 
The net profit margin is calculated using the formula: 
 Net profit after tax / Total revenue 
This ratio represents a percentage measure of revenue remaining after all expenses 
(including tax – however, some businesses calculate the ratio as net profit before tax) 
have been deducted from total revenue. It is a profitability ratio, and is an indicator 
of how efficiently a business can convert revenue into profit. 
This ratio was used in this case study to examine what the effect of removing the tax 
expense has on the ratio. 
Earnings per share 
Earnings per share is calculated using the formula: 
 Net profit after tax / Number of shares issued 
This ratio is not commonly used for businesses that are not traded, and is not a good 
measure of profitability, as the ratio is impacted by the number of shares issued.453 
This will be very clearly illustrated in this case study, where some treasuries have 
issued only one or two shares in the corporation being studied, whereas others have 
issued many shares.  
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This ratio was used in this case study in an attempt to quantify the impact of the 
removal of tax on the amount of earnings per share. 
Dividend payout ratio 
The dividend payout ratio is calculated using the formula: 
 Dividends / Net profit after tax 
The dividend payout ratio is an indicator of how much a company is returning to 
shareholders relative to the net profit after tax earned in that year. 
For the purpose of this case study, the dividend amount used is the dividends paid in 
the Cash Flow Statement, not the dividends relating to that financial year (it can be 
expected that the company will declare dividends from the 2017 financial results, 
which are then paid in the 2018 financial year). 
This ratio was used in this case study to measure the impact of replacing the tax 
equivalent with an additional dividend. 
Tax compared to total tax and dividend 
This ratio is calculated as follows: 
 Tax paid / (Total dividend + Tax paid) 
This ratio is not a recognised financial ratio in the financial literature. This ratio is 
one that is used for the purpose of this study to demonstrate what percentage of 
payments being received by the owner State or Territory Treasury relates to taxes. 
5.2.4.2 Tables of information 
The section provides the tables of information used in this case study. A number of 
State-owned NTER organisations in the water and electricity industries were used.  
This study attempted to use at least one NTER entity from each state. Due to 
electricity privatisations, there have been fewer electricity companies used in this 
case study. Where relevant, the consolidated figures have been used, because the 
entire consolidated group is owned by the State or Territory Treasury. 
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The first two tables, Table 5.2.4A and Table 5.2.4B relate to data extracted from the 






Water  SA Water  Sun Water 
 Sydney 
Water  TasWater 
 Water 
Corporation 
VIC SA QLD NSW TAS WA
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $M
Cash Flow Statement Pg 86 Pg 63 Pg 46 Pg 96 Pg 50 Pg 60
Tax refund received (397)
Tax Paid 192,529 83,493 31,918 209,030 9,036 316 
Dividend Paid 28,300 193,037 159,009 389,232 19,457 483 
Total dividend and tax paid 220,829 276,530 190,927 597,865 28,493 799 
Income Statement Pg 83 Pg 60 Pg 43 Pg 93 Pg 48 Pg 57
Total income 1,791,363 1,369,531 287,927 2,659,531 315,483 2,549 
Total expenses (1,553,410) (1,181,005) (236,874) (2,024,032) (274,625) (1,629)
Net profit 237,953 188,526 51,053 635,499 40,858 920 
Tax expense (87,520) (54,171) (15,005) (188,177) (12,266) (275)
Net profit after tax 150,433 134,355 36,048 447,322 28,592 645 
Balance Sheet Pg 84 Pg 61 Pg 44 Pg 94 Pg 49 Pg 58
Total assets 14,882,083 14,194,721 996,551 18,077,854 2,153,440 17,153 
Total liabilities 9,611,974 8,775,930 541,539 10,764,548 568,397 6,696 
Total equity (also Net assets) 5,270,109 5,418,791 455,012 7,313,306 1,585,043 10,457 
Current tax asset 0 5,659 0 16,508 0 0 
Current tax liability 7,066 0 0 0 737 26 
Deferred tax asset 0 45,460 11,114 0 39,703 0 
Deferred tax liability 1,239,675 1,673,790 0 996,967 0 246 
Total (1,246,741) (1,622,671) 11,114 (980,459) 38,966 (272)
Pg 66 Pg 141 Pg 49
Number of shares issued 2 3.161854b 8,972,507 
Ratios
Return on assets 1.01% 0.95% 3.62% 2.47% 1.33% 3.76%
Return on equity 2.85% 2.48% 7.92% 6.12% 1.80% 6.17%
Liabilities to equity 182.39% 161.95% 119.02% 147.19% 35.86% 64.03%
Liabilities to assets 64.59% 61.83% 54.34% 59.55% 26.39% 39.04%
Net profit margin 8.40% 9.81% 12.52% 16.82% 9.06% 25.30%
Earnings per share #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 18,024.00$ 0.00$            0.00$            #DIV/0!
Dividend payout ratio 18.81% 143.68% 441.10% 87.01% 68.05% 74.88%
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 87.18% 30.19% 16.72% 34.90% 31.71% 39.55%










Energy  Synergy  Tasnetworks 
 NT  QLD 
 NSW/Sth 
QLD  WA  TAS 
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
$'000 $M $M $'000 $'000
Cash Flow Statement Pg 69 Pg 59 Pg 69 Pg 34 Pg 52
Tax refund received
Tax Paid 18,940 632 24 30,704 46,596 
Dividend Paid 0 0 28 0 72,628 
Total dividend and tax paid 18,940 632 52 30,704 119,224 
Income Statement Pg 67 Pg 55 Pg 66 Pg 30 Pg 48
Total income 712,565 5,265 1,534 3,087,984 552,212 
Total expenses (755,512) (4,007) (1,462) (3,096,124) (418,125)
Net profit (42,947) 1,258 72 (8,140) 134,087 
Tax expense (737) (377) (22) (4,484) (40,160)
Net profit after tax (43,684) 881 50 (12,624) 93,927 
Balance Sheet Pg 67 Pg 57 Pg 67 Pg 32 Pg 50
Total assets 3,110,037 26,008 8,399 2,624,151 3,265,038 
Total liabilities 1,735,687 22,437 6,041 1,574,390 2,320,951 
Total equity (also Net assets) 1,374,350 3,571 2,359 1,049,761 944,087 
Current tax asset 0 92 0 0 0 
Current tax liability 26,959 0 10 8,995 6,069 
Deferred tax asset 47,516 0 0 46,137 0 
Deferred tax liability 73,502 3,520 222 0 226,196 
Total (52,945) (3,428) (232) 37,142 (232,265)
Pg 100 Pg 99 Pg 77 Pg 80
Number of shares issued 1 100 2 2 
Ratios
Return on assets -1.40% 3.39% 0.60% -0.48% 2.88%
Return on equity -3.18% 24.67% 2.12% -1.20% 9.95%
Liabilities to equity 126.29% 628.31% 256.08% 149.98% 245.84%
Liabilities to assets 55.81% 86.27% 71.92% 60.00% 71.08%
Net profit margin -6.13% 16.73% 3.26% -0.41% 17.01%
Earnings per share 43,684.00-$     8.81$               25.00$         #DIV/0! 46,963.50$     
Dividend payout ratio 0.00% 0.00% 56.20% 0.00% 77.32%
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 100.00% 100.00% 45.75% 100.00% 39.08%




The next two tables, Table 5.2.4C and Table 5.2.4D are extrapolated from Tables 
5.2.4A and 5.2.4B. These tables remove the effect of taxation from the Income 
Statement and Balance Sheet, and adjust Equity accordingly. In addition, the tax and 
dividend amounts from the Cash Flow Statement are consolidated into a single 






Water  SA Water  Sun Water 
 Sydney 
Water  TasWater 
 Water 
Corporation 
VIC SA QLD NSW TAS WA
B: IF NO TAX WAS PAID AND IT WAS ALL PAID AS A DIVIDEND INSTEAD
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $M
Cash Flow Statement Pg 86 Pg 46 Pg 96 Pg 50 Pg 60
Tax Paid
Dividend Paid 220,829 276,530 190,927 597,865 28,493 799 
Total dividend and tax paid 220,829 276,530 190,927 597,865 28,493 799 
Income Statement Pg 83 Pg 60 Pg 43 Pg 93 Pg 48 Pg 57
Total income 1,791,363 1,369,531 287,927 2,659,531 315,483 2,549 
Total expenses (1,553,410) (1,181,005) (236,874) (2,024,032) (274,625) (1,629)
Net profit 237,953 188,526 51,053 635,499 40,858 920 
Tax expense
Net profit after tax 237,953 188,526 51,053 635,499 40,858 920 
Balance Sheet Pg 84 Pg 61 Pg 44 Pg 94 Pg 49 Pg 58
Total assets 14,882,083 14,194,721 996,551 18,077,854 2,153,440 17,153 
Total liabilities 8,277,713 7,099,088 537,648 9,595,912 595,097 6,149 
Adjusted Equity
Equity per financial 
statements 5,270,109 5,418,791 455,012 7,313,306 1,585,043 10,457 
Addback: current tax liability 7,066 0 0 0 737 26 
Addback: deferred tax 
liability 1,239,675 1,673,790 0 996,967 0 246 
Addback: equity adjustment 
for tax expense 87,520 54,171 15,005 188,177 12,266 275 
Less: current tax asset 0 (5,659) 0 (16,508) 0 0 
Less: deferred tax asset 0 (45,460) (11,114) 0 (39,703) 0 
Total adjusted equity 6,604,370 7,095,633 458,903 8,481,942 1,558,343 11,004 
Pg 141
Number of shares issued 2 3.161854b 8,972,507 
Ratios
Return on assets 1.60% 1.33% 5.12% 3.52% 1.90% 5.36%
Return on equity 3.60% 2.66% 11.13% 7.49% 2.62% 8.36%
Liabilities to equity 125.34% 100.05% 117.16% 113.13% 38.19% 55.88%
Liabilities to assets 55.62% 50.01% 53.95% 53.08% 27.63% 35.85%
Net profit margin 13.28% 13.77% 17.73% 23.90% 12.95% 36.09%
Earnings per share #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 25,526.50$ 0.00$            0.00$            #DIV/0!










Energy  Synergy  Tasnetworks 
 NT  QLD 
 NSW/Sth 
QLD  WA  TAS 
B: IF NO TAX WAS PAID AND IT WAS ALL PAID AS A DIVIDEND INSTEAD
$'000 $M $M $'000 $'000
Cash Flow Statement Pg 69 Pg 59 Pg 69 Pg 34 Pg 52
Tax Paid
Dividend Paid 18,940 632 52 30,704 119,224 
Total dividend and tax paid 18,940 632 52 30,704 119,224 
Income Statement Pg 67 Pg 55 Pg 66 Pg 30 Pg 48
Total income 712,565 5,265 1,534 3,087,984 552,212 
Total expenses (755,512) (4,007) (1,462) (3,096,124) (418,125)
Net profit (42,947) 1,258 72 (8,140) 134,087 
Tax expense
Net profit after tax (42,947) 1,258 72 (8,140) 134,087 
Balance Sheet Pg 67 Pg 57 Pg 67 Pg 32 Pg 50
Total assets 3,110,037 26,008 8,399 2,624,151 3,265,038 
Total liabilities 1,682,005 18,632 5,787 1,607,048 2,048,526 
Adjusted Equity
Equity per financial statements 1,374,350 3,571 2,359 1,049,761 944,087 
Addback: current tax liability 26,959 0 10 8,995 6,069 
Addback: deferred tax liability 73,502 3,520 222 0 226,196 
Addback: equity adjustment for tax expense 737 377 22 4,484 40,160 
Less: current tax asset 0 (92) 0 0 0 
Less: deferred tax asset (47,516) 0 0 (46,137) 0 
Total adjusted equity 1,428,032 7,376 2,612 1,017,103 1,216,512 
Pg 100 Pg 99 Pg 77 Pg 80
Number of shares issued 1 100 2 2 
Ratios
Return on assets -1.38% 4.84% 0.85% -0.31% 4.11%
Return on equity -3.01% 17.06% 2.74% -0.80% 11.02%
Liabilities to equity 117.78% 252.62% 221.54% 158.00% 168.39%
Liabilities to assets 54.08% 71.64% 68.90% 61.24% 62.74%
Net profit margin -6.03% 23.89% 4.66% -0.26% 24.28%
Earnings per share 42,947.00-$ 12.58$         35.75$         #DIV/0! 67,043.50$   




The final two tables, Table 5.2.4E and Table 5.2.4F represent the impact on the 
financial ratios of removing tax from the financial statements and instead replacing it 
with a single, but larger, dividend payment to treasury. The change in ratios below 
was calculated as the difference between the ratios after and before tax was removed, 
divided by the actual financial results and is expressed as a percentage. To specify as 
a formula: 
 C = (B – A) / A 
TABLE 5.2.4E 
 Melbourne 
Water  SA Water  Sun Water 
 Sydney 
Water  TasWater 
 Water 
Corporation 
VIC SA QLD NSW TAS WA
C: Change in ratios as a result of only having a dividend payment, and no tax
Return on assets 58.18% 40.32% 41.63% 42.07% 42.90% 42.64%
Return on equity 26.22% 7.16% 40.42% 22.49% 45.35% 35.55%
Liabilities to equity -31.28% -38.22% -1.56% -23.14% 6.49% -12.73%
Liabilities to assets -13.88% -19.11% -0.72% -10.86% 4.70% -8.17%
Net profit margin 58.18% 40.32% 41.63% 42.07% 42.90% 42.64%
Earnings per share #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 41.63% 42.90% 42.90% #DIV/0!
Dividend payout ratio 393.31% 2.09% -15.22% 8.12% 2.48% 15.98%
Increase in equity % 25.32% 30.94% 0.86% 15.98% -1.68% 5.23%
Balance sheet
Change in assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change in liabilities (1,334,261) (1,676,842) (3,891) (1,168,636) 26,700 (547)












Energy  Synergy  Tasnetworks 
 NT  QLD  NSW/Sth QLD  WA  TAS 
C: Change in ratios as a result of only having a dividend payment, and no tax
Return on assets -1.69% 42.79% 43.00% -35.52% 42.76%
Return on equity -5.38% -30.86% 29.13% -33.45% 10.79%
Liabilities to equity -6.74% -59.79% -13.49% 5.35% -31.50%
Liabilities to assets -3.09% -16.96% -4.20% 2.07% -11.74%
Net profit margin -1.69% 42.79% 43.00% -35.52% 42.76%
Earnings per share -1.69% 42.79% 43.00% #DIV/0! 42.76%
Dividend payout ratio #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 28.91% #DIV/0! 14.99%
Increase in equity % 3.91% 106.54% 10.74% -3.11% 28.86%
Balance sheet
Change in assets -                       -                        -                      -                -                      
Change in liabilities (53,682) (3,805) (253) 32,658 (272,425)
Change in equity 53,682 3,805 253 (32,658) 272,425 
 
The following section will examine what the above tables mean for each corporation 
and overall. 
5.2.4.3 Analysis 
This section of the case study provides a brief overview of the operations of each 
company and an analysis of the impact that removal of tax equivalents would have 
on the financial ratios. 
Melbourne Water Corporation 
Melbourne Water supplies the Melbourne region with water and sewerage services. 
It manages the catchments, treats and supplies water, removes and treats sewerage 
and manages the waterways and drainage systems in Port Phillip and Westernport.454 
Melbourne Water is a statutory authority which is owned by the Victorian 
Government.455 The number of shares held by the Victorian Government in 
                                               
454
 Melbourne Water, Who we are <https://www.melbournewater.com.au/about-us/who-we-are>.  
455




Melbourne Water was not easily accessible, and so has been excluded for the 
purpose of this case study.  
Melbourne Water is also an NTER entity which pays its tax equivalents to the 
Victorian Government. Melbourne Water has no subsidiaries and is a stand-alone 
entity.456 
During the year ended 30 June 2017, Melbourne Water made a net profit after tax of 
$150.433m. It paid both a tax and a dividend to the Victorian Government. Of the 
receipts by the Victorian Government, tax made up the larger portion of tax and 
dividend, accounting for 87.18% of total tax and dividend payments. It had a large 
tax liability in its balance sheet of over $1.2b, which accounted for 23.66% of net 
assets. 
Because total tax liabilities comprised 23.66% of the total net assets, removal of 
these and tax expense in the Profit and Loss Statement, resulted in an increase to 
equity of over $1.3b, or 25.32%. The Net Profit Margin (and Return on Assets) 
increased by 58.18% as a result of the removal of the tax expense from the Profit and 
Loss Statement. In addition, the Dividend Payout Ratio increased from 18.81% to 
92.80%, an increase of 393.31%. This result is to be expected since tax made up such 
a large portion of the total payment to the Victorian Government – moving the tax 
paid to dividend would then result in a large percentage increase in dividend. This is 
a material distortion that would result from the removal of any system of tax 
neutrality. 
In addition, when adjusted total liabilities are compared to adjusted total equity and 
total assets, falls in the ratios of 31.28% and 13.88% are witnessed. This illustrates a 
shift from liabilities to equity, which demonstrates a better financial position than 
would actually be the case if taxes, and resulting tax liabilities, were included. 
South Australian Water Corporation 
South Australian Water Corporation is a statutory corporation which is owned by the 
South Australian Government and is included in the portfolio of the Minister for 
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Water and the River Murray.457 It provides water and sewerage services to 1.6 
million people in the South Australian region.458 The number of shares held by the 
South Australian Government, or Minister, was not reported, and so has been 
excluded for the purpose of this case study.  
South Australian Water Corporation holds a 50% interest in SA Water/Lofty Ranges 
Power.459 For the purposes of this study, the total consolidated figures have been 
used, as it is the total consolidated group which is ultimately owned by the South 
Australian Government. 
For the year ended 30 June 2017, South Australian Water Corporation made a net 
profit after tax of $134.355m and paid both a tax and a dividend to the South 
Australian Government. However, in contrast to Melbourne Water Corporation, 
above, South Australian Water Corporation made a large dividend payment, 
compared to total tax payments. Tax paid during the year accounted for only 30.19% 
of total tax and dividend payments received by the South Australian Government. 
Total tax liabilities compared to total assets was 29.95%. 
Removing the effect of taxation from the Balance Sheet reduced the liabilities by 
$1.67b, and resulted in a corresponding increase in Equity of $1.67b. This saw a drop 
in total liabilities compared to equity, and total assets of 38.22% and 19.11% 
respectively. However, unlike Melbourne Water, which saw a massive increase in 
the dividend payout ratio of 393.31%, the dividend payout ratio of South Australian 
Water increased by only 2.09%. This is because the dividend paid by South 
Australian Water in the 2017 financial year was much larger than the tax paid, and so 
including the tax as an additional dividend would not make such a large difference. 
However, the Return on Assets and Net Profit Margin increased by 40.32%. 
SunWater Corporation 
SunWater Corporation provides bulk water to Queensland. It owns the dams, weirs 
and barrages to store this water, and the pumping stations, pipelines and drains to 
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deliver the water.460 SunWater Corporation has three subsidiaries: North West 
Queensland Water Pipeline Pty Ltd; Eungella Water Pipeline Pty Ltd; and Burnett 
Water Pty Ltd. SunWater holds 100% equity in all three subsidiaries.461 
SunWater was established under the Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 
(QLD); and has two issued shares to its two shareholding Ministers: the Minister for 
Trade and Investment; and the Minister for Energy, Biofuels and Water Supply.462 
For the 2017 financial year, SunWater made a net profit after tax of $36m. Similarly 
to South Australian Water, it had a much larger dividend than tax payment. The 
percentage of tax paid compared to total tax and dividends was 16.72%. However, it 
differed from Melbourne Water and South Australian Water, in that it had a deferred 
tax asset rather than a deferred tax liability. Its deferred tax asset of $11.114m 
accounted for only 2.44% of total net assets. From the note reporting the Movement 
in Deferred Tax Balances note, the net total deferred tax asset balance is mainly as a 
result of the deferred tax asset recognised for provisions. There does not appear to 
have been a tax loss which was carried forward from prior years.463 
The removal of tax from the financial results for the year ended 30 June 2017 results 
in only a minor change to equity of 0.86%, or $3.891m. This is because the deferred 
tax assets did not make up a large component of the net assets. A large change can be 
witnessed in the decline of the dividend payout ratio, which fell by 15.22%. This is 
because the tax paid in the Cash Flow Statement is less than the tax expense in the 
Income Statement. 
Sydney Water Corporation 
Sydney Water was incorporated under the Sydney Water Act 1994 and is the largest 
water and wastewater service provider in Australia. Sydney Water services almost 
five million people across the Sydney, Blue Mountains and Illawarra regions.464 
Sydney Water is a stand-alone entity and has no subsidiaries. It is owned by the 
Treasurer and Minister for Industrial Relations; and the Minister for Finance, 
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Services and Property.465 Sydney Water ultimately pays its tax and dividends to the 
NSW State Government. 
During the financial year ended 30 June 2017, Sydney Water made a net profit after 
tax of $447.322m and paid both tax and dividends to NSW Treasury. The tax paid of 
$209.030m comprised 34.94% of total tax and dividend payments. Total net tax 
assets and liabilities formed 13.41% of total net assets. 
Removing tax from the Income Statement and Balance Sheet, and moving all the tax 
payments to be made as an additional dividend payment results in an increase in the 
Return on Assets (and Net Profit Margin and Earnings per Share) of 42.07%. The 
liabilities to equity and liabilities to assets falls from 147.19% and 59.55% 
respectively to 113.13% and 53.08% respectively. This would give a falsely better 
outcome if tax were to be removed and does not paint an accurate picture of the 
financial position of the organisation. However, because Sydney Water has issued 
many shares, earnings per share is negligible.  
TasWater Corporation 
TasWater provides water and sewerage services to customers in Tasmania. It was 
formed in 2013 by the merger of three water authorities: Ben Lomond Water, Cradle 
Mountain Water and Southern Water, and services provider Onestream. TasWater is 
owned by 29 councils in Tasmania. These 29 councils receive their share of 
dividends, tax equivalent payments, and the government guarantee fee.466 TasWater 
was founded under the Water and Sewerage Corporation Act 2012. 
TasWater is a standalone entity and has no subsidiaries. It is subject to tax under the 
National Tax Equivalent Regime, although it pays its tax back to its owner local 
councils rather than the State Treasury. 
For the financial year ended 30 June 2017, TasWater made a net profit after tax of 
$28.592m. The dividend paid to the owner local councils was much larger than the 
tax paid, with tax paid accounting for only 31.71% of the total tax and dividends 
paid. TasWater had a deferred tax asset in its balance sheet of $39.7m, of which 
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$10.424m related to tax losses brought into TasWater from the merger of the three 
abovementioned water authorities.467 
The removal of tax had a similar effect as Sydney Water on the Return on Assets, 
Net Profit Margin and Earnings per Share ratios, in that they fell by 42.90%. 
However, unlike Sydney Water, which saw the Return on Equity ratio rise by 
22.49%, the Return on Equity ratio for TasWater rose by 45.35%. This is because the 
removal of tax increased Sydney Water’s equity by 15.98%, whereas it decreased 
TasWater’s equity by 1.68%. Similarly, where Sydney Water saw a fall in both 
measures of debt to equity (liabilities to equity, and liabilities to assets), TasWater 
saw small increases in both (6.49% for total liabilities compared to equity, and 
4.70% for total liabilities compared to total assets). There was only a small change in 
the dividend payout ratio of 2.48%, which is to be expected since the tax payments 
made were small compared to the total tax and dividend payments during the year. 
Water Corporation (WA) 
Water Corporation supplies water, wastewater, drainage and bulk irrigation services 
in Western Australia. It is owned by the West Australian Government and is 
governed under two principal acts: Water Corporations Act 1995 and Water Services 
Act 2012 and is regulated by the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA). The State 
Government determines the prices of regulation services through the State Budget 
process.468 
Water Corporation made a profit after tax of $645m during the year ended 30 June 
2017. It paid both tax and dividends to the West Australian Government, where tax 
comprised 39.55% of the total $799m paid. The total tax liabilities were relatively 
small at (2.60%) of the total net assets. 
Removing tax from the financial results again has an outcome of an increase in the 
return on assets and net profit margin ratios in the vicinity of 42%, similar to a 
number of the entities studied in this case study. The return on equity had an increase 
of 35.55% from 6.17% to 8.36%. In addition, the debt to equity ratios decreased by 
12.73% (liabilities to equity) and 8.17% (liabilities to assets) respectively (from 
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64.03% and 39.04% to 55.88% and 35.85% respectively). This indicates a favourable 
result from removing tax and increasing the dividend payment. 
Power and Water Corporation (NT) 
Power and Water Corporation operates in the electricity network and water and 
sewerage segments in the Northern Territory. It owns and operates the dams, parts of 
the electricity network, and five generation plants. In addition, it retails water and 
wastewater, gas, and electricity.469 Power and Water Corporation is a parent entity of 
two subsidiaries: Indigenous Essential Services Pty Limited and BGP Tenure 
Holdings Pty Limited.470 Power and Water Corporation has issued one share which is 
ultimately owned by the Northern Territory Government.471 
For the year ended 30 June 2017, Power and Water Corporation made a net loss after 
tax of $43.684m and made no dividend payments to the Northern Territory 
Government. However, the Northern Territory Government received tax equivalent 
payments of $18.94m. Therefore, tax accounted for 100% of the total tax and 
dividend payments to the Northern Territory Government. The net tax liability in the 
balance sheet of $52.945m accounts for (3.85%) of the net assets in the balance 
sheet. 
The inclusion of tax as a dividend instead demonstrated the smallest change in ratios 
of all the companies examined in this case study. This is because the tax expense in 
the Income Statement was very small in comparison to the pre-tax profit, at only 
1.72%. Also, the total net tax liability when compared to the total net assets was 
small at (3.85%). All the ratios declined, with the largest decline being the liabilities 
to equity. This ratio declined by 6.74% from 126.29% to 117.78%. This decline is 
actually favourable as it indicates that total liabilities have declined (as a result of the 
removal of the total tax liability).  
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Energy Queensland Limited 
Energy Queensland Limited was formed in 2016 by the merger of Ergon and 
Energex groups. Energy Queensland operates electricity network, retail and energy 
services.472 
The Energy Queensland Limited consolidated group is comprised of the Energex 
Group, which has Energex as its head company, and four subsidiaries; and the Ergon 
Energy Group, which has Ergon Energy as its head company and two subsidiaries.473 
Energy Queensland Limited is owned by the Queensland Government and has two 
shareholding ministers.474 The shareholding ministers are the Treasurer and Minister 
for Trade and Investment; and the Minister for Main Roads, Road Safety and Ports 
and Minister for Energy, Biofuels and Water Supply.475 
During the year ended 30 June 2017, Energy Queensland made large tax payments of 
$632m, but no dividend payments to the Queensland Government. It has a net profit 
after tax of $881m, a tax receivable of $92m, and a deferred tax liability of $3,520m. 
The most notable ratios were the liabilities to equity of 628.31% and resulted from 
the total net tax liability being (95.98%) of equity. This indicates that the net deferred 
tax liability is very large when compared to total equity and that liabilities on the 
balance sheet are also very large. 
It then follows that the removal of all tax items in the financial statements results in 
an increase in equity of 106.54%. Further, the liabilities to equity fell by the largest 
results in this case study – a fall of 59.79%. This fall is favourable, as it represents 
overall less debt and greater equity. The removal of tax would present an inaccurate 
and far too favourable a view of the company. In addition, there was another increase 
in the vicinity of 42% to the return on assets, net profit margin and earnings per share 
ratios.  
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There was a decline in the return on equity from 24.67% to 17.06%, a decline of 
30.86%. This is as a result of the large increase in equity (an increase of $3.8b, or 
106.54%) once tax was removed from the balance sheet. 
Essential Energy 
Essential Energy builds, owns and operates one of Australia’s largest electricity 
networks. Essential Energy services 95% of NSW and parts of Southern 
Queensland.476 Essential Energy was founded under the Energy Services 
Corporations Act 1995 (NSW) and is a State-owned corporation owned by the NSW 
Government.477 It has issued two $1 ordinary shares, one to each of its two 
shareholders: the Treasurer; and the Minister for Finance, Services and Property.478 
Essential Energy owned one-third of Networks NSW Pty Limited until 29 January 
2016. The company had no transactions, and so did not make a material difference to 
the financial statements presented by Essential Energy for the year ended 30 June 
2017.479 
For the year ended 30 June 2017, Essential Energy made both tax and dividend 
payments to the NSW Government, with tax paid of $23.70m accounting for 45.75% 
of total tax and dividend payments back to the NSW Government. In addition, 
Essential Energy had a net profit after tax of $50m; and a net tax liability in its 
balance sheet of $231.9m, which accounted for (9.83%) of the total net assets. 
The removal of tax from the financial statements, and shifting tax payments to 
additional dividend payments results in an increase to equity of $253.4m (a 10.74% 
increase). Again, the return on assets, net profit margin and earnings per share ratios 
increased by 43% (although only from 0.60% to 0.85%, so not a large or material 
amount overall). The dividend payout ratio increases from 56.20% to 72.45% (an 
increase of 28.91%) on the moving of tax to be an additional dividend. This is the 
second largest increase in this ratio of all the companies included in this case study. 
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Synergy is the leading energy generator and retailer in Western Australia.480 Synergy 
is an electricity generator and a retailer of both electricity and gas. It also trades in 
wholesale electricity and gas under ringfenced arrangements. Synergy participates in 
the Wholesale Electricity Market in Western Australia.481 Synergy is owned by the 
West Australian Government and reports to the Minister for Energy.482  Synergy is 
comprised of a head (parent) entity and three subsidiaries: 
• Vinalco Energy Pty Ltd 
• South West Hub Pty Ltd 
• South West Solar Development Holdings Pty Ltd (was 50% prior to 2017, but 
the remaining 50% was acquired on 30 June 2017).483 
The amounts reported in this case study are the total consolidated figures because the 
entire group is owned by the West Australian Government. 
For the year ended 30 June 2017, Synergy made a net loss after tax of $12.624m, 
although it also had a tax expense. Synergy paid tax but made no dividend payments 
during the 2017 financial year. The balance sheet contains a net tax asset of 
$37.142m, of which a $21 thousand carried forward tax loss was created and is being 
carried forward to future years. 
The removal of tax resulted in a 3.11% decrease in equity (because the balance sheet 
held a deferred tax asset, the removal resulted in a reduction in net assets, and so also 
a reduction in the total equity). Although the return on assets, return on equity, and 
net profit margin ratios decreased by 35%, these ratios were less than one percent, so 
it was a very small decrease overall. Similar to TasWater, Synergy saw an increase in 
both the debt to equity ratios (liabilities to equity, and liabilities to assets). This is 
because both companies had net tax assets in their balance sheets, removal of which 
resulted in an unfavourable outcome in these formulas. 
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Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd, trading as TasNetworks, owns the Tasmanian 
transmission and distribution network. It also provides telecommunications network 
services. TasNetworks is owned by the State of Tasmania.484 
TasNetworks is a consolidated group, consisting of Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd as 
the parent entity, and two subsidiaries: Auroracom Pty Ltd and Ezikey Group Pty 
Ltd.485 
During the year ended 30 June 2017, TasNetworks paid both tax and dividends to the 
Tasmanian Government, with the tax paid of $46.596m accounting for 39.08% of the 
total tax and dividends paid. TasNetworks made a profit after tax of $93.927m and 
had net tax liabilities in the balance sheet of $232.265m, a total of (24.60%) of the 
net assets. 
The removal of tax from the financial results causes an increase in equity of 
$272.425m, or 28.86%. An increase of 42.76% is also witnessed in the return on 
assets, net profit margin, and earnings per share ratios. 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion 
This section examined why entities were required to make two separate payments to 
their State or Territory Government. It considered the result of removing tax 
neutrality and the resultant tax paid, tax expense and any tax balances in the balance 
sheet, and instead allowing for a greater dividend. As discussed in the opening, tax is 
an expense whereas a dividend is a return on equity, so the overall classification of 
the payments being made to the State or Territory Governments needs to be kept 
separate. The case study provided the figures to support this. In addition to just the 
reclassification of the payments being made to the government, a change to equity 
balances was witnessed, sometimes in the billions. Except for TasWater and Synergy 
(whose overall tax position, including tax expense, was an asset rather than a 
liability), this change in equity was favourable. Energy Queensland saw its equity 
double. Melbourne Water has an increase to equity of 25.34%. SA Water had the 
greatest dollar increase in equity of $1.677bn or 30.94%. 
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The return on assets, net profit margin and earnings per share ratios increased on 
average 32.65% for those companies studied, with the majority increasing in the 
vicinity of 40 - 43%. If compared to a privately owned entity, this advantage would 
be material. In addition, the debt to equity ratios, which compared total liabilities to 
equity, and liabilities to assets, decreased by an average of 18.78% and 7.45% 
respectively. This decrease is favourable as it represents a decrease to total liabilities 
when compared to both equity and total assets. 
Although there are differences in removing the effect of tax in the current year 
results, the true effect of removing tax is seen over the long-term – in the deferred tax 
assets and liabilities that are reported in the balance sheet. This is especially true of 
businesses in the infrastructure industries, where asset bases are very large and even 
a small difference between tax and accounting treatments of assets results in very 
large deferred tax assets and liabilities which are often not recognised in the short-
term. 
This case study illustrates the competitive advantage that would be given to state-
owned businesses if they were not subject to tax. It examined the result of keeping 
the payments to the government the same from a cashflow perspective, but 
reclassifying them to be a dividend instead. The case study returned some large 
differences that would result in a material competitive advantage if such a policy 
were to be introduced. It also illustrated the need for a system of tax neutrality, as to 
exclude tax from the financial statements would leave any competitor at a 
disadvantage. These advantages would result in a better credit rating, which in turn 
means that the State-owned corporation could obtain cheaper borrowing as a result 
although under current laws, most State-owned corporations are not permitted to 
borrow from any private institutions; they are required to borrow from their own 
State or Territory Treasury Corporation (this is discussed further in section 5.1.1: 
Debt neutrality). In addition, an entity which does not have to pay tax is able to 
charge lower prices than one which is liable to tax. 
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5.3 Comparison of NTER entities with their 
privately-owned counterparts: Case study 
Government-owned entities do not appear to have the same incentive to minimise tax 
as their privately-owned counterparts. CME486 argues that this is because privately-
owned entities have an interest in minimising tax and thereby maximising post-tax 
profits, leading to increased dividends to shareholders. However, where the 
government-owned entity pays both its tax equivalents and dividends to its owner 
State Treasury, it is maintained that the incentive to minimise taxes does not exist.487 
This section seeks to test that theory by comparing an NTER entity with a similar 
privately-owned entity in the same industry. 
As discussed earlier in section 5.2.2.2, the electricity industry in Australia is split into 
four segments: generation, transmission, distribution and retail. Ownership across 
these four segments is a mix of either private or public ownership. A summary of the 
ownership type is provided below. 
Majority ownership of electricity market components in Australia488 
Component Generation Transmission Distribution Retail 
SA Private Private Private Private 
VIC Private Private Private Private 
Qld Public Public Public Private# 
NSW Private Public Public Private 
WA Public Public Public Public 
TAS Public Public Public Public 
NT Public Public Public Public 
ACT Private* Private* Private* Private* 
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*ACT Government and AGL joint venture 
# Also includes a state-owned enterprise (Ergon Energy). 
Sources: Australian Energy Regulator; WA Department of Finance; NT Department 
of Treasury and Finance 
 
To summarise: 
• “Victoria and South Australia have sold all their electricity businesses, while 
only some have been sold in Queensland and NSW. 
• The generators have been sold in NSW and the retail businesses have been 
sold in Queensland and NSW. 
• Everywhere else in Australia, they are still state-owned assets.”489 
This section will compare a number of companies in the electricity industry, some of 
which are publicly-owned and others which are privately-owned. Many of the 
privately-owned electricity companies are structured as partnerships or consortiums, 
meaning that there are no publicly available annual reports or financial statements. 
The privately-owned companies selected for the purpose of this study are those for 
which annual reports are publicly available and, in most cases, are listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. This section aims to examine how they are structured for 
tax purposes, whether they pay tax, dividend return to shareholders, and are subject 
to price regulation. In doing this, it is hoped that any differences between public and 
private ownership will be brought to light. 
These case studies are examined over a period of five years, and then the results 
averaged over that time. This is because there are timing differences between when 
payments, such as tax and dividends, are paid, and the period they relate to. It is 
hoped that in providing a five-year average for each company researched, these 
variances will be largely smoothed out over that timeframe. Figures reported in this 
case study have been reported on a consolidated basis, as many of the consolidated 
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entities have businesses in the same sectors and would prove too difficult to attempt 
to separate out the data into segments. 
This case study will analyse the following privately-owned companies: AGL 
Limited, Origin Energy, and Ausnet. The government owned companies studied 
include Synergy Limited, Ergon, Energex, Energy Queensland, Tasnetworks, Aurora 
Energy, and Essential Energy. All are operators in the electricity and gas industries.  
As they all operate in the same industries, this enables a good comparison between 
public sector and private sector operations in the same market. 
In addition to the ratios outlined in section 5.2.4.1, the following ratios will also be 
utilised in this analysis: 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 
The formula used to determine the tax paid as a percentage of net profit is: 
 Tax paid / Net profit before tax 
This aims to determine, over the five-year time-frame examined, whether tax paid 
when compared to net profit is close to the statutory tax rate of 30%, and also, 
whether the tax paid differs according to ownership. It is expected that the tax paid 
will not be close to the 30% statutory rate when compared to net profit because there 
are many differences between net accounting profit and taxable income. These will 
be outlined in a future section. However, the comparison to be made in this case 
study is whether the rate varies greatly according to ownership. 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total assets 
The formula used to determine this ratio is: 
 Total borrowings / Total assets 
This ratio aims to determine how many of the total assets held by the company are 
financed by borrowings. A comparison of the private sector and public sector 
borrowings will be performed to determine if the rate of borrowings is similar 
between the private and public sectors. 
Interest paid as a percentage of total income 
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The formula used to calculate this ratio is: 
 Interest paid / Total revenue 
This formula aims to determine the total ratio of interest payments to revenue earned. 
Averaging this ratio over five years should eliminate any timing issues. A 
comparison between the private and public sector should determine whether the 
sector has a similar result regardless of ownership, or whether there is a difference 
that is related to ownership type. 
Interest paid as a percentage of total borrowings 
The formula used to calculate the ratio is as follows: 
 Interest paid / Total borrowings 
This ratio will give a very high-level interest rate on total borrowings. Comparing the 
interest rate for public companies and private companies will enable a comparison of 
whether the borrowing options offered by State and Territory Treasury corporations 
are similar to those available to the private sector. 
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 
The formula used to calculate this ratio is as follows: 
 Total net tax paid (from the cash flow statement) / Total revenue 
This ratio will determine how much tax was paid per dollar of revenue earned. It 
aims to compare whether the private sector pays more tax per dollar earned than the 
government-owned entities. 
Total dividends compared to total equity 
The formula used to calculate the total dividends compared to total equity is: 
 Total dividends paid (from cash flow statement) / Total equity 
This formula aims to calculated how much was returned to shareholders as a 
percentage of their total equity. This formula is being used to determine whether, if it 
was found privately owned corporations paid less tax compared to their state-owned 
counterparts, this resulted in more dividends being paid out to their shareholders. 
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The interest amounts utilised in this case study include any applicable government 
guarantee fees. Government guarantee fees are levied by State and Territory 
governments on their State-owned corporations. This fee is imposed to ensure 
competitive neutrality between the private and public sectors.490 
Total expenses compared to total income 
The formula used to calculate this ratio is as follows: 
 Total expenses / Total income 
This ratio aims to give a high-level indicator of the cost of earning each dollar of 
revenue. Explained simply, it is a very high-level measure of efficiency, where the 
higher the percentage, the greater the cost of earning each dollar of revenue. 
5.3.1 Privately owned companies studied 
Many of the privatised entities in the electricity industry are operating through a 
consortium, meaning that there was no publicly available annual reports or financial 
statements. Therefore, the following case study utilises only a small number of 
players in the industry, although they were companies with influence in the industry. 
However, despite the small number of participants studied in this case study, a larger 
case study is examined in section 6.5. The findings of the larger case study are 
consistent with the findings in this case study. 
5.3.1.1 AGL 
Australian Gas Light Company was formed in Sydney in 1837 and is one of the 
largest companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
AGL Energy provides gas and electricity to over 3.6 million customers across 
Australia. It is Australia’s largest electricity generator and the largest ASX-listed 
investor in renewable energy.491 
                                               
490
 New South Wales Treasury, Government Guarantee Fee Policy for Government Businesses: 
Policy and Guidelines Paper, (2014). 
491
 AGL, Who we are: Our company <https://www.agl.com.au/about-agl/who-we-are/our-company> 
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AGL Energy has 47 subsidiaries, of which a number have subsidiaries of their 
own.492 The consolidated group contains a number of partnerships, and three foreign 
(two New Zealand and one Netherlands) companies. 
Only part of AGL’s activities are price regulated. The electricity retail arm is 
generally not regulated because there are a number of players in the market, and it is 
competitive enough to not require price regulation. 
  
                                               
492
 AGL, Annual Report 2017, (2017) 44-45.  
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A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS 
FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 84   Pg 76   Pg 79   Pg 67   Pg 7      
Interest paid 
                   
257  
                   
217  
                   
216  
                   
186  
                   
188  
               
1,064  
                   
213  
            
                         
-   
                       
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                       
-   
                       
-   
Tax Paid 
                      
71  
                   
191  
                   
147  
                   
166  
                   
292  
                   
867  
                   
173  
Dividend Paid 
                   
214  
                   
269  
                   
344  
                   
446  
                   
517  
               
1,790  
                   
358  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
285  
                   
460  
                   
491  
                   
612  
                   
809  
               
2,657  
                   
531  
                
Income Statement  Pg 80   Pg 72   Pg 75   Pg 63   Pg 3      
Total income 
               
9,742  
               
9,568  
            
10,705  
            
11,201  
            
12,603  
            
53,819  
            
10,764  
Total expenses 
-             
9,278  
-             
8,808  
-          
10,368  
-          
11,675  
-          
11,839  
-          
51,968  
-          
10,394  
Net profit 
                   
464  
                   
760  
                   
337  
-                  
474  
                   
764  
               
1,851  
                   
370  
Tax expense 
-                     
75  
-                  
190  
-                  
119  
                      
67  
-                  
225  
-                  
542  
-                  
108  
Net profit after tax 
                   
389  
                   
570  
                   
218  
-                  
407  
                   
539  
               
1,309  
                   
262  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 82   Pg 74   Pg 77   Pg 65   Pg 5      
Total borrowings 
               
3,109  
               
3,714  
               
3,882  
               
3,108  
               
3,346  
            
17,159  
               
3,432  
                
Total assets 
            
13,366  
            
13,975  
            
15,833  
            
14,604  
            
14,458  
            
72,236  
            
14,447  
Total liabilities 
               
6,027  
               
6,387  
               
7,018  
               
6,678  
               
6,884  
            
32,994  
               
6,599  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
               
7,339  
               
7,588  
               
8,815  
               
7,926  
               
7,574  
            
39,242  
               
7,848  
                
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                       
-   
                       
-   
Current tax liability 
-                  
155  
-                     
49  
-                     
86  
-                  
102  
-                     
13  
-                  
405  
-                     
81  
Deferred tax asset 
                   
729  
                   
631  
                   
682  
                   
953  
                   
792  
               
3,787  
                   
757  
Deferred tax liability 
-                     
99  
-                     
50  
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
-                 
149  
-                     
30  
Total 
                   
475  
                   
532  
                   
596  
                   
851  
                   
779  
               
3,233  
                   
647  
                
                
                                               
493
 AGL, 2013 Annual Report, (2013). 
494
 AGL, Annual Report 2014, (2014). 
495
 AGL, Annual Report 2015, (2015). 
496
 AGL, Annual Report 2016, (2016). 
497
 AGL, Annual Report 2017, (2017). 
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B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 2.91% 4.08% 1.38% -2.79% 3.73% 1.81% 1.81% 
Return on equity 5.30% 7.51% 2.47% -5.13% 7.12% 3.33% 3.33% 
Liabilities to equity 82.12% 84.17% 79.61% 84.25% 90.89% 84.08% 84.08% 
Liabilities to assets 45.09% 45.70% 44.33% 45.73% 47.61% 45.68% 45.68% 
Net profit margin 3.99% 5.96% 2.04% -3.63% 4.28% 2.43% 2.43% 
Dividend payout ratio 55.03% 47.19% 157.80% 
-
109.58% 95.92% 136.77% 136.77% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 24.95% 41.52% 29.94% 27.12% 36.09% 32.63% 32.63% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 6.47% 7.01% 6.76% 10.74% 10.29% 8.24% 8.24% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 15.32% 25.13% 43.62% -35.02% 38.22% 46.84% 46.84% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of 
total assets 23.26% 26.58% 24.52% 21.28% 23.143% 23.75% 23.75% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 2.64% 2.27% 2.02% 1.66% 1.49% 1.98% 1.98% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 8.27% 5.84% 5.56% 5.98% 5.62% 6.20% 6.20% 
Total tax and dividends compared to 
total equity 3.88% 6.06% 5.57% 7.72% 10.68% 6.77% 6.77% 
Total dividends compared to total 
equity 2.91% 3.55% 3.90% 5.63% 6.83% 4.56% 4.56% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 0.73% 2.00% 1.37% 1.48% 2.32% 1.61% 1.61% 
Total income compared to total 
expenses 95.24% 92.06% 96.85% 104.23% 93.94% 96.56% 96.56% 
                
                
Key points worthy of note are that AGL has a large asset value of $14,447.16m (five-
year average), but an average net deferred tax asset of $646.64m, which is unusual 
for companies in this industry. Usually, infrastructure companies with large asset 
bases have deferred tax liabilities because, for tax purposes, assets are valued at their 
historical cost and are often depreciated more rapidly than for accounting purposes. 
Also, assets can be revalued for accounting purposes, which also increases the 
difference between the tax carrying value and the accounting carrying value. Total 
borrowings as a percentage of total assets is 23.75%, which is lower than the other 
privately-owned corporations studied, and also below the average for state-owned 
corporations (however, not the lowest result surveyed). AGL’s average interest paid 
as a percentage of total borrowings is 6.20%, which is higher than both other 
privately-owned companies surveyed, but again, less than the average for the 
government-owned sector. With the exception of 2016, when AGL made a loss, the 
company has made strong profits in the other years. Overall, AGL made tax 
payments in every year studied, suggesting that although AGL made an accounting 
loss in 2016, it might have still have made a taxable gain for that year. In addition, 
AGL had the lowest liabilities to equity of all the companies surveyed, at 84.08% 
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and the highest net tax paid as a percentage of profit of the private companies at 
46.84%. 
5.3.1.2 Origin Energy 
Origin Energy was formed in February 2000. It is one of the largest energy retailers 
in Australia, with 4.2 million gas, electricity and LPG customers across Australia.498 
It is also involved in developing renewable energy. Origin Energy is involved in 
retailing, exploration, production and generation.499 It is in both the electricity and 
gas markets. As an Australian-owned private company, it is listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange. Origin Energy is a very large consolidated group with 17 direct 
subsidiaries which have many more subsidiaries of their own, some being foreign 
companies. 
The following table contains key financial data and ratios for the financial years 


























A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 70   Pg 68   Pg 72   Pg 72   Pg 87      
Interest paid 
                   
448  
                   
463  
                   
547  
                   
611  
                   
540  
               
2,609  
                   
522  
            
                         
-   
                       
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                        
-   
                      
-   
                      
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                       
-   
Tax Paid 
                   
275  
                      
17  
                   
109  
                      
52  
                      
53  
                   
506  
                   
101  
Dividend Paid 
                   
546  
                   
550  
                   
553  
                   
452  
                         
-   
               
2,101  
                   
420  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
821  
                   
567  
                   
662  
                   
504  
                      
53  
               
2,607  
                   
521  
                
Income Statement  Pg 67   Pg 64   Pg 68   Pg 68   Pg 83      
Total income 
            
14,900  
            
14,951  
            
11,747  
            
11,956  
            
13,833  
            
67,387  
            
13,477  
Total expenses 
-          
14,397  
-          
14,204  
-          
12,281  
-          
12,693  
-          
15,908  
-          
69,483  
-          
13,897  
Net profit 
                   
503  
                   
747  
-                  
534  
-                  
737  
-             
2,075  
-             
2,096  
-                  
419  
                                               
498
 Origin Energy, Annual Report 2017, (2017) 13. 
499
 Origin Energy, What we do <https://www.originenergy.com.au/about/who-we-are/what-we-
do.html>.  
500
 Origin Energy, Annual Report 2013, (2013). 
501
 Origin Energy, Annual Report 2014, (2014). 
502
 Origin Energy, Annual Report 2015, (2015). 
503
 Origin Energy, Annual Report 2016, (2016). 
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-                     
42  
-                  
109  
                      
85  
                   
133  
                      
26  
                      
93  
                      
19  
Net profit after tax 
                   
461  
                   
638  
-                  
449  
-                  
604  
-             
2,049  
-             
2,003  
-                  
401  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 68   Pg 66   Pg 70   Pg 70   Pg 85      
Total borrowings 
               
7,116  
               
9,362  
            
11,877  
               
9,616  
               
8,515  
            
46,486  
               
9,297  
                
Total assets 
            
29,586  
            
31,139  
            
33,367  
            
28,898  
            
25,199  
         
148,189  
            
29,638  
Total liabilities 
            
14,792  
            
16,010  
            
19,208  
            
14,368  
            
13,781  
            
78,159  
            
15,632  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
            
14,794  
            
15,129  
            
14,159  
            
14,530  
            
11,418  
            
70,030  
            
14,006  
                
Current tax asset 
                   
174  
                         
-   
                   
79  
                      
59  
                         
-   
                   
312  
                      
62  
Current tax liability 
-                     
21  
-                     
41  
-                        
4  
-                       
6  
-                     
52  
-                  
124  
-                     
25  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-   
                        
-   
                      
-   
                      
-   
                      
35  
                      
35  
                         
7  
Deferred tax liability 
-             
1,136  
-                  
883  
-                  
147  
-                  
110  
                         
-   
-             
2,276  
-                  
455  
Total 
-                  
983  
-                  
924  
-                     
72  
-                     
57  
-                     
17  
-             
2,053  
-                  
411  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 1.56% 2.05% -1.35% -2.09% -8.13% -1.35% -1.35% 
Return on equity 3.12% 4.22% -3.17% -4.16% -17.95% -2.86% -2.86% 
Liabilities to equity 99.99% 105.82% 135.66% 98.89% 120.70% 111.61% 111.61% 
Liabilities to assets 50.00% 51.41% 57.57% 49.72% 54.69% 52.74% 52.74% 
Net profit margin 3.09% 4.27% -3.82% -5.05% -14.81% -2.97% -2.97% 
Dividend payout ratio 118.44% 86.21% 
-





                
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 33.50% 3.00% 16.47% 10.32% 100.00% 19.41% 19.41% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 6.64% 6.11% 0.51% 0.39% 0.15% 2.93% 2.93% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 54.67% 2.28% -20.41% -7.06% -2.55% -24.14% -24.14% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total 
assets 24.05% 30.07% 35.60% 33.28% 33.791% 31.37% 31.37% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total income 3.01% 3.10% 4.66% 5.11% 3.90% 3.87% 3.87% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 6.30% 4.95% 4.61% 6.35% 6.34% 5.61% 5.61% 
Total tax and dividends compared to total 
equity 5.55% 3.75% 4.68% 3.47% 0.46% 3.72% 3.72% 
Total dividends compared to total equity 3.69% 3.64% 3.91% 3.11% 0.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 1.85% 0.11% 0.93% 0.43% 0.38% 0.75% 0.75% 
Total income compared to total expenses 96.62% 95.00% 104.55% 106.16% 115.00% 103.11% 103.11% 
                
                
Origin Energy has the largest asset base of all companies studied for this research, 
with total assets of $29,637.8m, and also the largest total equity of $14,006m (five-
year average). It also earned more income than any other company in this study. 
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However, it was the only company in this study that had a five-year average net loss. 
Although making small losses in 2015 and 2016, the average net loss result is as a 
result of a large $2bn loss in 2017. This loss resulted from an impairment of $3.1b.505 
Origin Energy had a tax benefit (rather than tax expense) recognised in its Income 
Statement. However, because impairments are not recognised as a tax deduction, 
Origin Energy made tax payments for all the years surveyed. Origin Energy did not 
pay a dividend in 2017. Origin Energy had the lowest net tax liability over total 
equity ratio of all the companies surveyed, at 2.93%. 
5.3.1.3 Ausnet 
Ausnet owns and operates the electricity transmission network, an electricity 
distribution network, and a gas distribution network in Victoria. Ausnet is listed on 
the Australian Securities Exchange and is 49% publicly owned, while 31.1% is 
owned by Singapore Power, and 19.9% is owned by the State Grid of China.506 
Ausnet is regulated by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). Ausnet is a large 
consolidated group with 21 subsidiaries, some of which were not incorporated in 
Australia. Ausnet operates on 31 March financial year-ends.  



























A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 74   Pg 74   Pg 62   Pg 68   Pg 70      
Interest paid 
                   
357  
                   
361  
                   
326  
                   
297  
                   
285  
               
1,626  
                   
325  
            
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax Paid 
                      
41  
                      
35  
                      
55  
                   
142  
                      
49  
                   
322  
                      
64  
Dividend Paid 
                   
253  
                   
279  
                   
285  
                   
295  
                   
308  
               
1,419  
                   
284  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
294  
                   
315  
                   
339  
                   
436  
                   
357  
               
1,741  
                   
348  
                                               
505
 Origin Energy, 2017 Annual Report, (2017) 5. 
506
 Ausnet, About us <https://www.ausnetservices.com.au/en/Misc-Pages/Links/About-Us>.  
507




 Ausnet, Statutory Annual Report 2015, (2015). 
510
 Ausnet, Annual Report 2016, (2016). 
511
 Ausnet, Annual Report 2017, (2017). 
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Income Statement  Pg 68   Pg 68   Pg 57   Pg 63   Pg 65      
Total income 
               
1,639  
               
1,799  
               
1,834  
               
1,919  
               
1,882  
               
9,073  
               
1,815  
Total expenses 
-             
1,324  
-             
1,494  
-             
1,480  
-             
1,461  
-             
1,518  
-             
7,277  
-             
1,455  
Net profit 
                   
315  
                   
305  
                   
354  
                   
458  
                   
363  
               
1,796  
                   
359  
Tax expense 
-                     
42  
-                  
127  
-                  
332  
                      
31  
-                  
108  
-                  
578  
-                  
116  
Net profit after tax 
                   
273  
                   
178  
                      
23  
                   
489  
                   
255  
               
1,219  
                   
244  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 70   Pg 70   Pg 59   Pg 65   Pg 67      
Total borrowings 
               
5,277  
               
6,069  
               
7,216  
               
6,898  
               
6,665  
            
32,126  
               
6,425  
                
Total assets 
            
10,082  
            
10,612  
            
12,063  
            
11,676  
            
11,757  
            
56,190  
            
11,238  
Total liabilities 
               
6,645  
               
7,168  
               
8,815  
               
8,118  
               
8,058  
            
38,804  
               
7,761  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
               
3,437  
               
3,445  
               
3,249  
               
3,558  
               
3,698  
            
17,387  
               
3,477  
                
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                      
26  
                      
26  
                         
5  
Current tax liability 
-                     
10  
-                     
70  
-                  
139  
-                        
3  
                         
-   
-                  
222  
-                     
44  
Deferred tax asset 
                      
75  
                      
17  
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                      
92  
                      
18  
Deferred tax liability 
-                  
294  
-                  
305  
-                  
472  
-                  
466  
-                  
586  
-             
2,123  
-                  
425  
Total 
-                  
229  
-                  
357  
-                  
611  
-                  
469  
-                  
561  
-             
2,226  
-                  
445  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 2.71% 1.68% 0.19% 4.19% 2.17% 2.17% 2.17% 
Return on equity 7.95% 5.18% 0.70% 13.75% 6.90% 7.01% 7.01% 
Liabilities to equity 193.33% 208.09% 271.32% 228.18% 217.88% 223.18% 223.18% 
Liabilities to assets 65.91% 67.54% 73.07% 69.53% 68.54% 69.06% 69.06% 
Net profit margin 16.68% 9.91% 1.23% 25.50% 13.56% 13.43% 13.43% 
Dividend payout ratio 92.43% 156.53% 1259.73% 60.19% 120.66% 116.42% 116.42% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 13.90% 11.26% 16.07% 32.49% 13.83% 18.49% 18.49% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 6.65% 10.37% 18.80% 13.19% 15.16% 12.80% 12.80% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 12.94% 11.59% 15.38% 30.95% 13.60% 17.92% 17.92% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of 
total assets 52.34% 57.19% 59.82% 59.08% 56.695% 57.17% 57.17% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 21.77% 20.03% 17.79% 15.47% 15.16% 17.92% 17.92% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 6.76% 5.94% 4.52% 4.30% 4.28% 5.06% 5.06% 
Total tax and dividends compared to 
total equity 8.54% 9.13% 10.44% 12.26% 9.66% 10.01% 10.01% 
Total dividends compared to total 
equity 7.35% 8.10% 8.76% 8.28% 8.32% 8.16% 8.16% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 2.49% 1.97% 2.97% 7.38% 2.63% 3.55% 3.55% 
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Total income compared to total 
expenses 80.77% 83.03% 80.68% 76.14% 80.69% 80.20% 80.20% 
                
                
Ausnet had the lowest total assets of the three privately owned corporations 
surveyed, with average total assets of $11,238.06m, but the highest average 
percentage of total borrowings compared to total assets at 57.17%. However, 
although borrowings were so high compared to total assets, total interest paid as a 
percentage of total assets was the lowest of the privately owned, and amongst the 
lowest overall, at 5.06%. This could be due to Ausnet’s borrowings coming from a 
variety of different sources from a number of countries. Ausnet’s borrowings include 
medium-term and senior notes, bank debt facilities, floating rate notes and hybrid 
securities. Countries from which these financial instruments are held include the US, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong, Norway, Great Britain and Euro 
currency.512 
Ausnet made a net profit for all years studied, and paid tax in every year, although 
there was a sharp spike in tax paid in 2016. This was due to a settlement in relation to 
a tax dispute with the ATO.513 The ATO dispute related to the deductibility of 
payments made under s 163AA of the Electricity Industry Act 1993 (Vic). The 
payments were required to be made to the State out of company profits, but after the 
calculation of taxable income. These payments were required to be made as an owner 
of an electricity transmission license. Ausnet had been claiming these payments as 
deductible under s 8-1 of ITAA 1997, but the Court held that these were capital 
payments and not deductible.514 This resulted in additional tax payable of $54m and 
interest of $37m, being a total of $91m owed to the ATO.515 As a result of the 
outcome of this dispute with the ATO, Ausnet adjusted its Balance Sheet, which 
included a reduction in its deferred tax liabilities of $292.9m, the cancellation of tax 
losses (which led to an increase in the deferred tax liabilities of $153m) and the 
reversal of a derivative financial instrument of $4.9m.516 
                                               
512
 Ausnet, Annual Report 2017, (2017) 91. 
513
 Ausnet, Annual Report 2016, (2016) 68. 
514
 Ausnet Transmission Group Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) HCA 25. 
515
 Ausnet, Australian Taxation Office (ATO) Dispute – s 163AA (5 August 2015). 
516
 Ausnet, Tax Transparency Report 2017, (2017). 
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Dividends paid were fairly consistent over the five years surveyed, and the average 
dividend payout ratio over the five years was 116.42%. The tax expense for the year 
ended 31 March 2015 was abnormally high at 93.62% of net profit before tax. This 
was in anticipation of the settlement of the dispute with the ATO.517 
5.3.2 State-owned companies studied 
5.3.2.1 Synergy 
The Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation, trading as Synergy, was 
established in 1883 when the Perth Gas Company was formed and acquired the 
assets of City of Perth Gas Co.518 It is a “wholly-owned public sector entity, 
controlled by the State Government of Western Australia.”519 Synergy is a not-for-
profit entity which was incorporated under the Electricity Corporations Act 2005.520 
“Synergy is neither an agent of the state, and in accordance with schedule 1 of the 
Public Sector Management Act 1994 nor is it a public sector organisation.” It is a 
government trading enterprise which is not listed on the ASX.521 
Synergy is the leading energy generator and retailer in Western Australia.522 Synergy 
is an electricity generator and a retailer of both electricity and gas. It also trades in 
wholesale electricity and gas under ringfenced arrangements. Synergy participates in 
the Wholesale Electricity Market in Western Australia.523 
Synergy generates electricity through the following methods: 
• It operates large power stations in Collie, Kwinana, Cockburn and Pinjar; 
• It operates small power stations in Mungarra and West Kalgoorlie, and has a 
joint venture at Worsley Alumina refinery near Collie; and 
• It generates electricity from renewable sources via wind farms at Albany, 
Esperance, Kalbarri and Mumbida, a solar farm near Geraldton and wind-
diesel systems in Bremer Bay, Coral Bay, Denham and Hopetoun.524 
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As Western Australia’s largest energy retailer, Synergy supplies electricity and gas to 
one million residential, business and industrial customers.525 
Synergy is comprised of a head (parent) entity and three subsidiaries: 
• Vinalco Energy Pty Ltd 
• South West Hub Pty Ltd 
• South West Solar Development Holdings Pty Ltd (was 50% prior to 2017, but 
the remaining 50% was acquired on 30 June 2017).526 























total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS 
FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 56   Pg 56   Pg 55   Pg 37   Pg 34      
Interest paid 
            
75,250  
         
107,984  
            
36,082  
            
10,910  
               
8,892  
          
239,118  
            
47,824  
            
                          
-   
                        
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-     
                         
-   
-          
40,710  
                         
-   
-           
40,710  
-             
8,142  
Tax Paid 
            
13,946  
         
173,192  
            
44,111  
                         
-   
           
30,704  
          
261,953  
            
52,391  
Dividend Paid 
            
39,800  
            
37,600  
            
83,567  
            
70,331  
                         
-   
          
231,298  
            
46,260  
Total dividend and tax paid 
            
53,746  
         
210,792  
         
127,678  
            
29,621  
            
30,704  
          
452,541  
            
90,508  
                
Income Statement  Pg 53   Pg 53   Pg 52   Pg 34   Pg 30      
Total income 
    
1,606,676  
    
2,781,881  
    
3,240,566  
    
3,121,922  




    
2,767,806  
Total expenses 
-   
1,493,186  
-   
2,653,057  
-   
3,161,216  
-   
3,081,240  




-   
2,696,965  
Net profit 
         
113,490  
         
128,824  
            
79,350  
            
40,682  
-             
8,140  
          
354,206  
            
70,841  
Tax expense 
-          
54,596  
-          
45,454  
-          
22,203  
-             
6,996  
-             
4,484  
-        
133,733  
-          
26,747  
Net profit after tax 
            
58,894  
            
83,370  
            
57,147  
            
33,686  
-          
12,624  
          
220,473  
            
44,095  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 54   Pg 54   Pg 53   Pg 35   Pg 32      
Total borrowings 
         
790,208  
         
141,086  
         
292,183  
         
249,808  
         
193,984  
     
1,667,269  
         
333,454  
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2,825,274  
    
3,345,525  
    
2,910,985  
    
2,823,878  




    
2,905,963  
Total liabilities 
    
2,094,723  
    
2,218,894  
    
1,810,992  
    
1,763,903  
    
1,574,390  
     
9,462,902  
    
1,892,580  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
         
730,551  
    
1,126,631  
    
1,099,993  
    
1,059,975  
    
1,049,761  
     
5,066,911  
    
1,013,382  
                
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
            
31,591  
            
67,902  
                         
-     
             
99,493  
            
19,899  
Current tax liability 
-          
38,172  
                         
-   
                        
-   
-          
11,931  
-             
8,995  
-           
59,098  
-          
11,820  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-   
               
7,348  
                         
-   
           
24,042  
            
46,137  
             
77,527  
            
15,505  
Deferred tax liability 
-          
42,507  
                         
-   
-             
8,085  
                         
-     
-           
50,592  
-          
10,118  
Total 
-          
80,679  
            
38,939  
            
59,817  
            
12,111  
            
37,142  
             
67,330  
            
13,466  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 2.08% 2.49% 1.96% 1.19% -0.48% 1.52% 1.52% 
Return on equity 8.06% 7.40% 5.20% 3.18% -1.20% 4.35% 4.35% 
Liabilities to equity 286.73% 196.95% 164.64% 166.41% 149.98% 186.76% 186.76% 
Liabilities to assets 74.14% 66.32% 62.21% 62.46% 60.00% 65.13% 65.13% 
Net profit margin 3.67% 3.00% 1.76% 1.08% -0.41% 1.59% 1.59% 
Dividend payout ratio 67.58% 45.10% 146.23% 208.78% 0.00% 104.91% 104.91% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + 
dividend 25.95% 82.16% 34.55% -137.44% 100.00% 48.89% 48.89% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net 
assets 11.04% 3.46% 5.44% 1.14% 3.54% 1.33% 1.33% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net 
profit 12.29% 134.44% 55.59% 0.00% -377.20% 73.95% 73.95% 
Total borrowings as a percentage 
of total assets 27.97% 4.22% 10.04% 8.85% 7.392% 11.47% 11.47% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total income 4.68% 3.88% 1.11% 0.35% 0.29% 1.73% 1.73% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total borrowings 9.52% 76.54% 12.35% 4.37% 4.58% 14.34% 14.34% 
Total tax and dividends compared 
to total equity 7.36% 18.71% 11.61% 2.79% 2.92% 8.93% 8.93% 
Total dividends compared to total 
equity 5.45% 3.34% 7.60% 6.64% 0.00% 4.56% 4.56% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 0.87% 6.23% 1.36% -1.30% 0.99% 1.60% 1.60% 
Total income compared to total 
expenses 92.94% 95.37% 97.55% 98.70% 100.26% 97.44% 97.44% 
                
                
With the exception of 2017, Synergy reported net profits for all years studied, and an 
overall average net profit after tax of $44,094.6m over the five years studied. The 
loss in 2017 was due to the change to a long-term gas supply contract.532Synergy was 
the only company of the State-owned corporations studied to return a net tax asset in 
the balance sheet. The only year (of those studied) that had a net tax liability was 
                                               
532
 Ibid 6. 
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2013. As discussed in AGL, it is unusual for an infrastructure and asset-intensive 
company to return an overall tax asset.  
Total interest paid over total borrowings returned abnormal results, with the average 
being 14.34% and 76.54% for the year ended 30 June 2014. This result was excluded 
from the average government calculations. 
Synergy also had the highest tax paid as a percentage of net profit before tax of all 
companies studied, at 73.95%. This does not take into account the tax refund 
received in 2016. When the tax refund is included, this percentage falls to 62.46%, 
which is still the largest and fairly substantial when compared to all the other 
companies studied. However, tax paid in comparison to total income was amongst 
the lowest, at 1.60%. In addition, Synergy had the lowest Net Profit Margin (being 
net profit after tax compared to total revenue) of 1.59%. This result suggests extreme 
inefficiency and expenses that are way too high compared to revenue. It also had the 
lowest return on assets of 1.52%. 
5.3.2.2 Essential Energy 
Essential Energy was founded on 1 March 2011 and is the “poles and wires” 
company that delivers electricity to 95% of regional, rural and remote NSW and 
parts of southern Queensland.533 It is owned by the New South Wales Government 
and was incorporated under the State Owned Corporations Act 1989.534 Essential 
Energy had a one-third ownership in its subsidiary, Networks NSW Pty Limited, 
until 29 January 2016. At that date, Networks NSW became wholly owned. 
However, it had no transactions, and total assets and liabilities were immaterial. This 
subsidiary was subsequently de-registered on 3 August 2016.535 
Essential Energy currently has issued two fully paid $1 ordinary shares owned by the 
Treasurer and the Minister for Finance, Services, and Property on behalf of the NSW 
Government.536 As a monopoly, its prices are regulated by the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER). 
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The table below shows the key results (as extracted from the financial statements and 



























A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 36   Pg 38   Pg 40   Pg 41   Pg 69      
Interest paid 
                   
355  
                   
330  
                   
336  
                   
333  
                   
340  
               
1,694  
                   
339  
            
                         
-   
                       
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                       
-   
                        
-   
                        
-   
                       
-   
                        
-   
                       
-   
Tax Paid 
                   
132  
                   
219  
                   
125  
                      
35  
                      
24  
                   
534  
                   
107  
Dividend Paid 
                      
67  
                   
241  
                   
134  
                      
59  
                      
28  
                   
529  
                   
106  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
199  
                   
460  
                   
259  
                      
94  
                      
52  
               
1,063  
                   
213  
                
Income Statement  Pg 33   Pg 35   Pg 37   Pg 38   Pg 66      
Total income 
               
2,164  
               
1,965  
               
2,054  
               
1,552  
               
1,534  
               
9,269  
               
1,854  
Total expenses 
-             
1,665  
-             
1,615  
-             
1,672  
-             
1,560  
-             
1,462  
-             
7,975  
-             
1,595  
Net profit 
                   
499  
                   
350  
                   
381  
-                        
8  
                     
72  
               
1,294  
                   
259  
Tax expense 
-                  
149  
-                     
55  
-                  
115  
                         
7  
-                    
22  
-                  
333  
-                     
67  
Net profit after tax 
                   
350  
                   
295  
                   
266  
-                        
1  
                     
50  
                   
961  
                   
192  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 34   Pg 36   Pg 38   Pg 39   Pg 67      
Total borrowings 
               
4,336  
               
4,697  
               
4,798  
               
5,045  
               
5,229  
            
24,104  
               
4,821  
                
Total assets 
               
7,780  
               
8,037  
               
8,228  
               
8,283  
               
8,399  
            
40,727  
               
8,145  
Total liabilities 
               
5,833  
               
5,919  
               
5,846  
               
5,995  
               
6,041  
            
29,634  
               
5,927  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
               
1,947  
               
2,118  
               
2,382  
               
2,288  
               
2,359  
            
11,093  
               
2,219  
                
Current tax asset           
                         
-   
                       
-   
Current tax liability 
-                     
96  
-                        
5  
-                     
25  
-                        
3  
-                     
10  
-                  
138  
-                     
28  
Deferred tax asset           
                         
-   
                       
-   
Deferred tax liability 
-                  
332  
-                  
263  
-                  
258  
-                  
210  
-                  
222  
-             
1,287  
-                  
257  
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-                  
429  
-                  
268  
-                  
283  
-                  
213  
-                  
232  
-             
1,425  
-                  
285  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 4.50% 3.68% 3.24% -0.01% 0.60% 2.36% 2.36% 
Return on equity 17.98% 13.95% 11.18% -0.05% 2.12% 8.66% 8.66% 
Liabilities to equity 299.65% 279.54% 245.42% 262.00% 256.08% 267.13% 267.13% 
Liabilities to assets 74.98% 73.65% 71.05% 72.38% 71.92% 72.76% 72.76% 
Net profit margin 16.18% 15.03% 12.97% -0.08% 3.26% 10.36% 10.36% 
Dividend payout ratio 19.22% 81.52% 50.28% 
-
4891.67% 56.20% 55.05% 55.05% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 66.16% 47.61% 48.20% 37.42% 45.75% 50.24% 50.24% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 22.01% 12.67% 11.88% 9.32% 9.83% 12.84% 12.84% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 26.36% 62.51% 32.69% -438.75% 33.15% 41.26% 41.26% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of 
total assets 55.73% 58.44% 58.32% 60.90% 62.253% 59.18% 59.18% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 16.42% 16.78% 16.36% 21.45% 22.17% 18.28% 18.28% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 8.20% 7.02% 7.00% 6.60% 6.50% 7.03% 7.03% 
Total tax and dividends compared to 
total equity 10.22% 21.70% 10.85% 4.10% 2.20% 9.58% 9.58% 
Total dividends compared to total 
equity 3.46% 11.37% 5.62% 2.57% 1.19% 4.77% 4.77% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 6.08% 11.13% 6.07% 2.26% 1.55% 5.76% 5.76% 
Total income compared to total 
expenses 76.93% 82.19% 81.44% 100.52% 95.34% 86.04% 86.04% 
                
                
Essential Energy paid taxes and dividends in each of the years surveyed. With the 
exception of 2016, it also made net profits in all years surveyed. 
Overall, Essential Energy had net tax liabilities which formed an average of 12.84% 
of its net assets, which was far below the State-owned average of 40.73%. Total 
dividends paid over the five-year period compared to equity was an average of 
4.77%, which was also below the State-owned average of 12.49%. 
Tax paid as a percentage of total revenue was 5.76%, which was slightly higher than 
the State-owned average of 4.61%. 
5.3.2.3 Aurora Energy 
Aurora Energy is an electricity and gas retailer which operates in Tasmania. It was 
established in 1998 and is owned by the Tasmanian Government. It was established 
under the Electricity Companies Act 1997 (Tas). 
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Aurora Energy is a stand-alone entity and has no subsidiaries. It has issued 
112,700,004 shares542 to its two shareholders: the Minister for Energy and the 
Treasurer of Tasmania.543 
Aurora Energy used to have a distribution segment. As a result of the reform of the 
electricity supply industry in Tasmania, the electricity distribution segment of Aurora 
Energy’s business was transferred to TasNetworks from 1 July 2014 (see the next 
section below). However, Aurora continued trading as a gas and electricity retailer 
throughout Tasmania. 
Financial data for the 2013-2017 years were able to be extracted from publicly 
available annual reports and financial statements. These results were then collated 























total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS 
FROM FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS  $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 80   Pg 33   Pg 38   Pg 53   Pg 54      
Interest paid 
            
66,488  
            
50,332  
                   
121  
                         
-   
                        
2  
        
116,943  
            
23,389  
            
                         
-   
                        
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                        
-   
                        
-   
Tax Paid 
               
3,386  
            
29,881  
            
32,932  
            
14,481  
               
9,720  
            
90,400  
            
18,080  
Dividend Paid 
            
16,000  
            
25,000  
                         
-   
            
27,600  
            
27,000  
            
95,600  
            
19,120  
Total dividend and tax paid 
            
19,386  
            
54,881  
            
32,932  
            
42,081  
            
36,720  
         
186,000  
            
37,200  
                
Income Statement  Pg 77   Pg 30   Pg 35   Pg 50   Pg 51      
Total income 
    
1,575,566  
    
1,202,971  
         
948,951  
         
866,282  
         
903,050  
    
5,496,820  
    
1,099,364  
Total expenses 
-   
1,491,070  
-   
1,137,890  
-       
903,967  
-       
823,156  
-       
875,215  
-   
5,231,298  
-   
1,046,260  
Net profit 
            
84,496  
            
65,081  
            
44,984  
            
43,126  
            
27,835  
         
265,522  
            
53,104  
Tax expense 
-          
25,381  
-             
1,090  
-          
13,497  
-          
12,940  
-             
8,353  
-          
61,261  
-          
12,252  
Net profit after tax 
            
59,115  
            
63,991  
            
31,487  
            
30,186  
            
19,482  
         
204,261  
            
40,852  
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Balance Sheet  Pg 78   Pg 31   Pg 36   Pg 51   Pg 52      
Total borrowings 
         
749,813  
         
762,570  
                         
-   
                         
-     
    
1,512,383  
         
302,477  
                
Total assets 
    
1,816,196  
    
1,884,945  
         
269,391  
         
345,106  
         
349,697  
    
4,665,335  
         
933,067  
Total liabilities 
    
1,261,278  
    
1,321,929  
         
186,065  
         
236,421  
         
241,694  
    
3,247,387  
         
649,477  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
         
554,918  
         
563,016  
            
83,326  
         
108,685  
         
108,003  
    
1,417,948  
         
283,590  
                
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-     
                         
-   
                        
-   
Current tax liability 
-          
19,957  
-          
22,294  
-             
2,566  
-             
1,392  
-             
1,118  
-          
47,327  
-             
9,465  
Deferred tax asset 
            
46,053  
            
59,484  
               
7,471  
            
10,108  
            
10,198  
         
133,314  
            
26,663  
Deferred tax liability 
-       
159,942  
-       
143,062  
-             
9,503  
-          
21,534  
-          
23,460  
-       
357,501  
-          
71,500  
Total 
-       
133,846  
-       
105,872  
-             
4,598  
-          
12,818  
-          
14,380  
-       
271,514  
-          
54,303  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 3.25% 3.39% 11.69% 8.75% 5.57% 4.38% 4.38% 
Return on equity 10.65% 11.37% 37.79% 27.77% 18.04% 14.41% 14.41% 
Liabilities to equity 227.29% 234.79% 223.30% 217.53% 223.78% 229.02% 229.02% 
Liabilities to assets 69.45% 70.13% 69.07% 68.51% 69.12% 69.61% 69.61% 
Net profit margin 3.75% 5.32% 3.32% 3.48% 2.16% 3.72% 3.72% 
Dividend payout ratio 27.07% 39.07% 0.00% 91.43% 138.59% 46.80% 46.80% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + 
dividend 17.47% 54.45% 100.00% 34.41% 26.47% 48.60% 48.60% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net 
assets 24.12% 18.80% 5.52% 11.79% 13.31% 19.15% 19.15% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net 
profit 4.01% 45.91% 73.21% 33.58% 34.92% 34.05% 34.05% 
Total borrowings as a 
percentage of total assets 41.28% 40.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 32.42% 32.42% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total income 4.22% 4.18% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 2.13% 2.13% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total borrowings 8.87% 6.60% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 7.73% 7.73% 
Total tax and dividends 
compared to total equity 3.49% 9.75% 39.52% 38.72% 34.00% 13.12% 13.12% 
Total dividends compared to 
total equity 2.88% 4.44% 0.00% 25.39% 25.00% 6.74% 6.74% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 0.21% 2.48% 3.47% 1.67% 1.08% 1.64% 1.64% 
Total income compared to total 
expenses 94.64% 94.59% 95.26% 95.02% 96.92% 95.17% 95.17% 
                
                
Aurora Energy made net profits and paid taxes for all years studied. It paid dividends 
for all years except 2015. Total assets dropped off sharply in 2015 and in the 
following years, which was to be expected as a result of the distribution business 
being transferred to TasNetworks. A key result worthy of note is that Aurora Energy 
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no longer has any borrowings. Initially, in the 2013 and 2014 years, it had 
borrowings of $749.813m and $762.570m respectively, but as part of the restructure 
it was left with no borrowings at all for the 2015, 2016 and 2017 financial years. This 
resulted in a very low average interest paid as a percentage of total income over the 
five years of 2.13% and, as expected, total borrowings as a percentage of total assets 
was nil in the years following the transfer of the distribution business. However, even 
though there was not a high interest expense, total expenses expressed as a 
percentage of total income were still amongst the highest surveyed at 95.17%. 
Following on from this, net tax paid compared to total revenue was amongst the 
lowest at 1.64%. 
Although a significant portion of its business was transferred to TasNetworks, the 
resulting transfer of debt meant that the total debt to equity ratios (liabilities to 
equity, and liabilities to assets), remained fairly consistent over the five years. 
5.3.2.4 TasNetworks 
TasNetworks is the electricity transmission and distribution network, and 
telecommunications network company in Tasmania. It was formed on 1 July 2014 
from a merger between Aurora Energy’s distribution network (the electricity poles 
and wires) and Transend Networks (the electricity towers and lines). TasNetworks is 
owned by the Tasmanian Government.549 TasNetworks has two fully paid $1 
ordinary shares which are held in trust for the Crown in Right of the State of 
Tasmania. These shares have been issued to the Treasurer and the Minister for 
Energy.550 TasNetworks has two non-trading subsidiaries: Ezikey Group Pty Ltd and 
Auroracom Pty Ltd.551 
Transend provided electricity transmission and telecommunications (providing 
telecommunications services only to those in the electricity supply industry) to 
Tasmania until 30 June 2014.552 It was owned by the Tasmanian Government and 
had four issued fully paid ordinary shares with no par value. These shares were held 
in trust for the Crown in Right of the State of Tasmania.553 
                                               
549
 TasNetworks, About TasNetworks <https://www.tasnetworks.com.au/about-us/corporate-
profile/about-tasnetworks/>.  
550
 TasNetworks, Annual Report 2016-17, (2017) 70. 
551
 Ibid 28. 
552
 Transend, Annual Report 2014, (2014) 3. 
553
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In May 2012, the Tasmanian Government reformed the electricity supply industry 
which resulted in a merger of the transmission services of Transend Networks and 
the electricity distribution business of Aurora Energy. All the business activities of 
Transend were transferred to TasNetworks from 1 July 2014.554 
For the purposes of this case study, the Annual Reports of Transend Networks Pty 
Ltd were used for the 2013 and 2014 financial years; and the Annual Reports of 
TasNetworks Pty Ltd were used for the 2015, 2016 and 2017 financial years. This 























total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS 
FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000   $'000  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 34   Pg 46   Pg 64   Pg 60   Pg 52      
Interest paid 
            
39,705  
            
40,650  
            
72,393  
         
104,308  
            
78,049  
            
335,105  
            
67,021  
            
                            
-   
                      
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                            
-   
                      
-   
Tax Paid 
            
32,482  
            
31,187  
            
79,089  
            
55,612  
            
46,596  
            
244,966  
            
48,993  
Dividend Paid 
            
25,900  
            
28,686  
            
61,000  
            
63,200  
            
72,628  
            
251,414  
            
50,283  
Total dividend and tax paid 
            
58,382  
            
59,873  
         
140,089  
         
118,812  
         
119,224  
            
496,380  
            
99,276  
                
Income Statement  Pg 31   Pg 42   Pg 60   Pg 56   Pg 48      
Total income 
         
241,471  
         
234,644  
         
583,613  
         
597,778  
         
552,212  
       
2,209,718  
         
441,944  
Total expenses 
-       
173,142  
-       
181,296  
-       
422,217  
-       
457,254  
-       
418,125  
-      
1,652,034  
-       
330,407  
Net profit 
            
68,329  
            
53,348  
         
161,396  
         
140,524  
         
134,087  
            
557,684  
         
111,537  
Tax expense 
-          
20,519  
-          
16,024  
-          
48,465  
-          
42,142  
-          
40,160  
-          
167,310  
-          
33,462  
Net profit after tax 
            
47,810  
            
37,324  
         
112,931  
            
98,382  
            
93,927  
            
390,374  
            
78,075  
                
Balance Sheet  Pg 32   Pg 44   Pg 62   Pg 58   Pg 50      
Total borrowings 
         
631,197  
         
664,349  
    
1,643,718  
    
1,749,302  
    
1,785,762  
       
6,474,328  
    
1,294,866  
                
Total assets 
    
1,710,446  
    
1,754,096  
    
3,174,731  
    
3,198,236  
    
3,265,038  
    
13,102,547  
    
2,620,509  
Total liabilities 
         
988,624  
    
1,045,189  
    
2,158,681  
    
2,278,153  
    
2,320,951  
       
8,791,598  
    
1,758,320  
                                               
554
 Ibid 3. 
555
 Transend, Annual Report 2013, (2013). 
556
 Transend, Annual Report 2014, (2014). 
557
 Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd, Annual Report 2014-15, (2015). 
558
 Tasmanian Networks Pty Ltd, Annual Report 2015-16, (2016). 
559
 TasNetworks, Annual Report 2016-17, (2017). 
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Total equity (also Net assets) 
         
721,822  
         
708,907  
    
1,016,050  
         
920,083  
         
944,087  
       
4,310,949  
         
862,190  
                
Current tax asset 
                         
-     
            
11,951  
               
2,086  
                         
-   
               
14,037  
               
2,807  
Current tax liability 
-             
8,974  
-             
3,700  
                         
-   
                        
-   
-             
6,069  
-             
18,743  
-             
3,749  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-     
                         
-   
                        
-   
                         
-   
                            
-   
                      
-   
Deferred tax liability 
-       
209,987  
-       
208,116  
-       
237,302  
-       
218,208  
-       
226,196  
-      
1,099,809  
-       
219,962  
Total 
-       
218,961  
-       
211,816  
-       
225,351  
-       
216,122  
-       
232,265  
-      
1,104,515  
-       
220,903  
                
                
                
B: RATIOS               
Return on assets 2.80% 2.13% 3.56% 3.08% 2.88% 2.98% 2.98% 
Return on equity 6.62% 5.27% 11.11% 10.69% 9.95% 9.06% 9.06% 
Liabilities to equity 136.96% 147.44% 212.46% 247.60% 245.84% 203.94% 203.94% 
Liabilities to assets 57.80% 59.59% 68.00% 71.23% 71.08% 67.10% 67.10% 
Net profit margin 19.80% 15.91% 19.35% 16.46% 17.01% 17.67% 17.67% 
Dividend payout ratio 54.17% 76.86% 54.02% 64.24% 77.32% 64.40% 64.40% 
                
Tax compared to total tax + 
dividend 55.64% 52.09% 56.46% 46.81% 39.08% 49.35% 49.35% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net 
assets 30.33% 29.88% 22.18% 23.49% 24.60% 25.62% 25.62% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net 
profit 47.54% 58.46% 49.00% 39.57% 34.75% 43.93% 43.93% 
Total borrowings as a 
percentage of total assets 36.90% 37.87% 51.78% 54.70% 54.693% 49.41% 49.41% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total income 16.44% 17.32% 12.40% 17.45% 14.13% 15.17% 15.17% 
Interest paid as a percentage of 
total borrowings 6.29% 6.12% 4.40% 5.96% 4.37% 5.18% 5.18% 
Total tax and dividends 
compared to total equity 8.09% 8.45% 13.79% 12.91% 12.63% 11.51% 11.51% 
Total dividends compared to 
total equity 3.59% 4.05% 6.00% 6.87% 7.69% 5.83% 5.83% 
Net tax paid compared to total 
revenue 13.45% 13.29% 13.55% 9.30% 8.44% 11.09% 11.09% 
Total income compared to total 
expenses 71.70% 77.26% 72.35% 76.49% 75.72% 74.76% 74.76% 
                
                
Differently to what happened to Aurora Energy above, total borrowings and total 
assets increased sharply in 2015 as a result of the merger of Transend Networks and 
the electricity distribution business of Aurora Energy. However, unlike Aurora 
Energy, the liabilities to equity and liabilities to assets ratios both rose sharply in the 
initial year of the merger. Borrowings as a percentage of total assets also increased 
immediately after the merger. 
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As expected in such a situation, both taxes and dividends paid increased following 
the merger, and both taxes and dividends were paid in every year. TasNetworks also 
experienced net profits in all years surveyed. 
Tax paid compared to total revenue was the highest for any of the companies studied, 
at 11.09%. This could be in part due to the fact that total expenses as a percentage of 
total revenue were the lowest for all companies studied, at 74.76%, albeit interest 
paid as a percentage of total income was amongst the highest at 15.17%. 
5.3.2.5 Ergon, Energex and Energy Queensland 
Ergon 
Ergon Energy both builds and maintains the electricity distribution network, and also 
acts as a retailer to residential and business customers in Queensland.560 It services 
regional Queensland. Ergon Energy is a state-owned corporation, owned by the 
Queensland Government. In June 2016 it was merged with Energex and now sits 
beneath the Energy Queensland umbrella. However, the brand continues. 
Ergon Energy currently holds 100% ownership of two subsidiaries: Ergon Energy 
Queensland Pty Ltd and Ergon Energy Telecommunications Pty Ltd. Both are 
Australian companies.561 
For the purposes of this study, the three years to 30 June 2015 were studied, and the 
averages over those three years calculated as follows: 
  





June 2014  
 Year 
ended 30 
June 2015   3-year total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $'000   $M   $M   $'000   $'000  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 11   Pg 11   Pg 11      
Interest paid 
                   
365  
                   
369  
                   
337                 1,071  
                   
357  
            
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax Paid 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                      
51  
                      
51  
                      
17  
Dividend Paid 
                   
256  
                   
326  
                   
392  
                   
974  
                   
325  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
256  
                   
326  
                   
443                 1,025  
                   
342  
                                               
560
 Ergon Energy, Understanding our business <https://www.ergon.com.au/about-us/who-we-
are/understanding-our-business>.  
561




            
Income Statement  Pg 7   Pg 7   Pg 7      
Total income 
               
3,004  
               
2,440  
               
2,627                 8,071  
               
2,690  
Total expenses 
-             
2,409  
-             
2,019  
-             
1,636  -             6,064  
-             
2,021  
Net profit 
                   
595  
                   
421  
                   
991                 2,007  
                   
669  
Tax expense 
-                  
172  
-                  
126  
-                  
295  
-                  
593  
-                  
198  
Net profit after tax 
                   
423  
                   
295  
                   
696                 1,414  
                   
471  
            
Balance Sheet  Pg 9   Pg 9   Pg 9      
Total borrowings 
               
5,004  
               
5,141  
               
5,300              15,445  
               
5,148  
          
                         
-   
Total assets 
            
11,461  
            
10,931  
            
11,485              33,877  
            
11,292  
Total liabilities 
               
7,746  
               
7,862  
               
9,669              25,277  
               
8,426  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
               
3,715  
               
3,069  
               
1,816                 8,600  
               
2,867  
            
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Current tax liability 
                         
-   
-                        
7  
-                  
134  
-                  
141  
-                     
47  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Deferred tax liability 
-             
1,750  
-             
1,625  
-             
1,687  -             5,062  
-             
1,687  
Total 
-             
1,750  
-             
1,632  
-             
1,821  -             5,203  
-             
1,734  
            
            
            
B: RATIOS           
Return on assets 3.69% 2.70% 6.06% 4.17% 4.17% 
Return on equity 11.39% 9.61% 38.33% 16.44% 16.44% 
Liabilities to equity 208.51% 256.17% 532.43% 293.92% 293.92% 
Liabilities to assets 67.59% 71.92% 84.19% 74.61% 74.61% 
Net profit margin 14.08% 12.09% 26.49% 17.52% 17.52% 
Dividend payout ratio 60.52% 110.51% 56.32% 68.88% 68.88% 
            
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 0.00% 0.00% 11.51% 4.98% 4.98% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 47.11% 53.18% 100.28% 60.50% 60.50% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 0.00% 0.00% 5.15% 2.54% 3% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total 
assets 43.66% 47.03% 46.15% 45.591% 
                  
0.46  
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 12.15% 15.12% 12.83% 13.27% 13.27% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 7.29% 7.18% 6.36% 6.93% 6.93% 
Total tax and dividends compared to total 
equity 6.89% 10.62% 24.39% 11.92% 
                  
0.12  
Total dividends compared to total equity 6.89% 10.62% 21.59% 11.33% 
                  
0.11  
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 0.00% 0.00% 1.94% 0.63% 




Total income compared to total expenses 80.19% 82.75% 62.28% 75.13% 
                  
0.75  
            
            
Of note is that Ergon did not pay any tax in the financial years ended 30 June 2013 
and 30 June 2014. This is due to tax losses that were available from earlier years.562 
The utilisation of these carried forward losses against tax payable for those years 
resulted in the average tax paid as a percentage of revenue being lower than it 
otherwise would have been, had there been no losses available. This gave Ergon the 
lowest net tax paid compared to total revenue of all the companies studied, at 0.63%. 
Despite this, Ergon made a net profit after tax for all years surveyed and had a tax 
expense (as opposed to tax benefit) for those years.  
Dividend payments were high, at an average of 11.33% of total equity, the second 
highest of all companies surveyed, and represented 95.02% of total tax and dividend 
payments made to the Queensland Government. 
Energex 
Energex builds, operates and maintains the electricity distribution network in South 
East Queensland.563 Energex is a state-owned corporation which is owned by the 
Queensland Government. In June 2016 it was merged with Ergon and is now a 
subsidiary of Energy Queensland. However, it has kept its brand and still continues 
to trade as Energex. 
Energex currently holds 100% ownership of four subsidiaries of its own: 
• Energy Impact Pty Ltd 
• Metering Dynamics Business Support Pty Ltd 
• Vamsdorf Pty Ltd 
• VH Operations Pty Ltd564 
All these subsidiaries are Australian companies. 
                                               
562
 Ergon Energy, Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2014, (2014) 20. 
563
 Energex, Our profile <https://www.energex.com.au/about-us/company-information/who-we-
are/our-profile>  
564
 Energy Queensland, Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2017, (2017) 102. 
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For the purposes of this study, the three years to 30 June 2015 were studied, and the 
averages over those three years calculated as follows: 
  
 Year ended 
30 June 
2013565  
 Year ended 
30 June 
2014566  




total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 17   Pg 15   Pg 15      
Interest paid 
                   
389  
                   
419  
                   
350  
               
1,158  
                   
386  
        
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax Paid 
                      
15  
                      
35  
                   
121  
                   
171  
                      
57  
Dividend Paid   
                   
294  
                   
406  
                   
700  
                   
233  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                      
15  
                   
329  
                   
527  
                   
871  
                   
290  
            
Income Statement  Pg 13   Pg 11   Pg 11      
Total income 
               
2,274                 2,248                 2,575  
               
7,097  
               
2,366  
Total expenses 
-             
1,772  -             1,871  -             1,842  
-             
5,485  
-             
1,828  
Net profit 
                   
502  
                   
377  
                   
733  
               
1,612  
                   
537  
Tax expense 
-                  
151  
-                  
111  
-                  
221  
-                  
483  
-                  
161  
Net profit after tax 
                   
351  
                   
266  
                   
512  
               
1,129  
                   
376  
            
Balance Sheet 
 Pg 13, 2015 
restated 
amts   Pg 13   Pg 13      
Total borrowings 
               
6,001                 6,465                 6,811  
            
19,277  
               
6,426  
            
Total assets 
            
11,359              12,388              12,475  
            
36,222  
            
12,074  
Total liabilities 
               
8,414                 9,195              10,402  
            
28,011  
               
9,337  
Total equity (also Net assets) 
               
2,945                 3,193                 2,073  
               
8,211  
               
2,737  
            
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Current tax liability 
-                     
10  
-                     
64  
-                  
184  
-                  
258  
-                     
86  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Deferred tax liability 
-             
1,707  -             1,895  -             1,727  
-             
5,329  
-             
1,776  
Total 
-             
1,717  -             1,959  -             1,911  
-             
5,587  
-             
1,862  
            
            
                                               
565
 Energex, Annual Performance Report 2012/13, (2013). 
566
 Energex, Annual Report 2013/14, (2014). 
567
 Energex, Annual Report 2014/15, (2015). 
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B: RATIOS           
Return on assets 3.09% 2.15% 4.10% 3.12% 3.12% 
Return on equity 11.92% 8.33% 24.70% 13.75% 13.75% 
Liabilities to equity 285.70% 287.97% 501.78% 341.14% 341.14% 
Liabilities to assets 74.07% 74.23% 83.38% 77.33% 77.33% 
Net profit margin 15.44% 11.83% 19.88% 15.91% 15.91% 
Dividend payout ratio 0.00% 110.53% 79.30% 62.00% 62.00% 
            
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 100.00% 10.64% 22.96% 19.63% 19.63% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 58.30% 61.35% 92.19% 68.04% 68.04% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 2.99% 9.28% 16.51% 10.61% 11% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total 
assets 52.83% 52.19% 54.60% 53.219% 
                  
0.53  
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 17.11% 18.64% 13.59% 16.32% 16.32% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 6.48% 6.48% 5.14% 6.01% 6.01% 
Total tax and dividends compared to 
total equity 0.51% 10.30% 25.42% 10.61% 
                  
0.11  
Total dividends compared to total equity 0.00% 9.21% 19.59% 8.53% 
                  
0.09  
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 0.66% 1.56% 4.70% 2.41% 
                  
0.02  
Total income compared to total 
expenses 77.92% 83.23% 71.53% 77.29% 
                  
0.77  
            
            
Of note is that Energex did not pay a dividend in 2013 and had a very low tax 
payment for that year. There were tax losses in the group in 2012 which could 
explain the low tax payment. Energex earned a net profit after tax in all years studied 
and had a total net tax liability that averaged $1,862.33m. 
Interest paid as a percentage of total income was in the higher range of companies 
studied at 16.32%, while average interest rate on borrowings was 6.01% which was 
lower than the State-owned average of 6.29%, but higher than the privately-owned 
average of 5.62%. 
Energy Queensland 
Energy Queensland was formed in June 2016 through a merger of Ergon Energy and 
Energex. Energy Queensland combines the two electricity distributors, a retail arm 
(Ergon Energy Retail), and a new energy services business.568 These changes to the 
energy sector were undertaken with the intention of introducing efficiencies and 
keeping prices for customers low. Energy Queensland Limited is a consolidated 
                                               
568
 Energy Queensland, About us <https://www.energyq.com.au/about-us>.  
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group which controls Energex Limited (which has four subsidiaries of its own), 
Ergon Energy Corporation Limited (which has two subsidiaries of its own), and 
SPARQ Solutions Pty Ltd.569 
Financial data for the years ended 30 June 2015, 2016 and 2017 were able to be 
extracted from publicly available annual reports and financial statements. These 
results were then collated and averaged over the three-year period to produce the 
following table and ratios: 
  
 Year ended 
30 June 
2015570  
 Year ended 
30 June 
2016571  




total   Average  
A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  $M   $M   $M   $M   $M  
Cash Flow Statement  Pg 14   Pg 14   Pg 59      
Interest paid 
                   
688  
                   
697  
                   
791  
               
2,176  
                   
725  
            
Tax refund received 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Tax Paid 
                   
173  
                   
609  
                   
632  
               
1,414  
                   
471  
Dividend Paid 
                   
798                 4,147  
                         
-   
               
4,945  
               
1,648  
Total dividend and tax paid 
                   
971                 4,756  
                   
632  
               
6,359  
               
2,120  
            
Income Statement  Pg 10   Pg 10   Pg 55      
Total income                5,158                 5,029                 5,265  
            
15,452  
               
5,151  
Total expenses -             3,434  -             3,671  -             4,007  
-          
11,112  
-             
3,704  
Net profit                1,724                 1,358                 1,258  
               
4,340  
               
1,447  
Tax expense 
-                  
516  
-                  
416  
-                  
377  
-             
1,309  
-                  
436  
Net profit after tax                1,208  
                   
942  
                   
881  
               
3,031  
               
1,010  
            
Balance Sheet  Pg 12   Pg 12   Pg 57      
Total borrowings             12,112              16,287              16,267  
            
44,666  
            
14,889  
            
Total assets             23,956              24,177              26,008  
            
74,141  
            
24,714  
Total liabilities             20,070              20,812              22,437  
            
63,319  
            
21,106  
Total equity (also Net assets)                3,886                 3,365                 3,571  
            
10,822  
               
3,607  
            
Current tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                                               
569
 Energy Queensland, Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2017, (2017) 102. 
570




 Energy Queensland, Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2017, (2017). 
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Current tax liability 
-                  
318  
-                  
144  
                         
-   
-                  
462  
-                  
154  
Deferred tax asset 
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
                         
-   
Deferred tax liability -             3,414  -             3,453  -             3,520  
-          
10,387  
-             
3,462  
Total -             3,732  -             3,597  -             3,520  
-          
10,849  
-             
3,616  
            
            
            
B: RATIOS           
Return on assets 5.04% 3.90% 3.39% 4.09% 4.09% 
Return on equity 31.09% 27.99% 24.67% 28.01% 28.01% 
Liabilities to equity 516.47% 618.48% 628.31% 585.10% 585.10% 
Liabilities to assets 83.78% 86.08% 86.27% 85.40% 85.40% 
Net profit margin 23.42% 18.73% 16.73% 19.62% 19.62% 
Dividend payout ratio 66.06% 440.23% 0.00% 163.15% 163.15% 
            
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 17.82% 12.80% 100.00% 22.24% 22.24% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 96.04% 106.89% 98.57% 100.25% 100.25% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 10.03% 44.85% 50.24% 32.58% 33% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total 
assets 50.56% 67.37% 62.55% 60.245% 
                  
0.60  
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
income 13.34% 13.86% 15.02% 14.08% 14.08% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 5.68% 4.28% 4.86% 4.87% 4.87% 
Total tax and dividends compared to total 
equity 24.99% 141.34% 17.70% 58.76% 
                  
0.59  
Total dividends compared to total equity 20.54% 123.24% 0.00% 45.69% 
                  
0.46  
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 3.35% 12.11% 12.00% 9.15% 
                  
0.09  
Total income compared to total expenses 66.58% 73.00% 76.11% 71.91% 
                  
0.72  
            
            
The results show that, although Energy Queensland did not pay a dividend in the 
2017 financial year, the dividend paid in the 2016 financial year was so large 
($4,147m) that it had the highest average dividend payout ratio of any company 
studied at 163.15%. It also made the largest average dividend payment compared to 
total equity of any of the companies studied at 45.69%. 
Energy Queensland had the largest total assets balance of the State-owned 
corporations of $24.714b and was second only to Origin in the companies surveyed. 
However, it had much higher liabilities than Origin, resulting in a lower equity of 
$3.6b compared to Origin’s $14b. 
In addition, Energy Queensland had the largest average net tax liability of 
$3,616.33m which, when compared to average net assets, was 100.25% of those net 
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assets. Also, the liabilities to equity ratio was the highest of any company surveyed at 
585.10%, which is, in part, driven by high borrowings of 60.24% of total assets, 
again the highest for any company studied. Tax payments were also quite large, 
accounting for 9.15% of total revenue, the second highest of the companies surveyed. 
These results indicate that the Queensland Government stripped a significant amount 
of equity out of the business after it consolidated Ergon and Energex. 
5.3.3 Overall comparison 
This section seeks to compare the State-owned corporations against their privately-
owned counterparts. Typically, the State-owned corporations had smaller and simpler 
consolidated groups, if any. There were no consolidated groups containing any 
foreign entities. This could be due to the restrictions placed by State and Territory 
Treasuries as to group structuring and entities. 
The following table compares the averages of the privately owned and state-owned 
corporations. 
OWNERSHIP AVERAGES     
      
Ratios  Private   Government  
Return on assets 0.88% 3.23% 
Return on equity 2.49% 13.52% 
Liabilities to equity 139.62% 301.00% 
Liabilities to assets 55.83% 73.13% 
Net profit margin 4.30% 12.34% 
Dividend payout ratio 49.43% 80.74% 
      
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 23.51% 34.85% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 2.50% 40.73% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 13.54% 34.13% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total 
assets 37.43% 44.51% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total income 7.92% 11.57% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total 
borrowings 5.62% 6.29% 
Total tax and dividends compared to total 
equity 6.83% 17.78% 
Total dividends compared to total equity 5.24% 12.49% 
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 1.97% 4.61% 
Total income compared to total expenses 93.29% 82.53% 
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   Ausnet   Origin   AGL     Synergy   Ergon   Energex  
 Energy 
Queenslan





A: ACTUAL FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS  $'000   $M   $M     $'000   $'000   $M   $M   $'000   $'000   $M  
Cash Flow Statement                   
Interest paid 
          
325.16  
          
521.80  
          
212.80    
          
47,823.60  
          
357.00  
          
386.00  
          
725.33  
          
67,021.00  
          
23,388.60  
          
338.84  
  
                       
-   
                       
-   
                       
-     
                               
-     
                       
-     
                               
-   
                               
-   
                
-   
Tax refund received 
                       
-   
                       
-   
                       
-     
-            
8,142.00  
                       
-   
                       
-   
                       
-   
                               
-   
                           
-   
                    
-   
Tax Paid 
             
64.36  
          
101.20  
          
173.42    
          
52,390.60  
             
17.00  
             
57.00  
          
471.33  
          
48,993.20  
          
18,080.00  
          
106.76  
Dividend Paid 
          
283.76  
          
420.20  
          
357.98    
          
46,259.60  
          
324.67  
          
233.33  
      
1,648.33  
          
50,282.80  
          
19,120.00  
          
105.76  
Total dividend and tax paid 
          
348.12  
          
521.40  
          
531.40    
          
90,508.20  
          
341.67  
          
290.33  
      
2,119.67  
          
99,276.00  
          
37,200.00  
          
212.52  
                        
Income Statement                   
Total income 
      
1,814.64  
   
13,477.40  
   
10,763.80    
   
2,767,805.80  
      
2,690.33  
      
2,365.67  
      
5,150.67  
       
441,943.60  
   
1,099,364.00  
      
1,853.72  
Total expenses 





10,393.60    
- 
2,696,964.60  
-    
2,021.33  
-    
1,828.33  -    3,704.00  




-    
1,594.94  
Net profit 
          
359.24  
-         
419.20  
          
370.20    
          
70,841.20  
          
669.00  
          
537.33  
      
1,446.67  
       
111,536.80  
          
53,104.40  
          
258.78  
Tax expense 
-         
115.50  
             
18.60  
-         
108.46    
-         
26,746.60  
-         
197.67  
-         
161.00  
-         
436.33  
-         
33,462.00  
-         
12,252.20  
-            
66.66  
Net profit after tax 
          
243.74  
-         
400.60  
          
261.74    
          
44,094.60  
          
471.33  
          
423.00  
      
1,010.33  
          
78,074.80  
          
40,852.20  
          
192.12  
                        
Balance Sheet                     
Total borrowings 
      
6,425.10  
      
9,297.20  
      
3,431.80    
       
333,453.80  
      
5,148.33  
      
6,425.67     14,888.67  
   
1,294,865.60  
       
302,476.60  
      
4,820.80  
            
                       
-             
Total assets 
   
11,238.06  
   
29,637.80  
   
14,447.16    
   
2,905,962.60  
   
11,292.33  
   
12,074.00     24,713.67  
   
2,620,509.40  
       
933,067.00  
      
8,145.32  
Total liabilities 
      
7,760.72  
   
15,631.80  
      
6,598.76    
   
1,892,580.40  
      
8,425.67  
      
9,337.00     21,106.33  
   
1,758,319.60  
       
649,477.40  




Total equity (also Net assets) 
      
3,477.34  
   
14,006.00  
      
7,848.40    
   
1,013,382.20  
      
2,866.67  
      
2,737.00  
      
3,607.33  
       
862,189.80  
       
283,589.60  
      
2,218.62  
                        
Current tax asset 
                
5.18  
             
62.40  
                       
-     
          
19,898.60  
                       
-   
                       
-   
                       
-   
             
2,807.40  
                               
-   
                
-   
Current tax liability 
-            
44.30  
-            
24.80  
-            
80.92    
-         
11,819.60  
-            
47.00  
-            
86.00  
-         
154.00  
-            
3,748.60  
-            
9,465.40  
-            
27.56  
Deferred tax asset 
             
18.46  
                
7.00  
          
757.44    
          
15,505.40  
                       
-   
                       
-   
                       
-   
                               
-   
          
26,662.80  
                       
-   
Deferred tax liability 
-         
424.60  
-         
455.20  
-            
29.88    
-         
10,118.40  
-    
1,687.33  
-    
1,776.33  -    3,462.33  
-      
219,961.80  
-         
71,500.20  
-         
257.40  
Total 
-         
445.26  
-         
410.60  
          
646.64    
          
13,466.00  
-    
1,734.33  
-    
1,862.33  -    3,616.33  
-      
220,903.00  
-         
54,302.80  
-         
284.96  
                        
                        
                        
B: RATIOS                     
Return on assets 2.17% -1.35% 1.81%   1.52% 4.17% 3.12% 4.09% 2.98% 4.38% 2.36% 
Return on equity 7.01% -2.86% 3.33%   4.35% 16.44% 13.75% 28.01% 9.06% 14.41% 8.66% 
Liabilities to equity 223.18% 111.61% 84.08%   186.76% 293.92% 341.14% 585.10% 203.94% 229.02% 267.13% 
Liabilities to assets 69.06% 52.74% 45.68%   65.13% 74.61% 77.33% 85.40% 67.10% 69.61% 72.76% 
Net profit margin 13.43% -2.97% 2.43%   1.59% 17.52% 15.91% 19.62% 17.67% 3.72% 10.36% 
Dividend payout ratio 116.42% -104.89% 136.77%   104.91% 68.88% 62.00% 163.15% 64.40% 46.80% 55.05% 
                        
Tax compared to total tax + dividend 18.49% 19.41% 32.63%   48.89% 4.98% 19.63% 22.24% 49.35% 48.60% 50.24% 
Net tax assets/(liabilities) / Net assets 12.80% 2.93% -8.24%   -1.33% 60.50% 68.04% 100.25% 25.62% 19.15% 12.84% 
Tax paid as a percentage of net profit 17.92% -24.14% 46.84%   73.95% 2.54% 10.61% 32.58% 43.93% 34.05% 41.26% 
Total borrowings as a percentage of total assets 57.17% 31.37% 23.75%   11.47% 45.59% 53.22% 60.24% 49.41% 32.42% 59.18% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total income 17.92% 3.87% 1.98%   1.73% 13.27% 16.32% 14.08% 15.17% 2.13% 18.28% 
Interest paid as a percentage of total borrowings 5.06% 5.61% 6.20%     6.93% 6.01% 4.87% 5.18% 7.73% 7.03% 
Total tax and dividends compared to total equity 10.01% 3.72% 6.77%   8.93% 11.92% 10.61% 58.76% 11.51% 13.12% 9.58% 
Total dividends compared to total equity 8.16% 3.00% 4.56%   4.56% 11.33% 8.53% 45.69% 5.83% 6.74% 4.77% 
Net tax paid compared to total revenue 3.55% 0.75% 1.61%   1.60% 0.63% 2.41% 9.15% 11.09% 1.64% 5.76% 
Total income compared to total expenses 80.20% 103.11% 96.56%   97.44% 75.13% 77.29% 71.91% 74.76% 95.17% 86.04% 
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As can be seen from the table above, the State-owned corporations carry significantly 
higher liabilities compared to total equity compared to their privately-owned 
counterparts, at 301% to 139.2%.  
Borrowings and interest 
Total borrowings compared to total assets is higher for State-owned corporations at 
44.51% compared to 37.43% for their privately-owned counterparts. Also, the total 
interest paid compared to total borrowings is also higher for State-owned 
corporations than it is for their privately-owned counterparts at 6.29% versus 5.62%. 
This suggests that although State and Territory Treasuries require all State-owned 
corporations to borrow from their own financial institutions, and sometimes impose a 
government guarantee fee in order to uphold competitive neutrality, that competitive 
neutrality might not be upheld to the disadvantage of the State-owned corporations. 
An area for further research could be to determine whether State-owned corporations 
are in fact at a disadvantage compared to their privately-owned counterparts by being 
required to borrow from the State rather than seek their own borrowing and financing 
options. A possible reason for the difference in the average interest rate could be the 
age of the borrowings. For example, older State-owned corporations could have older 
fixed debt (which could have been fixed at a time when interest rates were higher) 
than a newly privatised company which could be taking advantage of historically low 
interest rates. Alternatively, this difference could be due to an availability of lower 
cost debt in other countries (as per Ausnet). 
The State-owned sector had a higher return on assets than the private sector with 
3.23% compared to 0.88%.  
Tax and dividends 
The dividend payout ratio is much higher for State-owned corporations than their 
privately-owned counterparts, at an average of 80.74% of net profit after tax, 
compared to 49.43% in the private sector companies studied. In addition, the State-
owned sector paid a higher rate of dividends compared to total equity than the private 
sector, with 12.49% compared to 5.24%. This indicates that the hypothesis tested that 
the private sector paying less tax would result in more dividends to shareholders has 
failed, because when comparing the average dividends paid over five years to the 
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average total equity over five years, the State-owned sector still paid more. In 
addition, the State-owned sector paid more tax as a percentage of net profit before 
tax. As a five-year average of net tax paid over net profit before tax, the public sector 
paid 34.13% whereas the private sector paid only 13.54%. When net tax paid is 
compared to the average revenue over the five years studied, the State-owned sector 
still pays more tax than the private sector with 4.61% tax paid compared to total 
revenue in the State-owned sector compared to 1.97% in the private sector. Although 
still low, the private sector figures would have been distorted by the tax payment that 
Ausnet made to the ATO in settlement of its tax dispute. 
However, when total expenses from the Income Statement are compared to the total 
revenue, State-owned corporations return a lower result than the private sector. This 
result equates to total expenses being 82.53% of total revenue in the government 
sector, whereas they are 93.29% in the private sector. This means that the private 
sector spends more to earn each dollar of revenue than the State-owned sector.  
These results indicate that the State and Territory Government take more out of their 
state-owned corporations than their privately-owned counterparts, both in the way of 
tax and as a dividend. When this result is added to the additional interest and 
government guarantee fee being paid, above, it indicates that governments are 
gaining more benefit from these corporations than they would if they were privately 
owned taxpayers, both in terms of tax paid, but also as a rate of dividends returned. 
Net tax liabilities as a percentage of net assets 
Also, the net tax assets/liabilities as a percentage of net assets is much higher in the 
State-owned sector than it is in the privately-owned sector. In the privately-owned 
companies studied, the net tax liabilities form only 2.50% of the total net assets (or 
equity), whereas in the State-owned sector they form 40.73% of the total net assets 
(or equity). This indicates that the State-owned sector carries a much higher tax 
liability than the private sector. 
Overall 
Whilst the figures overall indicate that State-owned corporations are not as efficient 
as their privately-owned counterparts in the energy sector, on closer examination, 
this appears to be in part due to the excess payments made to their owner State or 
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Territory government, in the way of dividends, or taxes, or via borrowings which are 
required to be financed through the State treasury corporation. When a comparison is 
made of how much operating costs are required to generate each dollar of revenue, 
the State-owned sector out-performed their privately-owned counterparts. This could 
potentially be an area for further research. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 presented the financial data and analysis undertaken in this study. It 
examined debt neutrality and privatisation as alternatives to competitive neutrality. It 
further considered monopolies and their role in competition policy, specifically in the 
water and electricity industries. 
Two case studies were researched. Firstly, the tax exemption granted to the 
privatisations of Ausgrid and Transgrid were studied. The effect of the tax exemption 
on key financial ratios was calculated. Further, a second case study considered the 
effect of removing tax neutrality payments and instead increasing the dividend paid 
to each NTER’s owner State or Territory Treasury. The effect on key financial ratios 
was quantified and found to be material.  
Overall, it was found that NTER entities pay more tax than their privately-owned 
counterparts, pay a higher rate of interest on borrowings, carry more liabilities 
compared to total equity, and have a lower ratio of total expenses to total income. 
This data appears to suggest that the NTER has limited State-owned corporations’ 
ability to minimise their tax, whilst at the same time out-performing their privately-
owned counterparts across a number of key financial ratios. As noted in section 
5.3.1, the findings of this case study were consistent with the findings of a larger case 




6 Price Regulation, the Tax Allowance 
and Actual Tax Payable 
The Hilmer report contained five policy elements which later formed part of the 
National Competition Policy. These policy elements are aimed at improving the 
efficiency and competition within the State-owned and government business sector. 
These policy elements came about after concerns were raised regarding monopolies, 
monopoly pricing, access to infrastructure to enable competition, and the competitive 
advantage enjoyed by government business.573 The five policy elements are as 
follows: 
- Regulatory restrictions on competition 
- Structural reform of public monopolies 
- Access to essential facilities 
- Monopoly pricing; and 
- Competitive neutrality. 
Of the policy elements listed above, the one examined in greatest detail in this thesis 
is competitive neutrality. In answering Objective 6: Consideration of whether another 
tool could have been more effective, this chapter will examine whether another of the 
above policy elements could have been more effective or appropriate. The focus of 
this chapter will be on monopoly pricing. It will consider price regulation in 
Australia, with a focus on the electricity and water industries. It will also examine, 
through the use of case studies, whether the tax allowance set by the price regulator 
could be a more effective and efficient replacement for the NTER. 
The main goal and purpose of price regulation is to ensure that prices are charged 
based on what an efficient, well-managed, privately owned organisation would 
charge in a competitive market. The price regulator seeks to impose these 
competitive prices on corporations which might not, due to the nature of their 
industry, have any real competition. This is mainly the case for companies in a 
monopoly market (refer to section 5.2.1). 
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 National Competition Council, above n 6, 183. 
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Part of determining and setting a price for the goods or services supplied involves a 
decision by the price regulator on how to treat tax. A price regulator can choose a 
pre-tax pricing model, or a post-tax pricing model. Under a pre-tax pricing model, 
tax is assumed to be 30% of profit, without taking into account any tax adjustments 
which are needed to arrive at taxable income. Under a post-tax pricing model, the 
price regulator makes an estimate based on data provided by the regulated entity and 
based on what the price regulator determines to be efficient, of the tax liability which 
would be paid by the organisation if it were well-managed, efficient, and privately 
owned. Most pricing regulators in Australia operate using a post-tax pricing model.  
Given that the aim of the pricing regulator is only to allow prices based on efficient 
use of resources, thereby achieving competitive neutrality (as both privately and 
publicly owned organisations are assessed against the same benchmarks), and that 
the aim of the NTER is to ensure that NTER entities remain competitive and efficient 
by imposing a tax equivalent, it could be argued that the amount of tax paid by an 
NTER entity should closely mirror the amount of tax allowance allowed by a pricing 
regulator in its determination of prices, and that any differences arising between the 
tax allowance and tax paid could be the result of inefficiencies. In addition, it could 
be expected that the taxes paid by privately owned entities should also mirror the tax 
allowance determined by the pricing regulator. This has been the subject of recent 
and ongoing reviews, and will be discussed in more detail in section 6.4.4. 
This chapter seeks to examine this proposition and to look at whether the NTER is 
needed if the pricing regulator already allows for tax based on its concepts of 
efficiency and competitive neutrality in its price determination. 
6.1 The background of price regulation in Australia 
Similar to the NTER, price regulation in Australia was introduced as a result of a 
recommendation of the Hilmer Report. In the terms of reference, set out in Annex A 
of the Final Report, paragraph 3(c) states that the Committee of Inquiry needs to 
consider “the best structure for regulation including price regulation, in support of: 
(i) pro-competitive conduct by government businesses and trading 
enterprises and in areas currently outside the scope of the Trade 
Practices Act 1972; and 
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(ii) the interests of consumers and users of goods and services.”574 
Price regulation is of use in industries and markets which are subject to natural 
monopolies. Price regulation is used where there is no competition, and therefore 
there exists the potential for inefficient use of resources and higher pricing resulting 
from a lack of competition in the market. 
There are five main forms of regulation: 
• Cost of service regulation (including direct price setting and rate of return) 
• Price cap regulation 
• Performance-based regulation 
• Franchise regulation 
• Yardstick regulation.575 
The function of price regulation is best summarised by Handley576, as follows: 
The fundamental task of the regulator is to set prices which provide the 
regulated firm with an opportunity to earn a fair compensation for the efficient 
delivery of the regulated service. Specifically, the regulatory framework 
requires the determination of allowed revenues on a nominal, post-tax basis 
using a building block approach and which includes building blocks for 
operating costs, depreciation (a return of capital), a return on capital and the 
cost of corporate income tax. The return on capital is to be determined within a 
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) framework such that the regulated 
firm is allowed a rate of return commensurate with the efficient financing costs 
of a benchmark efficient entity with a similar degree of risk. Allowed operating 
costs are those that a prudent operator would incur in order to achieve efficient 
delivery, security of supply and maintain the safety of the regulated service.577 
Two main methods of price regulation will be considered in this thesis: incentive-
based regulation and “cost plus” regulation.  
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 Ibid 362. 
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Incentive-based regulation involves the forecasting of operating and capital 
expenditure at the beginning of a regulatory period.578 This then provides an 
incentive for the regulated business to operate in a more efficient manner, as any 
savings made are then able to be retained by the business during that price path, 
rather than passed straight onto the customers. Regulated entities are permitted to 
depart from the benchmarks set by the regulator, but they do so at their own expense 
(or benefit). 
“Cost plus” regulation (referred to as cost of service regulation, above) involves 
using the actual costs and then allowing for a mark-up. This method provides no 
incentive or motivation for regulated entities to attempt to reduce costs or behave in a 
more efficient manner.579 
In Australia, the main method of price regulation is an incentive-based regulation. 
This uses the “building block” approach. 
6.2 The Building Block approach 
Price regulators in Australia set their prices using the “building block approach”. 
Under the building block approach, the price regulator determines the most efficient 
costs of running the business, that is, the costs the regulated entity would incur if it 
were an efficient, well managed, privately owned organisation. Prices are then set 
allowing for “indexation of the regulatory asset base, return on capital, depreciation, 
estimate cost of corporate income tax, revenue requirements, and forecast operating 
expenditure.”580 
As part of the price setting process, a regulated asset base (RAB) is determined. The 
RAB is the total asset value for the regulated assets of the business. Not all activities 
undertaken by a regulated entity are regulated activities. Some activities are non-
regulated. Non-regulated activities are activities whereby there is sufficient 
competition in the market to enable a fair and efficient price to be set through a 
competitive market, rather than needing a price regulator to determine a competitive 
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 Australian Energy Regulator (AER), Overview of the better regulation reform package, (2014) 6. 
579
 Energy Networks Australia, Submission to Australian Energy Regulator, Review of regulatory tax 
approach, 31 May 2018, 7; Jemena, Submission to Australian Energy Regulator, Review of regulatory 
tax approach, 31 May 2018, 2. 
580
 Australian Energy Market Commission, Perspectives on the building block approach: Review into 
the use of total factor productivity for the determination of prices and revenues (2009) 3.  
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price. For example, the retail arm of the electricity and gas industries is not regulated 
as there is sufficient competition to enable a fair and efficient price to be determined 
by the market. As a result, the price regulator will not determine the prices for those 
activities and will not allow for assets relating to those activities to form part of the 
RAB. The prices set by the price regulator do not allow for the recovery of costs 
relating to non-regulated activities. Most regulated entities are engaged in non-
regulated activities. 
Once the efficient costs related to running a regulated business have been determined 
by the price regulator, prices are then indexed for inflation. Also, for prices 
determinations involving multiple years (the most common price path is for four or 
five years), the cash flows are discounted back to today’s dollars. 
The way in which the price regulator determines prices is subject to interpretation, 
and price regulators are not bound to a set methodology of determining prices. As a 
result, there can be variation in the treatment of certain elements affecting the prices, 
and variation between price regulators. 
As discussed above, one of the building blocks in a price determination is tax. The 
price regulator can choose to use a pre-tax weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
or a post-tax WACC to set its prices. Where a price regulator chooses to set its prices 
using a post-tax WACC, there are many decisions a price regulator needs to make 
about the parameters it will use to set that tax allowance. The methodology for 
setting the tax allowance can differ from price regulator to price regulator, as will be 
seen in the following section. 
6.3 Comparison of the tax building block between 
IPART and the AER 
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) conducted a study 
comparing the tax building block calculations between IPART and the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER). They found some differences and similarities between the 
methods and approaches used by IPART and the AER to determine the tax 
allowance. These will be summarised below in order to illustrate that there is no 




Both IPART and the AER use a post-tax model and include a benchmark tax liability 
in the building block. Both calculate the tax allowance through the use of a statutory 
tax rate, and tax depreciation, and allow for an adjustment for imputation credits.581 
Note that NTER entities are not subject to imputation credits. This was discussed in 
section 4.1.5 and will be discussed further in section 6.5.4 below. 
Capital contributions and carried forward tax losses are also taken into consideration 
in both the IPART and AER models.582 However, although IPART states in its 
research paper that an allowance for capital contributions is made when calculating 
its tax building block component of the price allowance, this was found not to be the 
case when a water utility carried out an analysis and comparison of the actual tax 
paid and the tax allowance provided in the price determination. (Refer to the case 
study in section 6.4.3.) Note, however, that in the current price determination (2016 – 
2020) IPART has allowed for capital contribution/gifted assets in its calculation of 
the tax building block component. 
6.3.2 Differences 
IPART calculates the tax liability in nominal terms and converts it to a real tax 
liability, whereas the AER’s calculation of the tax liability is nominal.583 A nominal 
figure refers to the price at the time the figure was calculated. However, real prices 
are adjusted for inflation. 
The AER includes the imputation credits as a separate line item in the building block, 
whereas IPART benchmarks the tax liability. IPART states that these methods make 
no difference overall to the final figure in the tax allowance.584 
On the calculation of tax depreciation for inclusion into the tax allowance, IPART 
bases tax depreciation on the regulated entity’s forecast actual tax depreciation, 
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adjusted to remove unregulated activities.585 However, the AER uses a straight-line 
tax depreciation estimate based on its own forecasts in the tax allowance model.586 
Note that the AER tax allowance model is currently under review. This is discussed 
further in the case study below. 
The differences and similarities outlined above relate only to the setting of the tax 
allowance. Other differences in the calculation of the other components of the 
building block, for example in setting the forecast income or expenses, or 
assumptions around gearing or interest rates used, will also impact the tax allowance 
ultimately calculated.  
6.4 Case study: A comparison of the tax allowance to 
the tax paid 
This section will compare and examine the difference between the tax allowance 
provided by a price regulator and the actual amount of tax paid by a regulated entity. 
This topic has received a lot of media attention of late, and is currently the subject of 
a review by the AER (discussed further in section 6.5.2). 
The comparison of the tax allowance to the tax paid is being performed to determine 
whether these are comparable and, if they are, whether the tax allowance is an 
adequate replacement for the NTER. If the tax allowance is an adequate replacement 
for the NTER, rather than employ tax personnel to performance tax compliance and 
consulting tasks, NTER entities can make a saving on these costs and instead return 
the tax allowance calculated by the price regulator to their owner State or Territory 
Treasury as a tax equivalent payment. 
6.4.1 Data collection and issues for the comparison of the tax 
allowance to the tax paid 
This section will outline the various sources of data to be used for the comparison of 
the tax allowance to the tax paid and possible issues and assumptions resulting from 
these. 
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6.4.1.1 ATO data – Tax Transparency Report 
Since 2015, the ATO has published a “Tax Transparency Report” each year. The 
report outlines the tax paid by the largest companies in the country. These include: 
• “Australian public and foreign owned corporate tax entities with total income 
of $100 million or more 
• Australian-owned resident private companies with total income of $200 
million or more 
• Entities that have petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) payable.”587 
Companies lodge their tax returns on a consolidated basis. Where a regulated entity 
is a subsidiary and part of a larger tax group, the information reported to the ATO is 
on a consolidated basis. Extraction of tax payments made by a regulated entity which 
is part of a larger consolidated group would be very difficult to obtain without having 
a reliable means by which to allocate the regulated entity portion. 
NTER entities are exempt from having to lodge a Tax Transparency Report. 
However, they have the option to do so. 
6.4.1.2 Annual report/Financial statement 
Annual reports and financial statements are prepared on a consolidated basis. If the 
regulated entity is part of a larger consolidated group, data relating to the regulated 
entity could be extracted either through the segment data reported in the financial 
statements, or by head entity data if the regulated entity is the head entity of the 
consolidated group. The data provided in the annual report or financial statement 
could be useful in assigning a means of allocation of tax payments. 
Cash flow statement 
The Cash Flow Statement in the financial statements represents all the cash 
movements in the organisation during the year. The tax payments from the Cash 
Flow Statement are an unreliable measure of tax assessed in any one income year. 
The tax payments in the cash flow statement will usually relate to two financial (and 
therefore tax) years. In any one year, the last instalment and any outstanding tax 
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payment/refund for the prior year are included in the current year tax payments, and 
the final instalment and any outstanding tax payment/refund for the current year will 
be included in the following year’s Cash Flow Statement. In addition, the current 
year tax payments from the Cash Flow Statement could also include tax payments or 
refunds resulting from prior year amendments or the result of ATO audits. 
The tax payments in the cash flow statement are a measure of tax paid in a financial 
year, not the tax paid relating to that financial year. 
Tax expense note 
The Total Tax Expense is the sum of Current Tax Expense and Deferred Tax 
Expense. The accounting standard AASB112 defines current tax as “the amount of 
income taxes payable (recoverable) in respect of the taxable profit (tax loss) for a 
period.” The deferred tax expense relates to “amounts of income taxes payable in 
future periods in respect of taxable temporary differences.”588 
Many of the tax adjustments that occur affect both the Current Tax Expense and the 
Deferred Tax Expense (except for any “permanent” differences), resulting in a Total 
Tax Expense that is not indicative of tax paid or payable. For example, a tax 
depreciation adjustment might reduce the taxable income (and therefore Current Tax 
Expense) by $100m. However, as a result of the increased tax depreciation, the 
Deferred Tax Expense will increase by $100m, resulting in a nil difference to Total 
Tax Expense. Therefore, using the Total Tax Expense as an indicator of tax payable 
is inaccurate. 
The closest indicator of tax payable is the Current Tax Expense in the Financial 
Statements. The Current Tax Expense is, in effect, a calculation of the tax on taxable 
income at that time. It should be noted that the Current Tax Expense in the financial 
statements contains only preliminary tax payable figures which are then “trued-up” 
after the financial statements have been finalised and when the tax return is prepared. 
Any differences between the preliminary figures in the financial statements and the 
final figures in the tax return are reported as “prior year adjustments” in the 
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following year’s tax expense note. In addition, any tax payable/refundable resulting 
from amendments to tax returns are also reported as “prior year adjustments.” 
Deferred tax asset/(loss) 
AASB112 requires the carry-forward of unused tax losses to be recognised as a 
deferred tax asset. Therefore, any tax losses are normally recognised in the deferred 
tax asset note of the financial statements. However, these losses will likely be the 
consolidated group tax losses, and any losses relating to regulated activities will need 
to be extracted. 
6.4.2 Essential Services Commission for the water sector 
The Essential Services Commission of Victoria (ESC) regulates prices in the water 
industry in that State. In a study undertaken by CME Australia for the Essential 
Services Commission of Victoria, it was noted that there are intended differences 
between the tax paid and tax allowed by the price regulator.589 These differences will 
be discussed in the following section which compares the tax allowed to the tax paid. 
That research paper also notes that, regardless of ownership (whether public or 
private), all regulated entities are motivated to maximise the tax allowance provided 
by the price regulator as it increases their overall revenue.590 This is because an 
increase in the tax allowance results in an increase in prices allowed by the price 
regulator and therefore, an increase in revenue received by the regulated entity 
resulting from higher bills to the consumer. 
The paper goes on to state that privately owned organisations are then driven to 
reduce their tax, thereby maximising post-tax profits to be distributed to 
shareholders. However, it continues, this is not the case for government-owned 
entities, because the government-owned entity’s owner State or Territory Treasury is 
in receipt of both the tax and the dividend.591  
Furthermore, the paper finds that the differences between actual tax paid and the tax 
allowance set by the price regulator are mainly due to actual debt being much lower 
than the benchmark rate set by the regulator (resulting in a difference in interest 
deducted in the tax return and interest deductions allowed for in the calculation of the 
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tax allowance component of the price determination), differences in the valuation of 
assets (including differences in tax depreciation claimed as a deduction and 
depreciation allowed as part of setting prices), assumptions regarding dividend 
imputation, and deferred tax liabilities.592 
6.4.3 Case study: A comparison of the tax allowance and tax paid in 
the water sector 
This section will examine the tax paid with the tax allowance for a water entity in the 
NTER. It will outline how prices are set, and the reasons for the differences between 
the tax allowance and the actual tax paid. 
6.4.3.1 Comparison for water utility based in NSW 
IPART (the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW) sets prices or a 
method by which to calculate prices, for the company’s water, wastewater, 
stormwater and recycled water services. 
The first step taken by IPART in determining prices for the water utility is to 
calculate its annual revenue requirement (ARR). The ARR is made up of three 
components: 
• The return on assets 
• The return of assets (depreciation); and 
• Operating expenses. 
The ARR is then divided by the demand to estimate a price which will fully recover 
the ARR. 
The resulting price, therefore, has two components – a capital and an operating 
component. The capital component of any price set by IPART recovers the return on 
and return of assets. These are in turn derived from the regulatory asset base (RAB). 
The return on assets is derived by multiplying the RAB by an appropriate rate of 
return. The return of assets is calculated by dividing the RAB by the remaining life 
of the assets within the RAB. 
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The RAB includes only assets that the water utility buys or builds that need to be 
recovered through water, wastewater and stormwater postage stamp prices. 
As part of its 2015 price submission, the water utility undertook an exercise to 
identify why the prior price submission had included a tax allowance that was far 
below the tax actually paid by the organisation over that price path. 
The price regulator is IPART (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal). In the 
current Pricing Determination (2012 to 2016), the tax allowed by IPART as part of 
its tax building block was significantly less than the tax paid by the water utility. A 
comparison of actual/forecast tax to the Pricing Determination is shown below. 













$31 $37 $45 $51 $164 
Shortfall ($150) ($140) ($106) ($114) ($510) 
Shortfall as a %  83%  79% 70% 69% 76% 
 
Using 2012 as an example, the water utility identified the following as reasons for 
the difference between the tax allowed as part of the price determination, and the tax 
paid as part of the NTER assessment of tax payable on lodgement of the tax return: 
• Higher than forecast revenue, resulting in a higher taxable income and 
therefore a higher tax payable; 
• Lower operating expenses resulting in lower tax deductions, and a resulting 
higher amount of tax paid; 
• Tax depreciation included in the tax return was higher than tax depreciation 
forecast at the time of the price submission (this was due to the water utility 
moving to the diminishing value method of tax depreciation for all new 
eligible assets), therefore resulting in a higher tax deduction and reduced 
taxable income and tax payable;  
• The inclusion of abnormal items (in that year the utility made large gains on 
abnormal sales); and 
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• The inclusion of non-regulated and unregulated revenue/gains in the actual 
tax expense.593 
Although IPART aimed to base its calculation of the tax building block on actual tax 
laws, further investigation revealed a number of items were not allowed for, despite 
being subject to tax under current tax law.  
6.4.3.2 Capital gains 
The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) is similar to an asset register for pricing purposes. 
However, the RAB does not allow gifted assets or developer contributions to be 
included, as the regulated entity did not pay to acquire these assets. In addition, when 
assets are sold, rather than factoring in a gain on sale in determining prices, the 
regulator deducts the sale proceeds from the total value of the RAB. The oversight is 
when it comes to the tax regulatory treatment of these property sales. After deducting 
the sale proceeds from the RAB, IPART did not make an allowance or adjustment 
for the tax treatment on these gains on sale. 
For tax purposes, the gain on sale of property is subject to capital gains tax, and any 
capital losses arising can be applied only against capital gains or carried forward to 
future years to be offset against any future capital gains.  
However, in its calculation of the tax allowance in the price determination, IPART 
had not allowed for the tax on any capital gains. This meant that IPART had not 
based its calculation of the tax allowance on actual tax laws in this case. 
6.4.3.3 Conclusion 
Although the aim of price regulation and the introduction of the NTER was 
essentially to achieve the same aim, that is, to achieve the most efficient use of 
resources and encourage competitive neutrality, it has been shown, above, that one 
cannot replace the other. Nor is the use of both methods ‘doubling-up’. The reason 
for this is that the price regulators typically do not calculate a correct tax allowance. 
In some instances, the tax allowance calculated is not based on current tax laws, as 
seen in the case studies above. In addition, the tax allowance is based on forecasts, 
with no allowance being made for under or over-recovery during the price path.  
Furthermore, all price regulators operate differently and have their own models and 
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rules governing the setting of prices. This results in an inconsistency between 
regulators and jurisdictions and means that the tax liability calculated by one 
regulator may not match the tax liability calculated by another regulator, all other 
things being equal. 
In contrast to the regulators, the NTER does not base its calculation of tax liabilities 
on what is efficient, or what is considered the best in that industry. The NTER bases 
the tax liability on what actually is; on the real results, regardless of whether they are 
efficient, inefficient, or so on. The tax is based on the real profit and business 
outcomes, as opposed to what is ideal. This would be the same for the private sector 
– a private company might not be efficient but would still have to pay tax. The 
ATO’s aim is not to ensure efficiency, but rather, to ensure that the correct taxes are 
paid as they fall due. This will be further examined in the following section. 
6.4.4 The AER review of the regulatory tax approach in the energy 
sector 
In addition to the work done by the ESC in determining the high-level differences 
between the tax allowance and tax paid in the water sector, the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) has recently announced a review into the difference between the 
tax allowed by the AER and the actual tax paid by companies that the AER regulates 
in the distribution and transmission segments of the electricity and gas sectors. 
The ATO alerted the AER about differences between the tax allowances allowed by 
the AER and the actual tax paid by energy companies in its letter dated 10 April 
2018.594 In that letter, the ATO noted that: 
• “the aggregate AER tax allowance provided to taxpaying entities consistently 
overstated the actual tax payable by those entities; and 
• the aggregate AER tax allowance provided to NTER entities consistently 
understated the ‘notional’ tax payable by those entities.”595 
The ATO noted in its letter that the material differences between the tax allowance 
provided by the AER and the tax paid by those regulated entities was the entity 
structure (for example, stapled structures, companies and partnerships); the amount 
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of interest claimed as a tax deduction compared to the interest allowed for in the 
AER pricing models; carried forward tax losses; and tax depreciation deductions 
claimed, compared to tax depreciation allowed by the AER in its calculation of the 
tax allowance.596 
The ATO also noted that it had to make some assumptions and had to apportion 
figures where the regulated entity operated within a consolidated group.597 
The review came about after recent reports in the media of a $400m power “price 
gouging’” by electricity companies.598 This article exposed that customers of 
electricity networks and gas pipelines were being overcharged $400m a year to cover 
corporate tax bills which were not actually incurred. The article argued that the price 
regulator (the AER) had allowed for tax allowances totalling $600m in the energy 
and gas sectors, when data extracted from the ATO has indicated that tax paid was in 
the vicinity of $200m. The Federal Government then requested an AER review of 
what led to such considerable differences between the tax allowances provided by 
the AER and the actual tax collected by the tax office. 
In a letter to the Chair of the AER, the Minister for the Environment and Energy at 
the time, Hon Josh Frydenberg, requested that the AER investigate whether the 
setting of the tax allowance had resulted in overcompensation of tax liabilities 
incurred in the energy sector. He also requested a review of how the tax allowance is 
determined, including whether there is a need for more information gathering and 
whether the methodology for calculating the tax allowance needs to be updated or 
revised.599 
The following day, 15 May 2018, the AER released an issues paper “Review of 
Regulatory Tax Approach”.600 This Issues Paper outlines the differences the AER 
found in their review into the tax allowance and tax payments of companies in the 
energy sector, as well as possible reasons for those differences, including difficulties 
encountered in gathering data and extracting relevant information. The Issues Paper 
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sought submissions from interested parties by 31 May 2018 and aimed to complete 
the review by December 2018. 
In its Issues Paper, the AER sought to investigate and explain the differences 
between the way it calculates its tax allowance and the way the ATO arrives at its tax 
payable. Figure 2.1 of the Issues Paper (below) outlines how the AER determines its 
tax allowance in comparison to how the ATO arrives at the taxable income and tax 
payable.  
 
The AER sought to explain the reasons for the differences between the tax allowance 
and tax payable. Similar to the CME review of the water industry, above, gearing 
featured heavily as one of the main differences between the tax allowance and tax 
paid.601 The AER notes that net service providers are often more highly geared than 
the benchmark gearing of 60% it allows when setting prices. This results in a higher 
actual interest expense than is used in the calculation of the tax allowance, and 
therefore a lower taxable income and tax payable. Further, and also similarly to the 
CME review of ESC (above), another factor resulting in a large difference between 
the tax allowance and tax paid is the calculation of depreciation and other asset-
related adjustments. The AER uses straight-line depreciation and ATO effective lives 
for the determination of tax depreciation for use in the calculation of the tax 
allowance. However, the tax law allows entities a choice of either diminishing value 
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or straight-line depreciation, to group low value assets into low value pools, and also 
the option of forgoing the ATO effective lives in favour of self-assessed effective 
lives if the entity chooses. Also, the AER assumes a company tax rate of 30% 
without considering the ownership structure, thereby not accurately capturing 
structures such as stapled structures and partnerships. In addition, although the AER 
is aware of prior tax losses, it does not appear to take these carried forward losses 
into consideration when determining the tax allowance.602 
Also, the AER outlines further possible differences between the tax allowance and 
tax payable in its Issues Paper.603 Research and development is not taken into 
account in the AER models, and the benchmark regulated cost of debt is used in its 
calculations (where the regulated entity might have higher or lower interest rates and 
cost of debt depending on its debt and credit ratings). Further, the AER does not take 
into account the effect that sale or corporate restructuring has on the tax asset base; 
and does not take into account that certain refurbishments can be written off for tax 
purposes rather than depreciated.604 
This review closely mirrors the work undertaken in this thesis and will be further 
discussed in section 6.5.3. 
6.4.4.1 Submissions 
The AER received 16 submissions to its Issues Paper before initial submissions 
closed on 31 May 2018.  
Incentive-based regulation 
Many expressed a view that as the AER sets prices using a system of incentive-based 
regulation, it can be expected that not just tax, but rather, all expenses will have a 
variance between what the regulator allows in its building block and the actual 
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expenses incurred.605 This does not necessarily indicate that there is a problem in the 
approach or calculation of expenses, including tax.606 
Tax as a cost pass-through 
A number of submissions expressed concern that moving away from the current 
method of the AER calculating a tax allowance to tax as a cost pass-through (that is, 
where actual tax costs are included as the tax allowance) would result in a loss of 
incentive for regulated entities to pursue the most efficient tax costs possible.607 This 
is because, if the AER chose to use tax as a cost pass-through, any tax savings (and 
tax inefficiencies) would be passed on to the customer. The regulated entity receives 
no benefit and makes no loss by pursuing one method over another. 
Ownership structure 
Several submissions expressed the view that ownership structure should not be 
factored into the tax allowance; and that the tax allowance should be based only on 
the tax liability incurred by an efficient business.608 The submissions by 
IFM/Australian Super/Ausgrid and Energy Networks Australia expressed concern 
that prices linked to ownership structures would result in fluctuations in prices when 
ownership of the network assets changed.609 
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6.5 Comparison of tax paid by NTER entity with 
privately-owned entity: Case study 
As part of the current AER review of regulatory tax approach, the ATO submitted a 
note to the AER, stating that:  
“the aggregate AER tax allowance provided to NTER entities consistently 
understated the ‘notional’ tax payable by those entities” whereas “the aggregate 
AER tax allowance provided to taxpaying entities consistently overstated the 
actual tax payable by those entities.”610  
This observation indicates a possible underlying problem in the NTER entities. 
Either the NTER entities are not operating as efficiently as their privately-owned 
counterparts, or there are barriers in place to stop NTER entities from accessing the 
same methods of tax minimisation available to privately owned entities. 
In an attempt to explain the difference, the ATO Note states “in relation to NTER 
entities, we suspect the reason their notional tax payable under the NTER regime is 
higher than their AER allowance is that these entities typically have more 
conservative tax positions. For example, they are less likely to claim accelerated 
R&D deductions or have related party international dealings (as they are only 
permitted to borrow from State Treasury Corporations)”.611 This quote indicates that 
NTER entities, by the mere nature of their ownership, are actually disadvantaged 
when compared to their private sector counterparts. As examined in the Debt 
Neutrality section (refer to section 5.1.1), beyond enabling the State and Territory 
Treasuries to make additional revenue from their State-owned corporations, there is 
no real reason that NTER entities should not be free to borrow from other lenders. 
Indeed, there are many financial institutions available in the market to allow NTER 
entities to seek out their own debt and borrowing needs. 
The CCP submission to the AER review states, in regard to ownership “[…]however, 
if data shows that a material reason for the difference in tax paid between the two 
ownership structures is, say, their corporate structure, then this may be a good reason 
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to have different efficient calculations for each.”612 It should not be the role of the 
price regulator to allow for different levels or types of efficiencies. The NTER 
should be administered in such a way as to allow for this. If it is unable to do so, then 
it has not achieved its goal of competitive neutrality. 
The following case study will examine the tax paid according to ownership to 
determine whether this statement by the ATO was correct. 
6.5.1 Comparison of tax paid between privately owned and publicly 
owned companies in the electricity industry 
In order to test the theory above that NTER entities pay more tax, this case study will 
further examine tax payments made by publicly-owned electricity companies with 
those paid by their privately-owned counterparts. Although this was covered in part 
of the case study in section 5.3: Comparison of NTER entities with their privately-
owned counterparts, this section utilises the information available in the ATO’s Tax 
Transparency Report to allow for a greater number of privately-owned entities to be 
examined. 
In 2014, the ATO introduced the mandatory tax reporting of tax returns and 
amendments of: 
• “Australian public and foreign owned corporate tax entities with total income 
of $100 million or more 
• Australian-owned resident private companies with total income of $200 
million or more 
• entities that have petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) payable.613 
This data is then published each year in the ATO’s Report of entity tax information. 
The report is required to be produced under section 3C of the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953. The report contains the following information: 
• total income; 
• taxable income; and 
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• tax payable, after adjusting for franking credits, tax offsets, and R&D tax 
offsets. 
Where a number of companies in the electricity industry were exempted from 
publishing their financial statements because of foreign ownership, or other 
ownership structures, they were not exempted from having to comply with this 
legislation that requires them to disclose their tax paying status. Therefore, where 
case study 5.3: Comparison of NTER entities with their privately-owned counterparts 
was limited in the number of privately-owned entity information available, this case 
study enabled a more comprehensive review. 
There is no requirement for NTER entities to provide such data under this section of 
the legislation. However, for the purposes of this case study, the relevant information 
was able to be extracted from the Financial Statements and Annual Reports of the 
NTER entities, as indicated below.  
Total Income 
The Total Income was extracted from the Income Statement in the Financial 
Statements.  
Tax Payable 
The Tax Payable was calculated using the Current Tax from the Income Tax Expense 
Note in the Financial Statements as follows: 
 Current Tax Expense – the current year amount reported as Prior Year 
(over)/under provided + the prior year amount reported as Prior Year 
(over)/under provided. 
Adjusting for the prior year amounts results in a true representation of what the tax 
payable was for the year being studied. 
Taxable Income 
The Taxable Income was calculated by adding back any R&D tax offsets and then 
grossing up the resultant adjusted tax payable. Franking credits are not recognised in 
the NTER, so there was no need to remove any possible franking credit adjustments, 
as there would have been none. 
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6.5.1.1 Entities studied 
The entities studied in this case study are in the electricity industry, and are as 
follows: 
Privately owned 
AGL Energy Limited 
Origin Energy Limited 
Electranet Pty Limited 
ERM Power Limited 
Bluewaters Power Cat Pty Ltd 
EnergyAustralia Holdings Limited 
Infigen Energy Limited 














6.5.1.2 Tables of data 
The following tables contain the data for the entities studied by year, with an average 
at the end. 
2014 














            
Private           
AGL ENERGY LIMITED 8,852,853,753 424,942,168 127,054,079 4.80% 1.44% 
ORIGIN ENERGY LIMITED 12,574,554,876 501,252,871 108,004,529 3.99% 0.86% 
ELECTRANET PTY LIMITED 342,766,917 59,550,650 17,865,195 17.37% 5.21% 
ERM POWER LIMITED 2,038,986,111 1,372,885 390,893 0.07% 0.02% 
BLUEWATERS POWER 2 PTY LTD 196,796,679     0.00% 0.00% 
ALINTA POWER CAT PTY LTD 1,698,802,352 449,839   0.03% 0.00% 
ENERGYAUSTRALIA HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 8,843,049,950 51,800,099   0.59% 0.00% 
INFIGEN ENERGY LIMITED 149,918,610     0.00% 0.00% 
CLICK ENERGY GROUP HOLDINGS PTY 
LTD 126,048,210     0.00% 0.00% 
Average       2.98% 0.84% 
            
Government         
Synergy 
             
2,781,881.00  291,857 87,557 10.49% 3.15% 
Ergon 2,440 33 10 1.37% 0.41% 
Energex 2,248 307 92 13.64% 4.09% 
Energy Queensland         
TasNetworks 234,644 86,380 25,914 36.81% 11.04% 
Aurora Energy 1,202,971 77,453 23,236 6.44% 1.93% 
Essential Energy 1,965 429 129 21.81% 6.54% 
Western Power (WA) 1,648,870 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Horizon Power (WA) 591,658 139,513 41,854 23.58% 7.07% 
Average       14.27% 4.28% 
 
2015 














            
Private           
AGL ENERGY LIMITED 10,601,156,586 616,577,246 184,844,603 5.82% 1.74% 
ORIGIN ENERGY LIMITED 12,200,600,757     0.00% 0.00% 
ELECTRANET PTY LIMITED 340,685,391 74,229,419 22,268,826 21.79% 6.54% 
ERM POWER LIMITED 2,331,518,403     0.00% 0.00% 
BLUEWATERS POWER 2 PTY LTD 155,599,491     0.00% 0.00% 
ALINTA POWER CAT PTY LTD 1,575,189,251 271,517   0.02% 0.00% 
ENERGYAUSTRALIA HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 7,302,401,958     0.00% 0.00% 
INFIGEN ENERGY LIMITED 140,791,385     0.00% 0.00% 
CLICK ENERGY GROUP HOLDINGS PTY 
LTD 154,735,938     0.00% 0.00% 
Average       3.07% 0.92% 
            
Government         
Synergy 
             
3,240,566.00  20,763 6,229 0.64% 0.19% 
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Ergon 2,627 603 181 22.97% 6.89% 
Energex 2,575 790 237 30.68% 9.20% 
Energy Queensland         
TasNetworks 583,613 194,897 58,469 33.39% 10.02% 
Aurora Energy 948,951 43,883 13,165 4.62% 1.39% 
Essential Energy 2,054 476 143 23.18% 6.95% 
Western Power (WA) 1,767,429 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Horizon Power (WA) 517,072 42,433 12,470 8.21% 2.41% 
Average       15.46% 4.63% 
 
2016 














            
Private           
AGL ENERGY LIMITED 13,307,459,873 710,850,726 207,808,441 5.34% 1.56% 
ORIGIN ENERGY LIMITED 11,917,688,617 94,061,718   0.79% 0.00% 
ELECTRANET PTY LIMITED 364,943,613 90,897,487 27,269,246 24.91% 7.47% 
ERM POWER LIMITED 2,574,950,500 25,775,433 7,391,420 1.00% 0.29% 
BLUEWATERS POWER 2 PTY LTD 146,305,963 4,048,128   2.77% 0.00% 
ALINTA POWER CAT PTY LTD 547,022,650 42,125   0.01% 0.00% 
ENERGYAUSTRALIA HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 7,755,881,032     0.00% 0.00% 
INFIGEN ENERGY LIMITED 235,647,376     0.00% 0.00% 
CLICK ENERGY GROUP HOLDINGS PTY 
LTD 173,790,518     0.00% 0.00% 
Average       3.87% 1.04% 
            
Government         
Synergy 3,121,922 127,723 38,317 4.09% 1.23% 
Ergon           
Energex           
Energy Queensland 5,265 1,470 441 27.92% 8.38% 
TasNetworks 597,778 201,393 60,418 33.69% 10.11% 
Aurora Energy 866,282 44,357 13,307 5.12% 1.54% 
Essential Energy 1,552 91 27 5.86% 1.76% 
Western Power (WA) 1,840,554 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Horizon Power (WA) 490,371 61,827 18,350 12.61% 3.74% 
Average       12.76% 3.82% 
 
Averages 














            
Private           
AGL ENERGY LIMITED 10,920,490,071 584,123,380 173,235,708 5.35% 1.59% 
ORIGIN ENERGY LIMITED 12,230,948,083 198,438,196 36,001,510 1.62% 0.29% 
ELECTRANET PTY LIMITED 349,465,307 74,892,519 22,467,756 21.43% 6.43% 
ERM POWER LIMITED 2,315,151,671 9,049,439 2,594,104 0.39% 0.11% 
BLUEWATERS POWER 2 PTY LTD 166,234,044 1,349,376 0 0.81% 0.00% 
ALINTA POWER CAT PTY LTD 1,273,671,418 254,494 0 0.02% 0.00% 
ENERGYAUSTRALIA HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 7,967,110,980 17,266,700 0 0.22% 0.00% 
INFIGEN ENERGY LIMITED 175,452,457 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
CLICK ENERGY GROUP HOLDINGS PTY 
LTD 151,524,889 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Average       3.32% 0.94% 
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Government         
Synergy 3,048,123 146,781 44,034 4.82% 1.44% 
Ergon 2,534 318 96 12.56% 3.77% 
Energex 2,412 548 165 22.74% 6.82% 
Energy Queensland 5,265 1,470 441 27.92% 8.38% 
TasNetworks 472,012 160,890 48,267 34.09% 10.23% 
Aurora Energy 1,006,068 55,231 16,569 5.49% 1.65% 
Essential Energy 1,857 332 100 17.87% 5.36% 
Western Power (WA) 1,752,284 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Horizon Power (WA) 533,034 81,258 24,225 15.24% 4.54% 
Average       15.64% 4.69% 
 
6.5.1.3 Observations 
As can be seen from the tables above, most of the privately-owned entities studied 
did not pay any tax over the three years studied (five of the nine companies studied). 
A further two of the privately-owned companies studied did not pay tax in every year 
studied (Origin Energy and ERM Power). Also, three of the privately-owned 
electricity companies studied had taxable income but no tax payable. This suggests 
there were tax losses available, or tax credits resulting from either research and 
development tax concessions or franking credits. 
For all years studied, NTER entities paid more tax than their privately-owned 
counterparts in the electricity industry. Of the nine NTER entities studied, only one 
(Western Power) did not pay any tax at all during the time studied.  
The percentage of taxable income to total income averaged over the three years 
studied was nearly five times higher for the NTER entities than their privately-owned 
counterparts, at 15.64% compared to 3.32%. In addition, the percentage of tax 
payable to total income was also nearly five times higher for NTER entities than it 
was for their privately-owned counterparts, at 4.69% compared to 0.94% for the 
private sector. 
Many more privately-owned entities in the electricity sector are in losses than their 
publicly owned counterparts. This is also evidenced by their own release of tax 
transparency data, to be discussed further below. However, losses were evident in the 
NTER entities too, just not to the same extent as the private sector. 
The NTER could possibly consider ways of improving competitive neutrality in 
favour of NTER entities, for example, by allowing a lower rate of company tax for 
NTER entities to offset the differences detailed above. 
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6.5.1.4 Tax transparency data released by the companies 
Some companies have released their own additional tax transparency data in the form 
of Tax Contribution Reports. These reports disclose the company’s tax position and 
could include data on tax risk and policy. The following will discuss the information 
provided in those reports that contributed to the results above. 
Energy Australia 
According to Energy Australia’s tax contribution report for the year ended 31 
December 2016, Energy Australia paid no tax because it had tax losses from prior 
years available to offset any current year taxable income.614 
Origin Energy 
In 2016, Origin Energy reported total income of $11,917,688,617 and a taxable 
income of $94,061,718. However, Origin Energy paid no tax.615 Origin Energy 
provided further detail about why it paid no tax in its own tax transparency report. In 
that report, Origin Energy stated that the $28.2m of tax which resulted from the 
$94m taxable income was offset by a foreign tax credit of $2.4m, franking credits of 
$4.8m and an R&D tax offset of $21m.616 
6.5.2 Comparison of tax paid in the AER Review of Regulatory Tax 
Approach 2018 
As part of the AER Review of Regulatory Tax Approach 2018, the AER collected 
data from electricity network companies on a voluntary basis and commissioned 
PwC to perform some high-level comparisons of tax paid between privately owned 
and publicly owned network companies. It found that NTER electricity network 
companies paid significantly more tax than their privately-owned counterparts, as 
indicated in Figure 2, below. 
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PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 28.617 
Keeping in mind that the above table is based on only those electricity network 
companies who chose to voluntarily provide their tax data to the AER as part of this 
review, it can be seen that the NTER entities pay vastly more tax than their privately-
owned counterparts. 
The PwC618 report then goes on to analyse why this would be the case.  
Briefly, the drivers for the high amount of tax the NTER entities paid were found to 
be: 
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 PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 28. 
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 PwC, 'PwC Report - Findings and Recommendations' (Paper presented at AER Tax Review 
Forum, Sydney, 7 November 2018) 6. 
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• The revenue reported in the NTER entities’ tax returns was much higher than 
the income allowed for by the regulator. This could be due to a high amount 
of unregulated income. 
• The tax fixed asset registers overall were less than the regulatory tax asset 
book, resulting in less depreciation claimed as a deduction in the tax returns. 
• Actual financing costs claimed as a deduction were likely lower than the 
financing costs allowed by the price regulator.619 
The drivers for the low amount of tax the private sector paid were found to be as 
follows: 
• The holding structures utilised by some of the electricity network companies 
meant that tax was payable by other entities. As such, the network companies 
themselves showed no tax as payable, whereas tax would be paid further up 
the line by other entities in the holding structure. 
• The availability of carry forward tax losses and costs associated with mergers 
and acquisitions has driven down the amount of tax paid by privately owned 
entities. 
• The tax treatment employed by privately owned entities in relation to capex 
and financing (for example, write-off of refurbishment costs).620 
6.5.2.1 Depreciation method 
For most assets, a company can choose whether it wants to depreciate assets using 
the prime cost (s 40-75 ITAA97) or diminishing value (s 40-72 ITAA97) method. 
The prime cost method spaces depreciation evenly over the asset’s useful life. The 
diminishing value is a more aggressive method which allows for greater depreciation 
deductions in the early years of an asset’s ownership and then peters out in the later 
years. 
Of the data collected by the AER as part of their voluntary data collection, entities 
provided details of their tax fixed asset registers and the depreciation methods 
utilised. PwC collated this data in their expert advice. It was found that the private 




 Ibid 7. 
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sector had a higher rate of adoption of the diminishing value method, whereas the 
NTER had a very low rate of adoption of diminishing value depreciation. 
The tables from the PwC report have been reproduced below. 
In the privately-owned electricity network companies, the depreciation method 
adopted is as illustrated in Figure 23. 
 
PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 76.621 
The above table indicates that, of the total tax asset registers carried by the privately-
owned electricity network businesses who voluntarily provided their information, 
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 PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice, above n 617, 76. 
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60.42% of assets were depreciated using the diminishing value method, and 33.31% 
of the assets were depreciated using the prime cost method. 
The NTER electricity network companies presented their depreciation methods is 
illustrated in Figure 24, below. 
 
PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 77.622 
The above table indicates that, of the total tax asset registers carried by the NTER 
entity network businesses which voluntarily provided their information, 96.05% of 
assets were depreciated using the prime cost method, and the diminishing value 
method was utilised for only 3.82% of total assets. 
The difference in depreciation method adopted by NTER and privately-owned 
electricity network entities is materially different. It could be a potential indicator 
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that NTER entities are indeed less efficient than their privately-owned counterparts, 
especially in this instance, where tax laws allow for the selection of either method, 
and one method (diminishing value) is clearly more favourable as it allows more tax 
deductions to be claimed upfront. This is especially beneficial to an organisation 
because tax depreciation is not adjusted for the time value of money. However, it 
might also be an indicator that where the State and Territory Treasuries dictated the 
method used by NTER entities, there would have been a preference for the prime 
cost method because it maximised the tax returned to those State and Territory 
Treasuries. 
6.5.2.2 Privatisation and M&A costs 
There has been a lot of privatisation and merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in 
the electricity sector in recent years. As a result of these activities, newly privatised 
electricity network companies have been able to deduct expenses like stamp duty 
involved in the transaction, and costs of the transaction (legal expenses, accounting 
fees, and so on). These additional expenses have, in part, driven the lower amount of 
tax paid by the private sector. 
6.5.2.3 Carry forward tax losses 
A number of privately-owned electricity network businesses have tax losses carried 
forward, which minimised the amount of tax those companies paid. The availability 




PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 31.623 
The above indicates a very high level of tax losses available to the private sector. The 
cause of these losses was not specified in the report, but it could be due to the high 
costs of privatisation and M&A activities. 
6.5.3 Case study: A comparison of the tax allowance and tax paid in 
the energy sector 
This section of the thesis seeks to draw on the work undertaken by the AER to date, 
and to test this to a greater level of detail than provided in the Issues Paper. In doing 
so, this research aims to prove that the tax allowance set by the price regulator is not 
an adequate replacement for the NTER. It will further prove that the tax allowance is 
not an adequate indicator of tax payable in either the public or private sectors. 
As part of the AER review into the regulatory tax allowance, the AER engaged PwC 
to analyse data received as part of the voluntary information requests and to provide 
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249 
 
an expert opinion and advice around the difference between tax paid and the tax 
allowance. The report was released on 26 October 2018 and did not include analysis 
for all electricity network companies, but rather only those which had voluntarily 
provided data as part of the AER’s information request. 
There were a number of limitations in PwC’s report, the main one being that 
regulated and unregulated activities were not separated. Regulated activities are those 
activities for which the AER (or any price regulator) sets prices and provides a tax 
allowance. Unregulated activities are those activities for which there is a competitive 
market and, as such, there is no need for the price regulator to provide a price as the 
competitive market for those services is able to determine the most efficient price to 
be charged. PwC’s report compared the tax allowance provided for regulated 
activities, with the total tax paid from the entities’ tax returns for all activities – 
regulated and unregulated. In this way, the PwC analysis is not comparing like for 
like. 
However, for the purposes of this exercise, this serves the case study well. The 
proposition being made in this thesis is to abolish the NTER, thereby removing the 
tax paid according to what is calculated in the tax return, and replacing it instead 
with a tax payment based on the tax allowance. This would involve the removal of 
tax paid on all activities – both regulated and unregulated, and instead replacing that 
with a tax allowance based on only regulated activities. 
6.5.3.1 NTER entities 
The tax paid compared to the tax allowance for NTER entities which participated in 




PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 30.624 
This table indicates that NTER entities paid far more tax than the tax allowance 
provided by the AER allowed. NTER entities paid well over double the tax 
allowance in actual tax payments. This table alone indicates that if the NTER were to 
be abolished and instead replaced with tax payments based on the tax allowance, 
State and Territory Treasuries would receive significantly less in tax equivalent 
payments than they are currently receiving. 
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If the tax allowance is based on the theoretical efficient, well-managed, privately-
owned organisation, and the NTER tax payments returned a result that was so 
materially higher than the tax allowance, it could be argued that this is because the 
NTER entities are not efficient in the management of their tax affairs. 
6.5.3.2 Privately-owned entities 
Following on from the above section, it could be expected then, that an actual 
privately-owned, well-managed organisation would return a result which showed tax 
payable to be similar to the tax allowance. 
The tax paid compared to the tax allowance for privately-owned entities which 





PwC, AER Tax Review 2018: Expert Advice (2018) 29.625 
The above table indicated the exact opposite of the NTER – that average tax paid by 
the electricity network companies in the private sector was less than half for two of 
the years surveyed, and for the other two years surveyed, the privately-owned 
network companies paid no tax at all. The reasons for this are discussed in section 
6.5.2: Comparison of tax paid in the AER Review of Regulatory Tax Approach 
2018. 
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For the purposes of this study, the above clearly illustrates that the tax allowance 
provided by the price regulator is not an accurate indicator of taxes paid in either the 
privately-owned or the publicly-owned sectors, and therefore should not be used a 
replacement for a tax function in the State-owned sector. Further, it was not even a 
near-accurate measure of tax payments made by either sector. The possible reasons 
for this were outlined in section 6.5.2 above. 
Therefore, when considering the proposition that the NTER is not needed if the 
pricing regulator already calculates a tax allowance based on what would be payable 
if an organisation were efficient, it can be seen that this would not be a suitable 
replacement for the NTER. In addition to the reasons outlined above, the price 
regulator calculates the tax allowance on a forecast basis and does not often allow a 
true-up for tax in the previous price path. Also, the price regulator fails to adequately 
account for the complexities of the tax system and makes assumptions around 
gearing and interest rates which often vary from the actual. As outlined above, the 
tax allowance was not an accurate reflection of tax paid by the private sector. As 
such, it is not an adequate replacement for a system of tax neutrality. 
6.5.4 Imputation credits and the setting of prices 
Price regulators include imputation credits in their setting of prices. This is included 
as a gamma (γ) in the price setting formulas. The reason imputation credits are 
included in the setting of prices is because they have value to investors in the form of 
offsetting personal tax liabilities.626 The price regulator aims to reflect this value that 
investors place on the imputation credits in its price determinations. 
The tax allowance is adjusted for imputation credits as follows: 
 Tax allowance = taxable income x tax rate(1 – γ)627 
The gamma is set between 1 and 0, and the rate used can have a material impact on 
the tax allowance received by the regulated entity. IPART notes that “a lower gamma 
increases the tax liability, which in turn increases the notional revenue, while a 
higher gamma value decreases the notional revenue.”628 This value, while not 
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relating to a difference in income and deductions allowed in the tax allowance and 
actual income and deductions in the tax return, still can result in one of the main 
differences between tax allowed and tax paid. 
So why would imputation credits be taken into account, especially since the price 
regulator is setting prices for entities that are in a monopoly industry, and so do not 
have competition from privately owned companies? The reason lies in the 
benchmarks that price regulators use. As discussed in this chapter, regulated entities 
are benchmarked on the basis of efficient privately-owned organisations.  
Therefore, are regulated NTER entities disadvantaged by the pricing process since 
they are not privately owned? It has been shown above that allowing for imputation 
credits in the price determination of a State-owned corporation accounts for one of 
the main differences between the tax allowance and tax paid for these entities. 
Indeed, Handley states that the gamma is the company tax that is returned to 
shareholders as an imputation credit.629 If no imputation credits are returned to 
shareholders, as is the case in the NTER (refer to section 4.1.5), then could this be 
argued to be a limitation of the NTER when taken in the context of price regulation?  
Although it may appear that NTER entities which are also subject to price regulation 
are at a disadvantage when it comes to the treatment of imputation credits, a vital 
piece of the puzzle has been missing in the research and papers written about the 
topic to date. That is, that the shareholder (in the case of NTER entities, the owner 
State or Territory Treasury) actually receives the tax in the form of a tax equivalent. 
State and Territory Treasuries might not receive, or have a use for, imputation 
credits, but they do receive the actual tax in the form of tax equivalent payments 
made by the NTER entities. This is similar to the value an individual with no other 
income receives from an imputation credit. An individual with no other income is 
able to claim a refund for the full amount of the imputation credit (assuming that 
total income is below the tax-free threshold). So too, does the Treasury in question, 
receive the full benefit of the imputation credit, although, rather than the income 
stream being recognised as an imputation credit, it is in the form of a tax equivalent 
payment. 
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6.5.4.1 Imputation credits in the comparison of the tax allowance to the tax paid 
As discussed above, when setting the tax allowance, the price regulator allows an 
adjustment for gamma, which is included to reflect the advantage that investors 
receive by way of imputation credits available from company tax paid. This 
adjustment for gamma in the tax allowance has no corresponding adjustment in the 
tax paid as part of the tax return. 
Therefore, in order to enable a like-for-like comparison, the method of comparing the 
tax allowance to tax paid needs to start with the removal of the effect of the 





AER calc of estimated taxable income Actual taxable income per tax return 
  
Tax at 30% (a) Tax at 30% - This is the tax payable 
  
(Less: Imputation credits)  
  
 = Tax allowance  
 
As can be seen from the above table, in order to compare like-with-like, the AER 
needs to compare the difference between the tax allowance before the application of 
any imputation credits. This is illustrated as (a) in the table above. This is because the 
tax payable as the ATO calculates it does not recognise a similar imputation credit 
adjustment in the tax return. Therefore, the basis of calculation of gamma, or the 
value that gamma (whether 0 or 1, or anywhere between) is given when arriving at 
the tax allowance is irrelevant – the effect gamma needs to be removed before any 
comparison of tax paid to tax allowance.  
6.6 Conclusion: Why the tax allowance is not be a 
suitable replacement for the tax payable 
Two case studies involved comparing key financial ratios and data of NTER entities 
and their privately-owned counterparts. After comparing data from each entity’s 
annual report or financial statement to determine the tax effect of the NTER, the last 
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of the case studies involved comparing data provided in the ATO’s Tax 
Transparency reports, and additional data provided by a number of entities in their 
own tax transparency releases.  
To sum up, the progress of the AER review into the regulatory tax approach was 
discussed. This review also found that the NTER entities paid more tax than their 
privately-owned counterparts (in the electricity network sector) and attempted to give 
some high-level reasons for this. In time, the AER will undertake further studies into 
this and attempt to give more solid reasons for the variance. 
There has been considerable media coverage about the variance between the tax 
allowance determined by the price regulator and the tax paid by the regulated entity 
and, at the time of writing, this is subject to review by the AER. This thesis examined 
the difference from the perspective of using the tax allowance as a replacement for 
the tax payments made by State-owned entities. Rather than having the 
administrative burden of administering a tax equivalent regime, in addition to the 
compliance costs associated with preparing tax returns, and so on, it was explored 
whether the tax allowance determined by the regulator could instead replace the 
actual tax paid. Tax law and price regulation are based on two different frameworks. 
It has been demonstrated through other research papers, government reviews, case 
studies, and submissions to the AER’s Review of Regulatory Tax Approach that, by 
nature of price regulation in Australia, there will always be a difference not only 
between the tax allowance and tax paid, but also between all forecasts of expenses 
and actual expenses. This is an intended consequence of regulation and is not 
necessarily an indicator of an underlying issue or problem. Rather, the differences 
highlight that the function of price regulation is vastly different to the function of the 
tax law. Price regulation seeks to determine what is efficient, and provides an 
incentive for regulated entities to attempt to match or better that for their gain during 
the price path. However, tax law seeks to tax actual results within the confines of tax 
law. Further, where the price regulator considers only the monopoly segment of the 
business which needs to be regulated to ensure efficient costs are charged to 
customers, the tax system considers this as part of a usually much larger scope, 
especially where consolidated groups and overseas related party transactions are 





This thesis examined the effectiveness of the National Tax Equivalent Regime 
(NTER) in encouraging competitive neutrality. In order to answer this question, the 
central objectives of this research were: 
• To evaluate how effective a tool the NTER is in achieving competitive 
neutrality, and 
• Whether other methods could be more effective. 
In order to address the objectives, the thesis: 
• Provides an outline and history of the NTER and competitive neutrality; 
• Defines what is meant by “competitive neutrality” in this context; 
• Identifies alternative tools to achieve competitive neutrality and examine 
whether they were also subject to variation from to state due to differences 
arising from the workings of each State’s Treasury; 
• Examines a different existing regulatory structure and the impact it has on 
competitive neutrality; 
• Determines why tax was the policy used to achieve competitive neutrality in 
this circumstance; and 
• Looks at whether or not another tool (instead of tax) could have been more 
effective or appropriate. 
7.2 Chapter conclusions 
Chapter 1 gave a brief introduction to the thesis and background to the issues being 
studied, and the existing legislation and frameworks in which the NTER operates. It 
also outlined the significance of the research and the research methods which were 
used in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 gave an outline and history of the NTER and competitive neutrality. It 
outlined the reasons for the need for a national competition policy and tax neutrality 
and provided a timeline on how the Hilmer Report recommendations were 
implemented, and the successive Harper Review. In addition, it considered the 
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OECD recommendations into competitive neutrality. Lastly, this chapter considered 
the benefits of the National Competition Policy and criticisms of the Hilmer Report. 
Chapter 3 provided a further literature review, encompassing the definition of 
competitive neutrality and drawing on alternative tools for achieving competitive 
neutrality. This chapter considered who should be subject to competitive neutrality 
measures and touched on privatisation (an issue which was expanded in later 
chapters).  
Chapter 4 examined key features of the NTER, the dividend setting policies that 
State and Territory Treasuries employed in the calculation of dividends to be paid by 
State-owned corporations, and the taxation of the public sector outside of what is 
covered by the NTER. It was the first chapter to use case studies to demonstrate how 
NTER entities were advantaged over their privately-owned counterparts. Such 
advantage occurred firstly, by the ability of NTER entities to seek a letter from the 
ATO which allows tax treatment that does not strictly comply with tax legislation 
and, secondly, by being able to apply prospective rather than retrospective treatment 
when the ATO issued ATOIDs outlining the tax treatment of capitalised labour. 
Chapter 5 began by examining two different regulatory structures and the effect they 
had on competitive neutrality. The first was debt neutrality, and it was found that 
NTER entities are required to borrow from their State or Territory treasury despite 
there being alternative financing options available in the market. In order to 
counteract any advantages that government businesses might have by borrowing 
from the State, entities are required to pay government guarantee fees or debt 
neutrality adjustments. These government guarantee fees or debt neutrality 
adjustments are intended to ensure that State-owned corporations meet competitive 
neutrality requirements relating to debt. 
Chapter 5 followed with a case study to examine the effect on financial ratios if tax 
equivalent payments were to be abolished, and instead replaced with larger dividend 
payments to the State (section 5.2.4). As tax is classified as an expense and dividends 
are a return on equity, this case study found that there would be a material difference 
to the financial ratios resulting in a competitive advantage to State-owned 
corporations if they were not subject to tax. A single payment to the State or 
Territory Treasury cannot replace the current tax and dividend payment. Nor can a 
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tax payment be abolished in favour of an increased dividend. Either course of action 
would result in the distortion of the financial ratios and indicate a level of 
profitability that is not accurate. It would also result in incomparable financial 
statements between the private and public sectors. 
Further, chapter 5 compared the financial results for NTER entities with their 
privately-owned counterparts (section 5.3). However, the research appears to indicate 
that State-owned corporations are at a disadvantage, or at least less efficient when 
compared to their private sector ownership in some key areas. When State-owned 
corporations were compared to their privately-owned counterparts in the electricity 
industry, it was found that they pay more tax as both a percentage of profit and as a 
percentage of total revenue. In addition, State-owned corporations paid more 
dividends to their shareholders than their privately-owned counterparts, both as a 
percentage of net profit after tax, and as a percentage of total equity. 
Chapter 6 considered the role of price regulators in determining the prices allowed to 
be charged by businesses in sectors which are natural monopolies. This chapter 
considered whether the tax allowance set by a price regulator would make an 
adequate replacement for a tax neutrality regime. It was found that the two 
frameworks – the one in which prices are set, and the tax law framework - are too 
different to allow for the NTER to be abolished and instead be replaced with the tax 
payments based on the tax allowance calculated by the price regulators. In addition, 
the chapter covered the Australian Energy Regulator’s Review into the Regulatory 
Tax Approach, and how this work is relevant to this thesis. 
Additional comparisons of tax transparency data and the comparison of tax paid in 
the AER Review of Regulatory Tax Approach both supported the view that NTER 
entities do pay more tax than their privately-owned counterparts. Some of the reasons 
were due to more conservative tax treatments (for example, the use of the prime cost 
depreciation method instead of diminishing value depreciation) and others were due 
to the nature of the NTER (for example, the inability of NTER entities to structure 
their tax in order to minimise tax). 
7.3 Significance of research 
Although the NTER has been in place since 2001, this is an area which has not been 
subject to any research. 
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This thesis contributes to knowledge on whether the tax allowance could be a 
substitute to the National Tax Equivalent Regime. This research compared the tax 
payments made to the tax allowance allowed by the price regulator. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) considered removing the 
tax allowance and replacing it with an allowance for total tax paid. In doing so, work 
that was done overlapped with studies being undertaken as part of this research. I 
was able to act as an independent adviser and submitted papers to the AER review 
and attended forums to discuss the potential pros and cons of options in closing the 
gaps between the tax allowance and tax paid. 
This thesis has also examined the effect on the financial ratios of the removal of the 
tax equivalent payments and replacing these with a single payment to the owner State 
or Territory Treasury. The contribution to knowledge was through the illustration of 
how the comparability of financial statements between companies in the same 
industry would change if the tax expense was instead classified as a return on equity 
(by way of greater dividend). 
A further contribution to knowledge has been through the quantification of the effect 
of the tax exemptions granted under paragraph 103 of the NTER Manual on gains 
made on the privatisation of state-owned businesses. 
7.4 Limitations of the study 
7.4.1 Industries studied 
This research examined whether the National Tax Equivalent Regime (NTER) 
achieved its goal of competitive neutrality only in the water and electricity sectors. 
The NTER operates across a number of other industries, not all of which involve 
infrastructure and large capital investment. 
7.4.2 Electricity industry 
Many of the privatised entities in the electricity industry are operating through a 
consortium, meaning that there was no publicly available annual reports or financial 
statements. Therefore, the studies were completed using only a small number of 
players in the industry, although they were companies with influence in the industry. 
However, despite the small number of participants studied in the case study in 
chapter 5, findings were also supported by a larger case study in section 6.5, and by 
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the data and findings PwC collated through the AER’s collection of data during its 
Review of Regulatory Tax Allowance. 
7.4.3 Consolidated financial statements 
The analysis of financial statements relied on consolidated figures which often 
related to a number of subsidiaries operating in more than one sector. However, 
entities selected were those in which their main operations were in the same sectors 
and industries. 
7.5 Areas for further research 
7.5.1 Comparison of the tax paid to the tax allowed by the price 
regulator 
This issue is currently the subject of a study and investigation by the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER), as discussed in section 6.4.4. At the time of writing, this is 
yet to be completed. The comparison of the difference between the tax paid and the 
tax allowance provided by the price regulator will be easier to compare and analyse 
once the AER puts in place a more detailed information gathering requirement on its 
regulated entities. These additional information requirements will mean that privately 
owned electricity consortiums which do not currently have any publicly available 
published financial statements or annual reports will be able to be more closely 
scrutinised. 
7.5.2 Extension of the case studies 
The main industries studied in this thesis were the water and electricity sectors. 
Areas for further research could include expanding beyond these two industries to 
determine whether similar results would be found in other industries that have been 
privatised or other industries which contain both State-owned and privately-owned 
players. 
7.5.3 Debt neutrality 
In the case study which compared the total interest paid to the total borrowings in 
section 5.3.3 it was revealed that the state-owned corporations paid higher interest 
compared to total borrowings than the private sector. This higher rate of interest 
could potentially indicate an issue with debt neutrality. Although government 
guarantee fees are put in place in the State-owned sector to ensure that State-owned 
corporations do not benefit from their government ownership by having access to 
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lower debt costs, it is possible that they are paying too much. This is an area for 
further research. Also, the State and Territory Governments might want to consider 
lifting the restrictions on State-owned corporations being allowed to borrow only 
from their State or Territory Treasury Corporation. As discussed earlier, there is a 
multitude of borrowing and financing options available in the market so that this 
restriction could go against the principle of competitive neutrality. However, from a 
State perspective, requiring all State-owned entities to borrow through the State 
results in the State being able to negotiate cheaper borrowing from its own lenders 
due to size of borrowings and economies of scale. 
7.5.4 Privatisation 
Chapter 5 provided an overview of privatisation and drew on experiences overseas. It 
examined the differences between NTER entities and their privatised counterparts 
and found that NTER entities pay more tax, more dividends, a higher overall rate of 
interest, and had less expenses per dollar of revenue earned. For this reason, further 
work could be done around privatised NTER entities, and whether privatisation of 
NTER entities has been successful in Australia. 
7.5.5 Privatisation and price regulation 
Although outside the scope of this thesis, section 5.1.2.4 quoted a report by The 
Australia Institute which stated that the private sector would pay more for assets in a 
monopoly market as there is potential to earn more from these assets due to the lack 
of competition in the market. The result of paying above market value also comes 
with additional borrowings which also need to be funded by increased prices.630 This 
could be an area for further work to determine whether the high electricity prices are 
due to above-market prices paid by the private sector.  
7.6 Recommendations 
7.6.1 Who should be subject to the NTER 
Section 3.1.8.1: Definition of Government Entity provided case law guidelines about 
what constituted a government business. In section 2.13: The National Tax 
Equivalent Regime (NTER), it was found that it is the decision of owner State and 
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Territory governments to nominate which government businesses should be subject 
to tax equivalents and nominated for inclusion into the NTER. 
Rather than enabling the owner State or Territory governments to decide which 
government businesses should be included in the NTER, it is a recommendation of 
this thesis that a more definitive guideline based on case law and OECD 
recommendations be put in place. This guideline could be included as part of the 
NTER Manual and be administered by the ATO. This removes the possible conflict 
of interest involved where a State or Territory government has the power to decide 
the tax status of its own businesses. 
7.6.2 “Letters of comfort” from the ATO 
Section 4.4.1: Letter from the ATO described circumstances in which the NTER 
section of the ATO will issue a “letter of comfort” to an NTER entity about the tax 
treatment of a scheme or arrangement. These “letters of comfort” allow an agreed tax 
treatment that might not necessarily comply with the strict letter of tax law, 
especially in times where applying the tax treatment required under tax law could 
contravene competitive neutrality. Examples include agreements which provided for 
the private sector to benefit from favourable tax treatment at the expense of the SOC, 
made during a time where the SOC was not subject to any tax equivalent regimes. 
These letters are largely provided confidentially, and details are not permitted to be 
disclosed to any third parties. 
A recommendation of this thesis is that there should be more transparency by both 
the ATO and State and Territory Treasuries around agreements of this type. The 
NTER Administrator should consider publishing them as an appendix to the NTER. 
7.6.3 Tax decisions made by State and Territory governments 
Potential conflict of interest has been outlined as an issue where governments have a 
hand in decisions made which in turn can impact the amount of dividends they 
receive. For example, Infrastructure Australia noted that there was a potential 
conflict of interest where governments regulated and managed their own assets and 
“governments can be tempted to make sub-optimal regulatory decisions to protect 
their dividends from the asset.”631 This conflict of interest could clearly be seen in 
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the administration of the NTER. The NTER required that all State and Territory 
Treasuries agree on how tax outcomes would be treated in the NTER. This allowed 
State and Territories to have input into decisions which would ultimately impact the 
amount of tax they received. This outcome was illustrated in the case study which 
compared the State-owned corporations to their privately-owned counterparts and 
found that State-owned corporation paid both more tax and more dividends overall 
than privately owned companies. It is recommended that a structure is put in place to 
eliminate this conflict of interest. State and Territory treasuries should not be in a 
position to have input into decisions which ultimately impacts the amount of tax they 
receive from NTER entities. It is recommended that the NTER Administrator should 
make decisions that have tax implications based on current tax laws. 
7.6.4 CGT neutral treatment of government-imposed restructure 
and privatisations 
Certain government-imposed restructures and privatisations are permitted to be 
treated in a tax neutral manner under paragraph 103 of the NTER Manual. This was 
first discussed in section 4.1.2: Government imposed restructures or privatisations. 
Further, a case study relating to the privatisations of Ausgrid and Transgrid 
quantified the effect of this tax neutral treatment on key financial ratios in section 
5.1.3: Privatisation of Ausgrid and Transgrid. 
The effect of the ATO granting rulings that saw these privatisations treated in a tax-
neutral manner was quantified and found to be material. It is a recommendation of 
this thesis that no transfers or privatisation should be treated in a tax neutral manner. 
Privately-owned companies are taxable on merger and acquisition type transactions, 
so NTER entities should not receive a tax exemption by virtue of their public sector 
ownership, even if that transfer is being made to another State-owned entity which 
does not have commercial returns as a primary objective. The ATO should consider 
removing this paragraph from the NTER Manual, or restricting its application. 
7.6.5 Additional ways to improve tax neutrality 
NTER entities are currently exempt from providing tax transparency data. The 
requirement to provide tax transparency data should apply to the NTER, in the same 
manner it applies to the private sector entities. The ATO should consider requiring 
NTER entities to provide tax transparency data. 
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In addition, where a tax decision is made that requires possible prospective treatment 
(for example, capitalised labour, discussed in section 4.4.2), the treatment should be 
consistent for both NTER entities and the private sector. If privately owned entities 
are required to amend the prior four years tax returns and pay any tax outstanding, 
the same should be required of the NTER entities. The ATO should ensure 
consistency between privately owned and publicly owned entities.  
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a summary of the findings of this thesis and included 
limitations, areas for further research, and recommendations. This thesis set out to 
examine whether the NTER had achieved its goal of competitive neutrality, and 
consider whether any other method could be more effective. Overall, it was found 
that the NTER has been vital in ensuring that competitive neutrality requirements are 
met. However, it has also been found that there are areas of improvement which 
could be introduced. One of these areas of improvement relates to instances where 
the State or Territory Treasury can influence the amount of tax paid by an NTER 
entity by either allowing or disallowing certain tax treatments. Also, the NTER could 
be administered in such a way that results in NTER entities not being allowed 
advantages over their privately-owned counterparts, for example, the letters allowing 
more lenient tax treatment, and the tax neutral treatment of privatisations.  
When NTER entities were compared to their private sector counterparts, it was found 
that NTER entities paid more tax, both as a percentage of profit, and as a percentage 
of total revenue. NTER entities also paid more dividends to their shareholders, both 
as a percentage of net profit after tax, and as a percentage of total equity. Further, as 
part of its Review of Regulatory Tax Approach, the AER study supported the 
conclusion that NTER entities do pay more tax than their privately-owned 
counterparts. Some of the reasons for this are due to inefficiencies, for example, 
using the prime cost method of depreciation as opposed to diminishing value where it 
is available. Other reasons are due to the nature of the NTER, and NTER entities 
being unable to structure their tax in the same manner as privately-owned businesses. 
At the time of writing, the AER review was completed in December 2018. However, 
the full extent of the difference between tax paid by State-owned and privately 
owned corporations will not be available until the AER has received the reporting 
data now mandatory from these corporations. 
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It was found that tax neutrality cannot be abandoned in favour of a larger dividend 
payment because doing so would distort the financial ratios and would indicate a 
level of profitability that would not be a true reflection of the overall financial health 
of the business. In addition, the current regime of basing tax neutrality payments on 
current tax laws cannot be replaced by tax neutrality payments based on the tax 
allowance set by a price regulator. It was found that the tax allowance is set in too 
different a framework, and is subject to variation according to the price regulator. 
Overall, the NTER has been a very good regime for achieving tax neutrality, 
although it can be improved by implementing a number of recommendations outlined 
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9.2 The States’ definitions of competitive neutrality 
The following outlines the competitive neutrality definition taken by each state: 
9.2.1 New South Wales 
“The application of competitive neutrality principles is aimed at eliminating 
any net competitive advantages accruing to government businesses as a result 
of their public sector ownership. Such action removes potential market 
distortions and promotes an efficient allocation of resources between public 
and private businesses. 
Typically, the application of competitive neutrality principles may require 
adjustments to the price of a good or service that make allowance for the 
following: 
• taxes that may not be paid by a government business but would be paid by a 
private sector 
competitor; 
• the cost of capital; 
• any other material costs not borne by a government business purely as a result 
of its 
public ownership status.”632 
9.2.2 Victoria 
The principle of competitive neutrality requires that ‘government owned businesses 
competing with private sector businesses should compete on the same footing: 
business activities of government owned bodies should not enjoy any net competitive 
advantage simply as a result of their public sector ownership.’633 This includes 
making both government owned business and privately-owned entities subject to the 
same taxation and regulatory regimes. 
                                               
632
 New South Wales Treasury, Policy statement on the application of competitive neutrality, (2002) 
1. <http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/3868/tpp02-1.pdf> 
633
 Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic), Guide to National Competition Policy, above n 1, 19. 
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“It is common for private businesses (including both for profit and not-for 
profit entities) to coexist with government businesses in a variety of markets. 
They do not always compete on equal terms. Such inequalities arise from a 
variety of circumstances and it is the goal of competitive neutrality policy to 
offset these where appropriate. The inequalities of concern arise from 
differences in tax treatment, differences in the need to provide a return on 
investment, and related cost advantages or disadvantages which might impact 
on the prices that are set by government businesses. The aim of competitive 
neutrality policy is to account for these factors in such a way that where 
governments undertake significant business activities in markets, they do so on 
a fair and equitable basis. Competitive neutrality policy measures are designed 
to achieve a fair market environment without interfering with the innate 
differences in size, assets, skills and organisational culture which are inherent 
in the economy. Differences in workforce skills, equipment and managerial 
competence, which contribute to differing efficiency across organisations, are 
not the concern of competitive neutrality policy.”634 
9.2.3 Queensland 
“Competitive neutrality refers to the process of identifying and, where 
appropriate, removing any advantages (and disadvantages) that may accrue to a 
Government business by virtue of its Government ownership. Once this has 
been achieved the Government business competes on the same basis as its 
competitors.”635 
9.2.4 Western Australia 
“The application of competitive neutrality involves the introduction of 
measures which effectively neutralise any net competitive advantage flowing 
from government ownership. Its objective is to foster the allocation of 
resources in the economy to where they can be used to their best effect. It is 
important to realise that the implementation of competitive neutrality should 
not be at the expense of social welfare and equity, economic and regional 
development, or the interests of a class of consumers or consumers generally. 
Government can still pursue social and economic development objectives, but 
                                               
634 Ibid 4.  
635 Queensland Treasury, National Competition Policy Implementation in Queensland, above n 18, 9. 
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needs to do so through more transparent measures. This highlights that 
competition is not an objective in its own right but is desirable for the broader 
benefits it brings to the community.”636 
9.2.5 South Australia 
“Competitive neutrality policy applies to the business activities of publicly 
owned entities, that is the business activities of Government that are producing 
goods and/or services for sale in the market place with the intention of making 
a profit and providing financial returns to their owners.  
The objective of the competitive neutrality policy is to remove competitive 
advantages and disadvantages that arise solely through the ownership 
differences between public sector and private sector organisations..”637 
9.2.6 Northern Territory 
“Competitive neutrality aims to create a level playing field by removing 
resource allocation distortions so no net competitive advantage is held by 
government businesses as a direct result of public ownership. When properly 
implemented, the range of reforms aims to create a competitively neutral 
environment.  
The Territory has already adopted a range of reform measures based on the 
principles of competitive neutrality including cost-reflective pricing, 
corporatisation and commercialisation, which are discussed later in this 
statement.”638 
9.2.7 Tasmania 
“Competitive neutrality aims to promote the efficient use of resources in public 
sector business activities by removing any net competitive advantage that 
businesses may have solely as a result of public ownership. Government 
businesses must pay debt guarantee fees and make income tax equivalent and 
                                               
636
 Government of Western Australia, Policy Statement on Competitive Neutrality, above n 20, 2. 
637 Department of Treasury and Finance (SA), A guide to the implementation of Competitive 
Neutrality Policy, (2010) 1. <https://www.dpc.sa.gov.au/documents/rendition/B18578>  
638
 Department of Treasury and Finance (NT), Competitive Neutrality, (2018) 4. 
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dividend payments to the State Government under the Government Business 
Enterprises Act 1995.”639 
Tasmania also provides guidelines for local councils which participate in 
significant business activities. 
  
                                               





9.3 Criteria the State and Territory Governments 
use to determine whether competitive neutrality 
measures should apply640 
 
                                               
640
 Based on Andrew Trembath, Competitive Neutrality: Scope for Enhancement, (National 
Competition Council Staff Discussion Paper, AusInfo, Canberra, 2002). 
  Cth NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT 
                    
Government business activities:                 
User charging                   
An actual or potential competitor                   
Allow managers a degree of independence in production 
or supply, and price decisions                   
Have some form of government ownership                 
Engaged in trading in goods and/or services                 
Have a large measure of self-sufficiency                 
Result in the sale of goods or services to a purchaser through an arms length 
contract               
Are set up such that users make a significant contribution to costs               
Fall within the ABS definition of a PFE or PTE         
Also 
GBE     
Charge users for goods and services                 
Required to recover all or significant proportion of the costs from supply of goods or services           
Have a commercial or profit making focus               
Extend to the provision of goods and services to other parts of the public sector     
Include specialist activities located within Govt depts, separate legal entities such as statutory authorities and Territory-
owned corporations     
May include CSOs that private organisations could provide under contract       
Recover a proportion of costs through user charges             
Supply good and services to external client or to the state government         
                    
                    
Significant business activities include:                 
All GBEs and their subsidiaries                   
Other share-limited trading companies                   
All designated business units                   
Other activities that are businesses and have commercial 
receipts >$10m/pa                   
State-owned corporations                   
Other businesses monitored by NSW Treasury                 
The importance of competition in their relevant market (size of the business 
activity in the relevant market)               
The costs of providing the goods and services (the extent of user charging)               
The scale of operation (generally >$10m threshold)             
The impact of poor performance on the state economy             
The significance of their market to the WA economy             
Cat 1: Earn revenue >$2m, assets >$20m               
Cat 2: All other significant businesses                 




They are a separate legal entity                 
Predominant activity is trading goods and services             
Commercial or profit making focus                 
Actual or potential impact on the relevant market             
Significant business activities                   
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9.4 Circumstances around the issue of an ATO letter 
This appendix has been removed as it is commercial in confidence and subject to the 




9.5 Sample letter from the ATO 
This appendix has been removed as it is commercial in confidence and subject to the 
confidentiality restrictions noted in section 4.1.1. 
 
